The following is an address by former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, ahead of his recent report titled “The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe.” You can read the full report at the link below.
 
Dear Madame President,
Dear Honourable Members of the European Parliament,
Dear Executive Vice-President of the European Commission,
 
Let me start by saying that I’m very honoured to be invited to speak to you in this plenary today.
And I would like to thank the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, for this invitation and for her continuous support of my work.
Let me also thank the representatives of the political groups whom I had the pleasure to meet some weeks ago. Our exchange was wide-ranging, frank, fruitful and contributed decisively to shaping my thinking as I was finalising the report.
Last week, I presented this report on the future of Europe’s competitiveness to the President of the European Commission.
The starting point is that Europe is facing a world undergoing dramatic change. World trade is slowing, geopolitics is fracturing and technological change is accelerating.
It is a world where long-established business models are being challenged and where some key economic dependencies are suddenly turning into geopolitical vulnerabilities.
Of all the major economies, Europe is the most exposed to these shifts.
We are the most open: our trade-to-GDP ratio exceeds 50%, compared with 37% in China and 27% in the United States.
We are the most dependent: we rely on a handful of suppliers for critical raw materials and import over 80% of our digital technology.
We have the highest energy prices: EU companies face electricity prices that are 2-3 times higher than those in the United States and in China.
We are severely lagging behind in new technologies: only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European.
And we are the least ready to defend ourselves: only ten Member States spend more than or equal to 2% of GDP on defence, in line with NATO commitments.
In this setting, we are all anxious about the future of Europe.
My concern is not that we will suddenly find ourselves poor and subservient to others. We still have many strengths in Europe.
It is that, over time, we will inexorably become less prosperous, less equal, less secure and, as a result, less free to choose our destiny.
The European Union exists to ensure that Europe’s fundamental values are always upheld: democracy, freedom, peace, equity and prosperity in a sustainable environment.
If Europe cannot any longer deliver these values for its people, it will have lost its reason for being.
So, this report is not only about competitiveness – it is about our future and the common commitment that we need to reclaim it.
 
The challenges Europe faces are complex and, as such, they present us with difficult choices. But they are choices we must confront.
The purpose of this report is to lay out a strategy for Europe to change course: pinpointing the priorities we should focus on, explaining the trade-offs we face, and offering pragmatic solutions to resolve them.
The report identifies three main areas for action.
The first is aiming at closing the innovation gap with the United States and China.
EU companies spent around EUR 270 billion less on R&D than their US counterparts in 2021, largely because we have a static industrial structure dominated by the same companies and technologies as decades ago.
The top 3 investors in R&D in Europe have been dominated by automotive companies for the last twenty years. It was the same thing in the US in the 2 early 2000s, with autos and pharma leading, but now the top 3 are all tech companies.
The core problem in Europe is that new companies with new technologies are not rising in our economy. In fact, there is no EU company with a market capitalisation over EUR 100 billion that has been set up from scratch in the last fifty years. All six US companies with valuations above EUR 1 trillion have been created in that period of time.
This lack of dynamism does not reflect lack ideas or lack of ambition. Europe is full of talented researchers and entrepreneurs. It is because innovation often lacks synergies, and because we are failing to translate ideas into commercial success. Innovative companies that want to scale up in Europe are hindered at every stage by the lack of a Single Market and an integrated capital market, stopping the cycle of innovation in its tracks.
As a result, many European entrepreneurs prefer to seek financing from US venture capitalists and scale up in the US market. Between 2008 and 2021, close to 30% of the “unicorns” founded in Europe – that is to say, start-ups that went on the be valued at over USD 1 billion – relocated their headquarters abroad.
And these figures do not include the many young, talented Europeans who go to study in the United States and found their companies there. It is a huge loss for our economy in terms of jobs and brain drain.
The innovation gap is at the root of Europe’s slowing productivity growth relative to the US. So, we must bring innovation back to Europe – and the report proposes to do so through reforming the whole innovation ecosystem.
It starts with establishing our universities and research institutions at the frontier of academic excellence, and making it easier for researchers to commercialise their ideas. Only about one-third of the patented inventions registered by European universities are commercially exploited.
The next step is encouraging innovative start-ups to scale up in Europe by removing regulatory hurdles. This is not about deregulation: it is about ensuring the right balance between caution and innovation, and ensuring that regulation is consistently applied within Europe.
A key initiative we propose is the creation of a new EU-wide legal statute: the “Innovative European Company”. This status would immediately provide 3 companies with a single digital identity valid throughout the EU, and it is foreseen that these companies could then have access to harmonised legislation.
We also call for a profound review of how we spend public money on innovation in Europe. If spent wisely, public funds can be a powerful tool to launch breakthrough technologies. These technologies are often too risky or require too much financing for the private sector to undertake alone, especially in an environment like ours is where scaling up is typically difficult.
Yet, even though the public sector in the EU spends about as much on innovation as the United States as a share of GDP, just one-tenth of this spending takes place at the EU level. The report calls for EU spending on innovation to be expanded and refocused on a smaller number of commonly agreed priorities, with a larger allocation for disruptive innovation. In other words, we need to increase the intensity of financing.
The success of these measures will in turn depend on integrating the Single Market and Europe’s capital markets, so that private investment can be reoriented towards hi-tech sectors and the industrial structure can evolve.
Finally, a critical issue for Europe will be integrating new technologies like artificial intelligence into our industrial sector. AI is improving incredibly fast, as the latest models released in the last few days show. We need to shift our orientation from trying to restrain this technology to understanding how to benefit from it.
The cost of training frontier AI models is still high, which is a barrier for companies in Europe that don’t have the backing of US big tech firms. But, on the other hand, the EU has a unique opportunity to lower the cost of AI deployment by making available its unique network of high-performance computers.
The report recommends increasing the capacity of this network and expanding access to start-ups and industry. Many industrial applications of AI do not require the latest advances in generative AI, so it’s well within our reach to accelerate AI uptake with a concerted effort to support companies.
That said, the report recognises that technological progress and social inclusion do not always go together. Major transitions are disruptive. Inclusion hinges on everyone having the skills they need to benefit from digitalisation.
So, while we want to match the United States on innovation, we must exceed the US on education and adult learning. We therefore propose a profound overhaul of Europe’s approach to skills, focused on using data to understand where skills gaps lie and investing in education at every stage.
For Europe to succeed, investment in technology and in people cannot substitute for each other. They must go hand in hand.
 
