“Democratic institutions must constantly gain and regain the citizens’ trust. We must live up to the new challenges that history always puts before us. Just like Europeans did when millions of Ukrainians came knocking on their door. This is Europe at its best. A Union of determination and solidarity.”

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission

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Charting the course for the year ahead
In her State of the Union address on 14 September 2022, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen outlined flagship initiatives which the Commission plans to undertake in the coming year. Many of them are made in response to recommendations citizens made through the Conference on the Future of Europe.
The initiatives among others include:

Continuing to strongly support Ukraine and its people, including by mobilising the full power of the EU’s Single Market
Putting in place measures to support Europeans in weathering the energy crisis
Supporting the business environment, particularly small and medium enterprises, to strengthen Europe’s future competitiveness
Cutting the EU’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels, and working closely with reliable suppliers
Investing further in renewable energy and hydrogen in particular
Leading globally on climate adaptation and protecting our nature
Continuing to stand up for democracy, at home and across the world, and for the rule of law

Compliments of the European Commission.
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Women and men shop differently and have different perceptions of prices and inflation. This ECB Blog post examines how inflation expectations are formed and revised across gender and why that matters for central banks.
Women tend to have higher inflation expectations than men. As these differences are well documented across the world, we have used results from the ECB’s new Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) to shed light on certain factors which can explain some of the gender inflation gap. And this gap is quite substantial: the inflation expectations of women and men participating in the CES differed by almost one percentage point.
So, what factors did we find which could explain this gender gap? First, on average, women place more emphasis on perceived food inflation. Second, men are more confident about their inflation expectations. However, when women and men receive new information regarding price changes, while that may differ depending on personal experiences, they will both adjust their inflation expectations at a similar rate and in a similar pattern to each other. As humans we absorb news the same way regardless of our gender, whereas gaps result from different information sets.
But let’s take a step back and look at how we form expectations. Our inflation perception often starts with personal experience in everyday life situations. As consumers, we observe and focus on prices we encounter in our daily routines. We extrapolate these to broader inflation perceptions and eventually shape our expectations for future inflation.[1] This is why our heterogeneous preferences and shopping habits influence the way we perceive and expect inflation to develop. And it might shape perceptions and expectations for women and men differently, also depending on their age.[2]
Food prices have biggest effect on inflation expectations
This pattern is also represented in our findings from the CES. An analysis conducted on the results of the CES shows that the inflation expectations of the average euro area consumer depend on how she or he perceives inflation in all main spending categories: food, health, clothing, transport, utilities and housing services. All of them matter, but perception of food inflation matters the most .[3]
The predominant role of perceived food inflation holds for both women and men but is especially true for women.[4] Moreover, the gender gap in the influence of perceived food inflation on inflation expectations does not exist in consumers aged below 34 and is highest for women aged 35-49. It is estimated that a one-percentage-point increase in perceived food inflation will raise women’s short-term (one-year ahead) inflation expectations by 0.40 percentage points. By contrast, the impact on men’s expectations is 0.26 percentage points – see Chart 1. In reality, the share of food, beverages and tobacco in the price index is actually only 21 percent.[5] When thinking about future inflation, men seem to be more influenced by perceptions of transport, clothing and housing inflation developments. This divide could reflect the allocation of household chores between men and women. And indeed single men and single women aged 35-49 do not substantially differ in the extent to which their perceived food, transport and housing inflation carries on their inflation expectations whereas the divergence is confirmed in couples aged 35-49.[6]

Impact of perceived inflation in single spending category on inflation expectations one-year ahead

Percentage points

Sources: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (CES).
Notes: The chart shows how much impact a one percentage point higher perception of inflation in different spending categories has on one-year ahead inflation expectations for females and males aged 35-49 years old