The second area for action is a joint plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness.
If Europe’s ambitious climate targets are matched by a coherent plan to achieve them, decarbonisation will be an opportunity for Europe. But if we fail to coordinate our policies, there is a risk that it could run contrary to competitiveness – and ultimately be delayed or even rejected.
The first priority is to lower energy prices.
Over time, decarbonisation will help shift power generation towards secure, low-cost, clean energy sources. But without a European plan, it will take a long t ime before end users see the full benefits.
In 2022, at the peak of the energy crisis, natural gas was the price-setter 63% of the time, despite making up only 20% share of the EU’s electricity mix. Even if our renewable targets are met, fossil fuels will still set energy prices for much of the time for at least the remainder of this decade.
We must transfer the benefits of decarbonisation faster to Europeans by making energy prices lower and less volatile in Europe. And the report puts forward a set of – several initiatives – to achieve this goal.
In parallel, we call for pressing ahead with clean energy installation in a technology-neutral way. This approach should include renewables, nuclear, hydrogen, bioenergy, and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
Increasing the pace of permitting and raising investment in grids will be key – the key – to unlocking this potential. Otherwise, by 2040 we could lose up to 10 t imes more renewable energy generation than we lose today owing to grid constraints. From a European perspective, rapidly increasing the deployment of interconnectors should be the focus.
Decarbonisation is also an opportunity for the EU industry.
The EU is a world leader in clean technologies like wind turbines, electrolysers and low-carbon fuels. We are also strong in green innovation. More than onef ifth of clean and sustainable technologies worldwide are developed here.
Yet, it is not guaranteed we will seize this opportunity. Chinese competition is becoming acute, driven by a powerful combination of subsidies, innovation and scale. By 2030 at the latest, China’s annual manufacturing capacity for solar photovoltaic is expected to be double the level of global demand, and for battery cells it is expected to at least cover the level of global demand.
Europe faces a trade-off. Increasing reliance on China may offer the cheapest route to meeting our climate targets. But China’s State-sponsored competition represents a threat to otherwise productive industries, and to the promise that the green transition will bring “good green jobs”.
We will not be able to manage this challenge with black-and-white solutions. This is why the report proposes a differentiated approach according to sectors and technologies.
There are some technologies, like solar panels, where foreign producers are too far ahead and attempting to capture production in Europe will only set back decarbonisation. Even if those countries are using subsidies, we should let foreign taxpayers finance cheaper installation of clean energy in Europe. There are other sectors, however, where we are open to using foreign technology and to increasing inward investment.
There are still other sectors, like batteries, where we do not want to be fully dependent on foreign technology for strategic reasons, and so it is key to keep the know-how in Europe. Determining strategic value should take place according to rigorous criteria which avoid protecting vested interests.
Finally, there are the so-called “infant industries” where Europe has an innovative edge that we need to nurture until companies are ready to compete internationally.
To be clear: this should not be read by anyone as a call for blanket protectionism. Our priority is to do everything possible to make all partners comply with the WTO rules, including those who presently do not. Although 6 some of the proposals in the report will require negotiations, they are generally aligned with the spirit of those rules.
Insofar as we use trade measures, they should be careful, defensive and especially designed only to level the playing field. We should clearly distinguish between innovation abroad – which is good for Europe – and State-sponsored competition, which harms our workers.
The proposals should also not be seen as a programme for defending national champions or “picking winners”, like some of the failed industrial policies of the past. In fact, the report argues for returning to the normal State aid regime, while foreseeing State aid for investment projects of common European interest.
 
The third area for action is increasing security and reducing dependencies.
Peace is the first and foremost objective of Europe, at home and abroad. And we must continue in this steadfast effort. But security threats are rising and we must prepare.
For Europe to remain free, we must be more independent. We must have more secure supply chains for critical raw materials and technologies. We must increase production capacity at home in strategic sectors. And we must expand our industrial capacity in defence and space.
But independence comes at a cost.
Securing critical raw materials will mean diversifying away from countries that were the cheapest suppliers in the world of yesterday. Strengthening the supply chain for semiconductors will require major new investments. The cost of developing our defence capability will be substantial.
These costs will be much more manageable if we have a strategy to reduce our dependencies and increase our security together.
The report recommends developing a genuine EU “foreign economic policy”, coordinating preferential trade agreements and direct investment with resource-rich nations, building up stockpiles in selected critical areas, and creating industrial partnerships to secure the supply chain of key technologies.
It also sets out a strategy to enhance Europe’s domestic presence in the most advanced chips segments.
This “foreign economic policy” should reflect European values and reconcile our security interests with solidarity towards middle and low-income countries, helping them to develop and decarbonise as we do.
For defence, our key weakness is excessive fragmentation of the industrial base, compounded by lack of coordination among Member States, unnecessary duplication and lack of interoperability of equipment. In the defence sector, common planning comes before common expenditure.
EU countries are, collectively, the second largest military spenders in the world, but we do not help our defence and space industries to build up scale. Collaborative procurement accounted for less than a fifth of spending on defence equipment procurement in 2022. Almost four-fifths of total procurement spending went to non-EU suppliers.
The report therefore recommends increasing substantially the aggregation of demand between groups of Member States, as well as raising the share of joint defence procurement and common R&D spending.
In the defence sector, this consolidation of spending should be matched by selective integration and consolidation of EU industrial capacity, with the explicit aim of increasing scale, standardisation and interoperability.
However, at the same time, higher scale should not lead to lower competition. Europe has many highly sophisticated SMEs in the defence sector that could make an exceptional contribution to our common defence.
 
A key question that has arisen in the last few days is how to finance the massive investments that transforming Europe’s economy will entail.
Europe has set itself a series of ambitious objectives that have been endorsed by EU institutions and the Member States.
We have enshrined becoming carbon-neutral by 2050 in EU law. We have committed to raise public spending on innovation to 3% of GDP a year. Member States that are part of NATO are committed to invest at least 2% of GDP on defence per year. Over the past months, this House and the EU leaders 8 have discussed and agreed on the urgent, immediate and medium-term defence needs for Europe. And they have also set out targets for upgrading our digital infrastructure as part of the Digital Decade.
The report contains a bottom-up analysis by Commission staff of the investment needs to carry out these objectives. And they reach the conclusion that EUR 750-800 billion in additional investment will be required each year. Analysis by the European Central Bank arrives at similar figures.
These investments are vital to carry out the objectives of the report. But let me be clear: they are not new investment needs that the report has identified. They are the needs required to deliver on the EU’s existing objectives. Once these objectives were agreed, the numbers followed.
However, it is a massive volume of investment. And we calculate that, to marshal investment on this scale, the share of investment in GDP would have to rise to levels not seen in Europe since the 1960s and 70s. The effort would be more than double that of Marshall Plan.
So, we must ask the question of how we will finance it.
Historically, investment in Europe has been financed about 80% privately and 20% publicly. We asked staff from the Commission and the International Monetary Fund to conduct simulations to see whether we could maintain that split for such a large investment push.
The results show that to finance this volume of investment, we must make progress on Capital Markets Union, so that private savings can be channelled into investment across the whole EU. But even with mobilising private finance, public support will still be required.
Two key conclusions emerge.
First, if the EU carries out the strategy outlined in the report and productivity rises, capital markets will be more responsive to the flow of private savings, and it will be much easier for the public sector to finance its share. Faster productivity growth could reduce the costs for governments by one-third.
Second, to lift productivity, some joint investment in key projects – such as breakthrough research, grids, defence procurement – will be critical, and these projects could be funded through common debt.
It is natural that these large numbers create worries about rising debt levels. It is also legitimate to be concerned about common debt issuance.
But it is important to remember that this debt is not for general government spending or subsidies. It is to carry out the objectives that are critical for our future competitiveness, and that – and I stress this – we have all already agreed upon.
If one objects to building a true Single Market, to capital market integration, and objects to debt issuance, one objects to our EU objectives.
 