Women are also more likely to report round numbers in their inflation expectations. Reiche and Meyler (2022) show that people who are more uncertain about the quantitative level of inflation typically report round figures as their inflation expectations.[7] Women are more likely than men to report multiples of 10 or of 5, whereas men are more likely to report either single non-rounded digits or even decimal places. There is also evidence that those who have a negative attitude about the economy tend to be more uncertain about the inflation outlook and to report rounded and higher inflation expectations.
Reassuringly for economic forecasters, the CES also provides data that indicates some interesting ways in which women and men can be predicted to behave in a similar manner. The participants in the survey were asked, on two occasions, about how they perceive inflation in the different spending categories and were also asked for the inflation rate they expected in the future. Their answers show that changes in inflation perceptions move inflation expectations when food, transport and utilities are concerned. Most interestingly, inflation expectations change to the same extent for women and men and in line with these categories’ weight in households’ consumption baskets.[8] In other words: following a similar change of perceived inflation, men and women, regardless of their age, tend to revise their inflation expectations in a similar fashion.
Why does this all matter for monetary policy? Gender indicates our inflation perceptions and perceptions influence behaviours in a myriad of different ways. Related to the different expectations of women and men, there are consequences in real life, for example, how we behave when economic circumstances or financing conditions change. Women might be less prone than men to cancelling, postponing or reducing their holiday plans when energy prices spike or be less influenced by a similar spike when planning to purchase a car. The fallout on aggregate economic activity are self-evident.
Enhancing central bankers’ understanding of how consumers form and update their inflation expectations is important in several ways. It helps identify what type of inflation matters for consumers. It enhances the analysis of the macroeconomic implications of monetary policy decisions and thus ultimately it builds up central banks’ credibility. Gender differences underscore the need for a differentiated communication strategy which can speak to specific experiences. Recently, the Eurosystem has undertaken several initiatives aimed at promoting financial literacy generally and the understanding of inflation specifically. Such initiatives could overcome the cognitive inattention of consumers by stimulating both women and men to broaden the information set upon which their beliefs and actions are grounded. Ultimately, better-informed evaluations of inflation and real interest rate would enable households to take better informed consumption and investment decisions.
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1. Inflation perceptions and expectations are highly influenced by personal experiences, see de Bruin B., W., W. van der Klaauw and G. Topa G, 2011, “Expectations of Inflation: The Biasing Effect of Thoughts about Specific Prices.” Journal of Economic Psychology 32(5): 834-845; Cavallo, A., G. Cruces and R. Perez-Truglia. 2017, “Inflation Expectations, Learning, and Supermarket Prices: Evidence from Survey Experiments” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 9(3): 1-35. Conrad C., Enders Z., Glas A., 2021, “The role of information and experience for households‘ inflation expectations”, Bundesbank Discussion Paper; D’Acunto F., Malmendier U., Ospina J., Weber M., 2021 “Exposure to Grocery Prices and Inflation Expectations”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 129, N. 5;
2. For a further discussion of the gender gap in inflation perceptions and expectations see Jonung L.,1981, Perceived and Expected Rates of Inflation in Sweden”, American Economic Review (Vol. 71, Issue 5); and Arioli et al., 2016, “EU consumers’ quantitative inflation perceptions and expectations: an evaluation”, European Economy – Discussion Papers 2015 – 038, DG ECFIN European Commission.
3. Consumers are asked about perceived changes in the price level over the previous 12 months (perceived inflation) and those expected over the next 12 months (inflation expectations) every month. In December 2021 and March 2022, they were also asked to report perceived price changes over the same horizon in single spending categories. The empirical evidence is obtained estimating inflation expectations 12 months ahead to perceived inflation in the six main spending groupings (three years ahead inflation expectations confirm main findings) and separately revisions in inflation expectations to revisions in perceived inflation in the six spending categories. Effects due to structural factors encompassing time, country, gender, age, attained education, income are controlled for. For further information visit here.
4. Men and women report about the same spending allocation across categories, women perceive higher inflation in each spending category and overall. See also, D’Acunto F. Malmendier U., Weber M.,2021, “Gender roles produce divergent economic expectations”, Proceeding of National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 118, N.21.
5. For weights of main components of the euro area HICP inflation in 2022 see here.
6. See. Flagg, L., Sen, B., Kilgore, M., & Locher, J. (2014). “The influence of gender, age, education and household size on meal preparation and food shopping responsibilities”. Public Health Nutrition, 17(9), 2061-2070
7. The rounding to multiples of 10 or 5 by both males and females is one reason why mean inflation expectations tend to be systematically higher than actual inflation. Reiche, L. and A. Meyler (2022) “Making sense of consumer inflation expectations: the role of uncertainty”, ECB Working Paper Series No 2642, February.
8. See also, Armantier O., Nelson S., Topa G., van der Klaauw W., Zafar B., 2016, “The Price Is Right: Updating Inflation Expectations in a Randomized Price Information Experiment”, The Review of Economics and Statistics (2016) 98 (3): 503–523;.