This report has come out at a difficult time for our continent.
On many key questions, we are divided about what to do. There is discontent in large parts of Europe about the direction in which we are heading. And there is considerable unease about the future.
My role, as set out by the European Commission, is to present you with a diagnosis of where Europe stands and to offer you recommendations on how to move forward. But it is for you, our elected representatives, to turn this agenda into actions.
We will only overcome division in Europe if the will to change receives broad democratic backing. The choices we face are too important to be settled by technocratic solutions. Our elected institutions must be at centre of the debate on Europe’s future – and on the actions that will shape it.
I trust that we can find consensus, if only because the alternatives look progressively bleaker.
As I observed some time ago, Europe faces a choice between paralysis, exit or integration. Exit has been tried and has not delivered what its proponents hoped for. Paralysis is becoming untenable as we slide towards greater anxiety and insecurity.
So, integration is our only hope left.
It is important that all of us understand that the size of the challenge we face far exceeds the size of our national economies. And we are facing a world where we risk losing not just peace, but also our freedom.
In this world, it will be only through unity that we will be able to retain our strength and defend our values.
Thank you.
Read full report here.
 
Compliments of the European CommissionThe post European Commission | Address by Mr. Draghi – Presentation of the report on the Future of European competitiveness – European Parliament – Strasbourg – 17 September 2024 first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

By Luca Nocciola and Alejandro Zamora-Pérez[1]
What factors could drive transactional demand for central bank digital currency (CBDC)? We analyse payment survey data to arrive at a framework for understanding the role of adoption frictions and design strategies in shaping CBDC demand. The results of our analysis show that, while consumers may initially prefer to use more traditional payment methods, a design tailored to their specific needs could significantly increase CBDC uptake. Raising awareness and capitalising on network effects could also boost demand for CBDC.
Public money: “too much” versus “too little” demand
Central banks are at various stages in investigating and developing central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) alongside cash. While cash use is losing ground to digital private payment methods, the role of public money in payments remains crucial. The potential implications of a society without public money has long been a topic of debate[2], highlighting concerns about maintaining its key role in payments. In the digital era, these discussions have resurfaced in central banking and academia. The Eurosystem is now preparing for the potential development of a digital euro alongside cash, the use of which is declining. One of the main motivations for introducing a CBDC is to consolidate the role of public money as the anchor of the monetary system (Lagarde and Panetta, 2022), a sentiment not confined to the euro area alone. In 2022 the Bank for International Settlements conducted a survey of 86 central banks, which revealed that the main reason for introducing a CBDC was to enhance payment efficiency and safety (Kosse and Mattei, 2023). Central banks’ ongoing efforts in CBDCs reflect global momentum and interest in the future of public money in payments.
While there is considerable interest in issuing CBDCs, one challenge lies in striking the right balance between “too much” and “too little” consumer demand (Ahnert et al., 2022). Extensive research has already tackled situations in which a CBDC might become too popular, potentially undermining the banking system (Burlon et al., 2024; Assenmacher et al., 2024). However, much less research has gone into ensuring there is sufficient interest in a CBDC for it to be used as a regular means of payment. Despite being universal to any CBDC, this challenge has been identified and qualitatively assessed in the euro area (Bindseil et al, 2021; Panetta, 2022 and Kantar Public, 2022). Here, drawing on Nocciola and Zamora-Pérez (2024), we shed further light on this “too little” scenario. Using a model based on survey data, we quantitatively examine some of the potential drivers and barriers to CBDC adoption and discuss strategies to overcome these obstacles.
Assessing potential transactional demand for CBDC
Advances in the digital payments landscape underscore the importance of understanding the extent to which consumers might use a CBDC as a new form of digital currency and the need for comprehensive data on consumers’ current payment methods. To that end, the study on payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area (SPACE)[3] collects survey data on current consumer behaviour and preferences concerning payment methods. The 2022 edition of SPACE spanned 17 euro area countries with over 40,000 respondents. The survey includes a payment diary, in which respondents recorded their transactions and respective means of payment, together with a questionnaire asking them to rank different payment instruments according to their most important attributes, such as transaction speed and convenience.
Using this data and on the basis of a model, we study how consumers’ payment choices are related to current preferences for certain attributes of payment instruments.[4] We simulate a CBDC that resembles existing means of payment and assess the transactional demand for it. Payment methods, including CBDC, are distilled into various attributes, encompassing features like ease of use, transaction speed and safety. Additionally, we exploit consumers’ preferences for features such as budgeting usefulness and privacy protection.[5] Comparing these attributes with familiar benchmarks such as cash and cards offers a framework for exploring the different designs of a CBDC.
To this end, it is important to differentiate between adoption and usage when discussing the uptake of new payment methods. We cannot assess novel payment technologies like a CBDC on the same playing field as entrenched methods like cash and cards. First, there is the adoption phase: this is when consumers decide to include a new payment method in their repertoire. But adopting a method does not necessarily translate into using it regularly. For instance, some consumers might prefer the idea of a CBDC and choose to adopt it, but if they have a deeply ingrained habit of using cash, they might not use the CBDC often in practice.
We find that adoption costs play a pivotal role in determining the success of new payment methods. Introducing a novel payment method presents an inherent “cost” to consumers, and this is not purely a monetary cost – it also encompasses the effort, time and adjustments required of consumers when adapting to a new payment method. Previous qualitative findings show that some consumers are satisfied with current methods based on familiar technologies and prefer less complexity rather than adopting new methods (Kantar 2022; Kantar Public 2023). In contrast to those studies, we gauge this cost quantitatively by exploiting the SPACE survey and delving into the adoption patterns of mobile payment apps – a technology that, despite being available for some time, has only gained traction in the sampled countries relatively recently.[6] The idea behind our approach is straightforward: if those accustomed to cash and cards hesitate to embrace mobile payments due to the perceived cost of switching, they might exhibit similar reluctance towards another newly introduced means of payment, such as a CBDC. Our findings show that consumers generally face a substantial adoption cost, revealing a preference for established payment methods like cash or cards and a tendency to stick to familiar habits.[7] However, pinpointing the reasons for this cost offers avenues to lowering it.
Evidence on the drivers of demand for CBDC as a means of payment
Key among the strategies that central banks may consider is addressing those factors that drive CBDC adoption. We identify three potential drivers – design alignment with consumer preferences, effective information dissemination, and leveraging network effects from emerging payment technologies.
For a start, a CBDC’s design attributes can heavily influence how attractive it is to users. Our study suggests that CBDC demand could be influenced by merging the perceived top qualities of cards (like speedy transactions and ease of use) with the benefits of cash (such as tracking expenses and preserving privacy). The left panel of Chart 1 offers a glimpse into the potential impact of a CBDC tailored to consumer preferences, compared with one that is not. While it is essential to view these findings as indicative results rather than fixed outcomes – given the interplay of various factors – the chart does seem to suggest that a well-designed CBDC would enjoy more substantial adoption and regular usage.

Chart 1
Indicative results for central bank strategies to influence CBDC adoption and usage

Effect of consumer-tailored design

Effect of effective information campaign

(rate of change of adoption and usage shares from baseline)
(rate of change of adoption and usage shares from baseline)

Sources: SPACE survey (European Central Bank, 2022) and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Both panels illustrate the normalised effects of two distinct central bank strategies on CBDC adoption and usage, relative to a baseline simulation. The left panel assesses the impact of a consumer-tailored design (blue bars), while the right panel examines the outcomes following an information campaign (yellow bars). “Adoption” and “usage” stages are plotted on the x-axis. The values represent the rate of change from the baseline in each situation, with results at 95% confidence intervals displayed. The consumer-tailored design exploits specific user preferences on CBDC features (against a baseline not accounting for preferences), whereas the information campaign leverages information strategies (against a baseline without an effective information campaign). These results highlight the indicative influence of targeted policy interventions on CBDC design and implementation.

Second, ensuring consumers have the right information can make it easier for them to embrace new payment methods, such as a CBDC. The literature often highlights the crucial role that raising awareness plays in boosting the appeal of novel technologies, including payment methods. To gain a clear and causal understanding of how new information influences payment choices, we need to look at an unexpected event or “exogenous shock” that might change the usual consumer behaviour. The COVID-19 pandemic provides such an opportunity. This unforeseen event significantly altered many consumers’ habits. The SPACE survey delves into these changes, specifically asking participants if discovering new payment methods due to the pandemic influenced their payment choices even two years later. Our model exploits this information from the SPACE survey, and we find that discovering new payment options, like mobile apps, can significantly reduce the barriers people face when adopting a new means of payment. Based on this fact, we model what might happen if there was a targeted campaign to raise consumers’ awareness of a CBDC as a prospective means of payment. The results depicted in the right panel of Chart 1 suggest that with the right targeted information, consumers might find it easier to make the switch to a CBDC. However, it is important to note that these results should not be seen as an attempt to make an accurate inference, but rather as indicative insights illustrating the potential influence of effective information dissemination on consumer behaviour towards CBDCs.
Network effects fuelled by the spread of emerging payment technologies can substantially boost CBDC adoption. The diverse landscapes within the sampled countries, as captured by the SPACE survey, reveal differences in both payment habits and available payment options across different countries. This variation can be exploited to analyse the relevance of an environment that is favourable to new payment methods.[8] Chart 2 shows the importance of an environment in which new payment technologies are gaining traction, because the collective adoption of a method can be self-reinforcing. As more people use new payment methods, like mobile apps, their popularity snowballs, creating an environment where the adoption of new payment technologies – including CBDC – becomes more likely. We find that network effects can act as powerful multipliers, making markets receptive to emergent payment technologies fertile grounds for promoting CBDC.

Chart 2
Network effects: indicative impact of current diffusion of novel payment means on CBDC adoption

(x-axis: percentage of consumers using novel means of payment (exemplified by mobile payment apps); y-axis: percentage of consumers in a country adopting CBDC)

Source: SPACE survey (European Central Bank, 2022) and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The chart illustrates how the simulated CBDC adoption rates (y-axis, represented in percentages) relate to the spread of novel payment technologies in different countries, exemplified by the use of mobile apps for peer-to-peer and point-of-sale payments in various countries (x-axis, represented in percentages). The yellow confidence intervals are at the 95% level. As mobile apps are not used widely in most euro area countries, usually accounting for below roughly 10% of total transactions, the values above this 10% threshold are estimated. Although the confidence intervals are wide due to a lack of data, all estimates point to the same finding: more extensive diffusion of mobile payments in a country generally results in higher CBDC adoption rates among consumers.