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Financing of unprecedented EUR 1 billion built-to-sell construction facility including one of the biggest loans ever granted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) under a Project Finance structure
EIB loan backed by the EU’s new InvestEU programme
Further loans from seven commercial banks
More than EUR 2 billion project volume in total for entire renewable energy pipeline in Spain and Portugal with over 50 projects

Aquila Clean Energy EMEA, the clean energy development platform in Europe of Aquila Capital, has closed a EUR 1 billion construction facility, supported by the InvestEU programme. The financing will support the development and construction of Aquila Clean Energy’s entire renewable energy pipeline in Spain and Portugal over the next three years. The projects will be implemented in regions like Castilla y León, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha and Murcia, in Spain, and Setúbal, Coimbra, Evora, Leiria, in Portugal.
The pipeline consists of more than 50 projects of predominately solar photovoltaics (PV) and onshore wind assets, with a total electricity generation capacity of 2.6 giga watts (GW), a volume equivalent to the annual consumption of around 1.4 million households. These projects will have an estimated yield of 5.3 Terawatt-hours per year.
The operation is aligned with the EU’s renewable energy targets and supports Spain and Portugal in meeting their commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the vast majority of investments are expected to be located in the EIB’s cohesion priority regions (91 % according to the project pipeline), thus supporting the economic recovery in these regions which were particularly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
For the construction facility, Santander acted as the Facility and Security Agent. NatWest acted as Documentation Agent and KfW IPEX-Bank as Hedging Documentation Agent. BNP Paribas, ING, Intesa SanPaolo and Banco Sabadell further supported the facility. The debt was significantly oversubscribed, confirming lenders’ strong interest in the financing.
CMS and White & Case (both Hamburg) acted as borrowers’ and lenders’ legal counsel, respectively. Glas SAS in Frankfurt is acting as Administration Agent.
For the EIB, this short-term construction financing is breaking new ground, as the development bank had mainly acted as long-term lender in the infrastructure space in the past. This project was made possible because of an EU budget guarantee under the InvestEU programme, which allows the EIB to increase its risk taking capacity and in this particular case, to assume electricity merchant risk under a non-recourse financing structure as the transaction does not involve any price hedge mechanism such as PPA.
The InvestEU programme follows up on the success of the Investment Plan for Europe and aims to facilitate investments in the EU. The landmark transaction announced today not only increases the renewable energy generation capacity on the Iberian Peninsula significantly, but also contributes to the objectives of the European Green Deal.
A bespoke EUR 1 billion construction facility consists of EUR 400 million credit from EIB – supported by an EU budget guarantee under InvestEU – and EUR 600 million from the consortium of the commercial banks. For the total project volume of over EUR 2 billion, the remaining amount of more than EUR 1 billion comes from funds managed by Aquila Capital.
Valdis Dombrovskis, Executive Vice-President for an Economy that Works for People, said: “Developing the infrastructure that will secure the objectives of the European Green Deal will require significant financial support. InvestEU will play an important role in mobilising the financing. I am delighted that this programme is facilitating a €2 billion investment that will help Spain and Portugal fulfil their green energy potential.”
Susanne Wermter, CEO of Aquila Clean Energy EMEA, emphasises: “We are extremely pleased being able to secure this landmark financing in a market environment which is marked by high inflation, rising interest rates, supply chain issues and the war in the Ukraine. This transaction constitutes the largest financing in the history of Aquila Clean Energy and Aquila Capital. It demonstrates the creditability and appeal of our clean energy assets that aim to actively shape the European energy transition. With the financing now secured, we are opening up additional growth for our company and with the planned assets we will be able to offer our investors further interesting opportunities. I would like to thank all parties involved for their dedication and effort shown over the past twelve months to make this deal work.”
Ricardo Mourinho Félix, EIB Vice-President, highlights: “This construction facility is the first of its kind and a landmark transaction for the EIB. As the EU climate bank, we put sustainable development at the heart of our activities. We are therefore extremely proud of financing this project, through a Green Loan that contributes substantively to Europe’s energy transition and the security of energy supply.”