Finally, although we lack the data necessary to produce the relevant simulation, it is likely that other important factors could boost CBDC adoption, such as the role of legislation in ensuring its distribution and obliging merchants to accept it at the point of sale, as found in Kantar Public (2022). These two components of the role of legislation could be important in accelerating these network effects, as suggested by Bindseil et al. (2021). Additionally, the universality of use cases could further enhance adoption.[9]
Conclusions
We assess potential drivers for the adoption of CBDC as a means of payment, providing insights which could contribute to the design of adoption strategies. In the digital age, the role of public money in our daily transactions is evolving, and it is important to ensure that CBDCs can effectively fit into this changing landscape. Drawing on the SPACE survey data, we develop a framework to quantitatively measure how likely consumers are to use CBDC as a means of payment in everyday transactions, by accounting for individuals’ preferences for payment method attributes. We distinguish between the initial decision to adopt a CBDC and the subsequent decision to use it, emphasising that the costs and barriers associated with the initial adoption phase are vital in understanding overall demand. Building on insights from previous qualitative research, our analysis confirms that three drivers are key to consumer demand: how CBDC is designed, the level of consumer awareness and the growth of current new payment technologies. However, we do not cover all potentially relevant factors, such as the role of legislation in exploiting network effects, ensuring efficient distribution, and boosting adoption through universal use cases. In sum, our research provides a framework for understanding the role of adoption costs and design strategies in shaping demand for CBDC.
 

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This article was written by Luca Nocciola (Directorate General Market Infrastructures and Payments, European Central Bank) and Alejandro Zamora-Pérez (Directorate Banknotes, European Central Bank), drawing on selected results of Nocciola and
Zamora-Pérez (2024). The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments by Ulrich Bindseil, Piero Cipollone, Ignacio Terol, Anton van der Kraaij, Claudia Lambert, Livio Stracca, Gareth Budden, Alexander Popov and Luc Laeven. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.
Historical discussions on the challenges of a cashless economy – and, by extension, an economy without public money in payments – date back to Wicksell (1936), who inquired as to whether private banks could control price fluctuations in a credit-only system. Over time some economists (Black, 1987; King, 1999; and Friedman, 1999) have expressed concerns about the overall effectiveness of the central bank’s policies in such scenarios, while others have downplayed potential risks (Goodhart, 2000; and Woodford, 2000).
See European Central Bank (2022).
There are similar studies by Huynh et al (2020) and Li (2023).
According to previous qualitative surveys, these attributes also play an important role for consumers when considering the prospective adoption of new means of payment (Kantar Public, 2023).
Despite over two decades of mobile payment availability, usage remains limited, particularly at the POS. In 2022, mobile apps accounted for just 3% of POS payments on average, with usage ranging from 1% in Slovenia to 10% in the Netherlands, according to the latest SPACE survey data. However, mobile payments are increasingly being used for person-to-person (P2P) transactions, averaging 10% in 2022, up from 3% in 2019, from 1.5% in Austria to 43% in the Netherlands.
Our findings should not be interpreted as a direct extrapolation of demand for any specific CBDC.
Although our analysis primarily assesses the impact at the point-of-sale, we also address the potential influence of the
person-to-person (P2P) use case, in line with findings that highlight its relevance (Kantar Public, 2023). Hence, our simulation includes data on the aggregate usage of both P2P and POS transactions with novel means of payment, such as mobile payments, to estimate the potential level of adoption of a CBDC.
Our data primarily focus on established payment features and do not explicitly capture preferences for innovative features identified in the referenced qualitative surveys which still have a low adoption rate, such as QR code payments, offline payments, conditional payments or the benefit of integrated payment solutions. While these innovative features are among the unobservable factors that influence consumer behaviour in our model, the absence of specific data on them precludes detailed policy simulations.

 
Compliments of the European Central BankThe post ECB | Consumer demand for central bank digital currency as a means of payment first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

“Check against delivery”
Today, I have met with the Conference of Presidents of the political groups in the European Parliament. In this meeting I have presented to the Parliament the planned structure of the new college, based on my political guidelines, on which we worked together; intensive weeks of negotiations with the Member States.
I know that you are very interested in the structure but allow me to speak first about the content that defines the structure. Together, we have defined core priorities. They are built around prosperity, security, democracy. The backdrop is: competitiveness in the twin transition, and they are very much intertwined and cross-cutting.
The whole college is committed to competitiveness! We have dissipated the former rigid stovepipes.
This is one of the main recommendation of the Draghi report. Strengthening our tech-sovereignty, security and democracy. Building a competitive, decarbonised and circular economy, with a fair transition for all. Designing a bold industrial strategy with innovation and investment at its heart. Boosting European cohesion and regions. Supporting people, skills and our social model. Ensuring Europe can assert its interests and lead in the world. And this is reflected in the titles of the six Executive Vice-Presidents.
Another principle: as the treaty says, each Member of the College is equal – and each Commissioner has an equal responsibility to deliver on our priorities. That means that all Commissioners must work together. In this spirit, each Executive Vice-President will also have a portfolio to focus on – for which they will have to work with other Commissioners. Because what affects security affects democracy, what affects the economy affects society, and what affects climate and environment, also affects people and business.
This is also why we do not have the extra layer of Vice-Presidents. Leaner structure, more interactive and interlinked.
Another topic is balance in general. Be it gender or topic or geography.
As you will see, we now have 11 women in the College I propose today. That is 40%. When I received the first set of nominations and candidates, we were on track for around 22% women and 78% men. That was unacceptable. So I worked with the Member States and we were able to improve the balance to 40% women and 60% men. And it shows that – as much as we have achieved – there is still so much more work to do. And with this in mind I assigned six Executive Vice-presidents.
Six Executive Vice-Presidents: four women, two men. Three from Member States that joined before the fall of the Iron Curtain. And three from Member States that joined after Europe was reunited. From the Baltics, Nordics and Eastern Europe. Ministers and Prime Ministers. Different backgrounds. But all with one common goal – and that is to make Europe stronger.
So allow me to introduce them.
Teresa Ribera will be Executive Vice-President of a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition. She will also be responsible for Competition policy. She will guide the work to ensure that Europe stays on track for its goals set out in the European Green Deal. And that we decarbonise and industrialise our economy at the same time.
Henna Virkkunen will be the Executive Vice-President for Tech-Sovereignty, Security and Democracy. She will also be responsible for the portfolio on digital and frontier technologies. I will ask Henna to look at the internal and external aspects of security. But also to strengthen the foundations of our democracy, such as the rule of law, and protect it wherever it comes under attack.
Stéphane Séjourné will be the Executive Vice-President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy. He will also be responsible for the Industry, SMEs and the Single Market portfolio. He will guide the work to put in place the conditions for our companies to thrive – from investment and innovation to economic stability and trade and economic security.
As you already know, Kaja Kallas will be our High Representative and Vice-President. We are in an era of geostrategic rivalries and instability. Our foreign and security policy must be designed with this reality in mind and it must be more aligned with our own interests. I know that I can count on her to bring all of this together – and be the bridge between our internal and external policies. And to ensure we stay a Geopolitical Commission.
I am also very happy to entrust the role of Executive Vice-President for People, Skills and Preparedness to Roxana Mînzatu. She will have the responsibility for skills, education and culture, quality jobs and social rights. This is under the umbrella of demography. Roxana will notably lead on a Union of Skills and the European Pillar of Social Rights. She will focus on those areas which are crucial to unite our society.
Raffaele Fitto will be Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms. He will be responsible for the portfolio dealing with cohesion policy, regional development and cities. We will draw on his extensive experience to help modernise and strengthen our cohesion, investment and growth policies.
This is the team of Executive Vice-Presidents which will work hand in hand with each other and with all Commissioners.
And I would now like to introduce them to you all.
I will start here with Maroš Šefčovič, to whom I am very happy to give two roles. He will be Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security. This is a new portfolio which also includes customs policy. I have also entrusted him with a second role: Commissioner for Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency. For this second role, he will report directly to me.
Valdis Dombrovskis will also have a double role. He will be the Commissioner for Economy and Productivity. I have also given him the role of Commissioner for Implementation and Simplification. He will report directly to me on this part of his work.
Dubravka Šuica will be the Commissioner for the Mediterranean. I am entrusting her with this new role. She will also be responsible for the wider southern neighbourhood. She will work closely with Kaja Kallas – and many other Commissioners – to develop our shared interests with the region.
Olivér Várhelyi will be Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare. He will be responsible for building the European Health Union and continuing the work on beating cancer and on preventive health.
Wopke Hoekstra will be the Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth. He will continue to work on implementation and adaptation, on climate diplomacy and decarbonisation. And he will also be responsible for taxation.
Andrius Kubilius will be the Commissioner for Defence and Space. He will work on developing the European Defence Union and boosting our investment and industrial capacity.
Marta Kos, it should be noted that the Government of Slovenia has suggested Marta Kos as Member of the College. The nomination procedure which involves the consultation of the national Parliament for a non-binding opinion is ongoing. She will be Commissioner for Enlargement – also responsible for our Eastern neighbourhood.
She will work on supporting Ukraine – and continuing the work on reconstruction, and support candidate countries to prepare them for accession.