About Aquila Clean Energy
Aquila Clean Energy EMEA is Aquila Capital´s clean energy platform in Europe. Aquila Clean Energy develops, realizes and operates clean energy assets in the technologies solar, wind, hydropower and battery storage. Currently, Aquila Clean Energy manages a portfolio with a total capacity of more than 8.2GW.
With a local approach and through local teams of experts, Aquila Clean Energy initiates, develops, realizes and operates what we identify as essential assets along the entire value chain and lifetime. Aquila Clean Energy has built a permanent presence in 7 countries with 140 employees, believing that local, on-site management teams are key to the company’s operations.
Aquila Clean Energy is part is part of Aquila Capital, an investment and asset development company focused on generating and managing essential assets on behalf its clients. Currently, Aquila Capital manages nearly 14 billion euros on behalf of institutional investors worldwide. The company has been carbon neutral since 2006 and aims to act carbon negative.
Further information: https://www.aquila-capital.de/en/
About the European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union owned by its Member States. It provides long-term financing for sound investments that contribute to EU policy. The Bank finances projects in four priority areas: infrastructure, innovation, climate and environment, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The EIB recently adopted its Climate Bank Roadmap to deliver on its ambitious agenda to support €1 trillion of climate action and environmental sustainability investments in the decade to 2030 and to allocate more than 50% of its financing to climate action and environmental sustainability by 2025. As part of the roadmap, all new EIB Group operations have been aligned with the goals and principles of the Paris Agreement since 2021.
About the InvestEU Programme
The InvestEU Programme provides the EU with crucial long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of a sustainable recovery. It also helps mobilise private investments for the EU’s policy priorities, such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition. The InvestEU Programme brings together under one roof the multitude of EU financial instruments currently available to support investment in the EU, making funding for investment projects in Europe simpler, more efficient and more flexible. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub, and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is implemented through financial partners who will invest in projects using the EU budget guarantee of €26.2 billion. The entire budgetary guarantee will back the investment projects of the implementing partners, increase their risk-bearing capacity and thus mobilise at least €372 billion in additional investment.
Further information: http://investeu.europa.eu
Compliments of the European Commission.
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The three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA – ESAs) issued today their Autumn 2022 joint risk report. The report highlights that the deteriorating economic outlook, high inflation and rising energy prices have increased vulnerabilities across the financial sectors. The ESAs advise national supervisors, financial institutions and market participants to prepare for challenges ahead.
The post-pandemic economic recovery in Europe has dwindled as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s war on Ukraine and the disruptions in trade caused a rapid deterioration of the economic outlook. It adds to pre-existing inflationary pressures by strongly raising energy- and commodity prices, exacerbates imbalances in supply and demand, and weakens the purchasing power of households. The risk of persistent inflation and stagflation has risen.
These factors, coupled with the deteriorated economic outlook, have significantly impacted the risk environment of the financial sector. Financial market volatility has increased across the board given high uncertainties. After a long period of low interest rates, central banks are tightening monetary policy. The combination of higher financing costs and lower economic output may put pressure on government, corporate and household debt refinancing while also negatively impacting the credit quality of financial institutions’ loan portfolios. The reduction of real returns through higher inflation could lead investors to higher risk-taking at a time when rate rises are setting in motion a far-reaching rebalancing of portfolios.
Financial institutions also face increased operational challenges associated with heightened cyber risks and the implementation of sanctions against Russia. The financial system has to date been resilient despite the increasing political and economic uncertainty.
In light of the above risks and vulnerabilities, the Joint Committee of the ESAs advises national competent authorities, financial institutions and market participants to take the following policy actions:

Financial institutions and supervisors should continue to be prepared for a deterioration in asset quality in the financial sector and monitor developments including in assets that benefitted from temporary measures related to the pandemic and those that are particularly vulnerable to a deteriorating economic environment, to inflation as well as to high energy and commodity prices.
The impact of further increases in policy rates and of potential sudden increases in risk premia on financial institutions and market participants at large should be closely monitored.
Financial institutions and supervisors should closely monitor the impact of inflation risks.
Supervisors should continue to monitor risks to retail investors, in particular with regard to products where consumers may not fully realise the extent of the risks involved, such as crypto-assets.
Financial institutions and supervisors should continue to carefully manage environmental risks and cyber risks to address threats to information security and business continuity.

Contact:

Solveig Kleiveland, Acting Team Leader | press@esma.europa.eu

Compliments of the European Securities and Markets Authority.
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OECD labour markets bounced back strongly from the COVID-19 pandemic, but the global employment outlook is now highly uncertain according to a new OECD report.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has caused lower global growth and higher inflation, with negative impacts on business investment and private consumption.
The OECD Employment Outlook 2022 says that while labour markets remain tight in most OECD countries, lower global growth means employment growth is also likely to slow, while major hikes in energy and commodity prices are generating a cost of living crisis.
Since the low point of the pandemic in April 2020, OECD countries have created about 66 million jobs, 9 million more than those destroyed in a few months at the onset of the pandemic.
The OECD unemployment rate stabilised at 4.9% in July 2022, 0.4 points below its pre-pandemic level recorded in February 2020 and at its lowest level since the start of the series in 2001.
The number of unemployed workers in the OECD continued to fall in July and reached 33.0 million, 2.4 million less than before the pandemic.
Looking at individual countries however, the unemployment rate in July remained higher than before the pandemic in one fifth of OECD countries. In a number of countries, labour force participation and employment rates are also still below pre-crisis levels. Moreover, employment is growing more strongly in high pay service industries, while it remains below pre-pandemic levels in many low pay, contact-intensive industries.
“Rising food and energy prices are taking a heavy toll, in particular on low income households,” OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann said. “Despite widespread labour shortages, real wages growth is not keeping pace with the current high rates of inflation. In this context, governments should consider well targeted, means-tested and temporary support measures. This would help cushion the impact on households and businesses most in need, while limiting inflation impacts and fiscal cost of that policy support,” he said.

Graph is courtesy of the OECD.
Tight labour market conditions mean that companies across the OECD are confronted with unprecedented labour shortages. In the European Union, almost three in ten manufacturing and service firms reported production constraints in the second quarter of 2022 due to a lack of labour.
Nominal wages are not keeping pace with the rapid rise in inflation. The real value of wages is expected to decline over the course of 2022, as inflation is projected to remain high and generally well above the level expected at the time of relevant collective agreements for 2022. The cost of living crisis is affecting lower-income households disproportionally. They have to devote a significantly larger share of their incomes on energy and food than other groups and were also the population segment falling behind in the jobs recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.
In these circumstances, supporting real wages for low-paid workers is essential, according to the report. Governments should consider ways to adjust statutory minimum wages to maintain effective purchasing power for low paid workers. Targeted, means-tested, and temporary social transfers to people most affected by energy and food price hikes would also help support the living standards of the most vulnerable.
In the current circumstances, active discussions between governments, workers and firms on wages will also be key. None of them can absorb the full cost associated with the hike in energy and commodity prices alone. This calls for giving new impetus to collective bargaining, and for rebalancing bargaining power between employers and workers, enabling workers to bargain their wage on a level playing field.
Countries should step up their efforts to reconnect the low-skilled and other vulnerable groups to available jobs. About two thirds of OECD countries have increased their budget for public employment services since the onset of the COVID 19 crisis. However, more funding is not enough: employment and training services need to be integrated, comprehensive and effective in reaching out to employers and job seekers.
Improving job quality for frontline jobs should be an urgent priority for governments. More than half of OECD countries set up one-time rewards to compensate workers in the long-term care sector for extra work during the pandemic. Yet less than 30% of countries have increased pay on an ongoing basis.
Contact:

Spencer Wilson | spencer.wilson@oecd.org

Compliments of the OECD.
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Thank you minister, good afternoon everyone.
It is a pleasure to be back in Prague.
Thank you for hosting us in this beautiful city.
As the minister already outlined, today’s discussions in Ecofin focused on two main topics: financial support for Ukraine and our economic policy response to the war in Ukraine and its economic implications.
As regards financial support for Ukraine, it is excellent news that ministers have endorsed the next part of our exceptional macro-financial assistance programme and agreed to provide national guarantees required to make a further €5 billion available in concessional loans to Ukraine.
This is part of the overall €9 billion exceptional macro-financial assistance package for Ukraine. Its first part of €1 billion was already paid out in early August and we are now working on operationalising the remaining amount in this package.
Obviously, we need to think how we further support Ukraine because Ukraine is an economy at war.
Its economic situation has deteriorated dramatically due to Russia’s protracted war of aggression.
There are estimates that Ukraine’s GDP is set to fall by up to 15% this year. So clearly, Ukraine needs short-term financial assistance to keep the country running on a daily basis and to maintain essential services.
For this year alone, the International Monetary Fund estimates its balance of payments gap at $39 billion.
That does not include costs for the country’s longer-term reconstruction.
Since the invasion began, the EU, its Member States and financial institutions – like the EIB and EBRD – have mobilised €9.5 billion to support Ukraine. But still, more short-term financial assistance will also be needed.
And we will need to look beyond immediate needs.
The long-term costs for Ukraine’s reconstruction are likely to keep growing as long as war continues.
So today ministers also discussed options for funding the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine.
Apart from this, we discussed the policy implications of the war in Ukraine on the EU and our economy, and the necessary policy response.
Clearly, we see a marked economic slowdown in the second half of the year, and we see surging inflation.
So we need to find a delicate balance between promoting growth, controlling inflation and protecting the most vulnerable.
We also see tighter financing conditions and rising borrowing costs – which all reduces governments’ room for policy manoeuvre. And it’s also clear that fiscal support measures should not contradict the ECB’s efforts to reduce inflation.
When we discussed the support measures, these should be targeted and temporary, compatible with the green transition.
One of the major implications of the war in Ukraine is surging energy prices. Correspondingly, the issue of how to address them is very much on everyone’s minds.
This week, the European Commission came with a set of policy proposals – or options – for how we can respond to the situation in energy markets.
I will not go into detail on these measures because they were not part of today’s Ecofin agenda.
In parallel in Brussels, there was an Energy Council which was discussing exactly these energy issues. Thank you.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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Ceiling for remuneration of government deposits to remain at deposit facility rate (DFR) or euro short-term rate (€STR), whichever is lower, until 30 April 2023
Measure aims to preserve effectiveness of monetary policy transmission and safeguard orderly market functioning

To preserve the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission and safeguard orderly market functioning, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) today decided to temporarily remove the 0% interest rate ceiling for remunerating government deposits. Instead, the ceiling will temporarily remain at the lower of either the Eurosystem’s deposit facility rate (DFR) or the euro short-term rate (€STR), also under a positive DFR. The measure is intended to remain in effect until 30 April 2023. This change will prevent an abrupt outflow of deposits into the market, at a time when some segments of the euro area repo markets are showing signs of collateral scarcity, and will allow for an in-depth assessment of how money markets are adjusting to the return to positive interest rates.
As it currently stands, the relevant legal framework provides that, if the DFR is negative, government deposits are remunerated up to the DFR or the €STR, whichever is lower. It also foresees a remuneration ceiling of 0% if the DFR is 0% or higher. However, market and liquidity conditions have changed since this ceiling was put in place and a temporary adjustment of the remuneration arrangements, in a context of normalisation of monetary policy, is warranted. The new temporary change to the remuneration does not alter the long-term desirability of encouraging market intermediation, and the ECB calls on relevant depositors to plan for alternative arrangements to central bank deposits.
Government deposits are non-monetary policy deposits accepted by the Eurosystem from any public entities of an EU Member State or any public entities of the European Union, except for publicly owned credit institutions, as laid down in Guideline ECB/2019/7[1] and Decision ECB/2019/31[2].
The revised remuneration will apply as of the start of the sixth maintenance period, i.e. on 14 September 2022, will remain in place until 30 April 2023 and will be reflected in an ECB decision to be published on the ECB’s website and in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Contact:

For media queries, please contact William Lelieveldt | william.lelieveldt@ecb.europa.eu | tel.: +49 69 1344 7316

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Today, the Commission is proposing to fully suspend the EU’s Visa Facilitation Agreement with Russia. A country like Russia, waging a war of aggression, should not qualify for visa facilitations as long as it continues conducting its destructive foreign policy and military aggression towards Ukraine, demonstrating a complete disregard to the international rules-based order. The suspension is in response to increased risks and threats to the Union’s security interests and the national security of the Member States as result of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. This means that Russian citizens will no longer enjoy privileged access to the EU and face a lengthier, more expensive and more difficult visa application process. Member States will have wide discretion in processing short-stay visa applications from Russian citizens, and will be able to ensure greater scrutiny in respect of Russian nationals travelling to the EU.  The EU will remain open to certain categories of Russian visa applicants travelling for essential purposes, including notably family members of EU citizens, journalists, dissidents and civil society representatives.
The Commission is also presenting today a proposal on the non-recognition of Russian passports issued in occupied areas of Ukraine.
These proposals follow the political agreement reached by Foreign Affairs Ministers at their informal meeting of 31 August on a common and coordinated way forward when it comes to visa issuance for Russian citizens.
Vice-President for Promoting our European Way of Life, Margaritis Schinas, said: “The EU’s visa policy is a mark of trust – a trust that Russia has completely undermined with its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. As long as Russia’s military aggression towards an EU candidate country lasts, Russian citizens cannot enjoy travel facilitations to Europe. Once again, the EU is showing its unwavering unity in its response to Russia’s military aggression.”
Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson said: “Russia continues to violate international law with its illegal military actions, committing atrocities against Ukrainians and undermining European and global security and stability. These actions breach the fundamental principles on which the Visa Facilitation Agreement was concluded and go against the interests of the EU and its Member States. Today’s proposal shows a strong and united EU response. We will soon follow up with additional guidelines to ensure enhanced scrutiny on visa applications and border crossings by Russian citizens, without cutting ourselves from Russian dissidents and civil society.”
Ending privileged access to the EU for Russian citizens
The proposal to suspend the Visa Facilitation Agreement will put an end to all facilitations for Russian citizens applying for a short-stay visa to the Schengen area. The general rules of the Visa Code will apply instead.
In practice, Russian applicants will face:

A higher visa fee: The visa fee will increase from €35 to €80 for all applicants.

Increased processing time: The standard deadline for consulates to take a decision on visa applications will increase from 10 to 15 days. This period may be extended up to a maximum of 45 days in individual cases, when further scrutiny of the application is needed.

More restrictive rules on multiple-entry visas: Applicants will no longer have easy access to visas valid for multiple entries to the Schengen area.

A longer list of supporting documents: Applicants will have to submit the full list of documentary evidence when applying for a visa. They will no longer benefit from the simplified list included in the Visa Facilitation Agreement.

The EU has concluded Visa Facilitation Agreements only with a limited number of countries. These Agreements are based on mutual trust and respect of common values between the EU and the given country. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is incompatible with a trustful relationship and runs counter to the spirit of partnership on which Visa Facilitation Agreements are based. It justifies measures to protect the essential security interest of the EU and its Member States.
Since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the situation has worsened, with tragic humanitarian consequences for civilians and widespread destruction of key infrastructure.
Non-recognition of Russian passports issued in occupied regions of Ukraine
Today the Commission is also proposing a common EU approach for the non-recognition of Russian passports issued in occupied foreign regions, as Russia currently extends the practice of issuing ordinary Russian passports to more non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine, in particular the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Member States should not recognise Russian passports issued in occupied areas of Ukraine as valid documents for the purpose of issuing a visa and crossing the EU’s external borders. This legislative proposal will ensure a binding approach, applicable in all Member States, replacing the voluntary actions taken by Member States since the illegal annexation of Crimea. This is a further step in the EU’s common response to the Russian military aggression against Ukraine and the Russian practice of handing out passports in occupied foreign regions.
Next Steps
It is now for the Council to examine and adopt the proposal to suspend the Visa Facilitation Agreement. Once adopted, the suspension will enter into force on the second day following its publication in the EU Official Journal.. Russia will be notified of the decision on suspension no later than 48 hours before its entry into force.
It is for the European Parliament and the Council to decide on the proposal on the non-recognition of Russian travel documents issued in occupied foreign regions. The measures will enter into force on the first day following that of their publication in the EU Official Journal.
The Commission will soon present additional guidelines to support Member States’ consulates when it comes to general visa issues with Russia, including to implement the suspension of the Visa Facilitation Agreement.
Background
The EU-Russia Visa Facilitation entered into force in June 2007. It eases the issuance of visas to citizens of the Union and the Russian Federation for intended stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period.
As of 1 September 2022, around 963 000 Russians held valid visas to the Schengen area.
At their informal meeting on 31 August, Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed on a common and coordinated way forward when it comes to visa issuance for Russian citizens, including the full suspension of the Visa Facilitation Agreement with Russia. Ministers also agreed that passports issued by the Russian authorities in occupied areas of Ukraine will not be recognised. Visa applications will continue being processed on an individual basis, based on a case-by-case assessment.
The EU had already partially suspended the Visa Facilitation Agreement with Russia on 25 February 2022 as regards Russian officials and business people. Today’s proposal will suspend the Agreement in full, with all facilitations suspended for all Russian applicants.
The proposal on the non-recognition of passports comes after the Commission issued a series of guidelines to Member States in 2014, 2016 and 2019 on how to handle visa applications for residents of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk; and on the non-recognition of certain Russian passports.
The Union reiterates its unwavering support to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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