Jozef Síkela will be the Commissioner for International Partnerships. He will lead the work on Global Gateway – and ensure that we develop mutually beneficial partnerships which invest in a common future.
Costas Kadis will be the Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans. I count on his experience to help build a resilient, competitive, and sustainable sector and present the first European Oceans Pact.
Maria Luís Albuquerque will be the Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investment Union. This will be vital to strengthen and complete our Capital Markets Union and ensure that private investment powers our productivity and innovation.
Hadja Lahbib will be the Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management. This is another new portfolio which will look at resilience, preparedness and civil protection. She will be responsible for leading our efforts on crisis management and humanitarian aid.
Magnus Brunner will be the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration. He will of course focus on the implementation of the Pact on Asylum and Migration – but also on strengthening our borders and developing a new internal security strategy.
Jessika Roswall will be the Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy. She will have an important job to help preserve our environment and put nature on the balance sheet. She will help develop a more circular and more competitive economy. And she will lead the work on water resilience which is a big priority for the years ahead.
Piotr Serafin will be the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration. He will report directly to me and notably focus on preparing the next long-term budget and ensure we have a modern institution to deliver for Europeans.
Dan Jørgensen will be the Commissioner for Energy and Housing. His work will help to bring down energy prices, invest in clean energy and ensure that we cut our dependencies. He will be the first ever Commissioner for Housing – looking at all aspects from energy efficiency to investment and construction.
Ekaterina Zaharieva will be Commissioner for Research and Innovation. We must put research and innovation, science and technology at the centre of our economy. She will help ensure that we invest more and focus our spending on strategic priorities and on groundbreaking innovation.
Michael McGrath will be Commissioner for Democracy, Justice and the Rule of Law. I have entrusted him with the responsibility to take forward the European Democracy Shield. He will also lead our work on the rule of law, anti-corruption and consumer protection.
Apostolos Tzitzikostas will be Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism. He is responsible for mobility of goods and people. These are essential sectors for our competitiveness but also for our transitions, for connecting people and driving local economies.
Christophe Hansen will be the Commissioner for Agriculture and Food. He will have the task to bring to life the report and recommendations of the Strategic Dialogue. And based on the Strategic Dialogue he will develop a Vision for Agriculture and Food in the first 100 days of the mandate.
Glenn Micallef will be Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Culture, Youth and Sport. Intergenerational fairness is a cross cutting topic. It affects all of us – and especially young people. It is about the right balance in a society. And I have entrusted Glenn to watch over it.
The key message is that wherever we come from, whatever our job title: we must all work together. We will have open debates. We will all be independent in thought and action. And we will all take ownership of what is agreed. This is the team that I am putting forward today.
On this basis, once the European Parliament has received the official letter of the Council in agreement with the President of the Commission, it may proceed with the formal proceedings for the nomination of the new college. Always in accordance with its rules of procedure.The post European Commission | Press statement by President von der Leyen on the next College of Commissioners first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EU companies grow and innovate less than American counterparts
Blog post by Diego Cerdeiro, Gee Hee Hong, Alfred Kammer | In the European Union, income per person, one of the main gauges of living standards, is on average one-third less than in the United States, mostly because of lower productivity—as emphasized by Mario Draghi’s Sept. 9 competitiveness report for the European Commission. But what is the cause of the problem? As we show in the forthcoming Regional Economic Outlook, Europe’s aggregate productivity problem can be traced back to performance differences at the firm level.
Among large, leading companies, productivity and innovation have diverged markedly across both sides of the Atlantic. Market valuations of US-listed firms have more than tripled since 2005, while Europe’s have grown by only 60 percent. While valuations can reflect expectations that end up unmet, our analysis suggests that the divergence stems also from a productivity gap across all industries and is particularly pronounced in technology sectors. Productivity for US technology firms has surged by nearly 40 percent since 2005, yet it’s little changed for European companies. This significant difference is underpinned by much greater innovation efforts among enterprises in the United States, where research and development spending as a share of sales is more than double that of Europe.

Europe also suffers from a broader lack of business dynamism beyond large corporations. There is a lower number of startups, and too few among them grow fast and eventually become large firms. In the United States, the fastest growing young companies employ six times more people (as share of total employment) than their European counterparts. With fewer successful young firms, there are also fewer large and highly productive companies later on. There is, instead, an overabundance of small and low-growth firms.
Europe’s weaker business dynamism is partly due to constraints to scaling up—particularly in innovation. Two key factors are a smaller market size and access to finance:

Market size: While the EU and US markets are comparable in terms of purchasing-power parity gross domestic product, the EU’s is still highly fragmented. Trade intensity between EU countries is less than half the level between US states. That means a European business doesn’t benefit from economies of scale and network effects the way an American one does—which is especially harmful in tech, where scaling up quickly is critical.

Access to finance: In the last two decades, US-listed firms have issued about twice as much equity relative to their size as their European counterparts. Equity is crucial to finance intangible investments like patents or trademarks that can’t be pledged as collateral for bank credit, and to protect these investments against short-term economic fluctuations. Funding through debt also bears higher interest rates, especially for younger businesses. Venture capital investment could help these firms, but the size of that market in the EU as a share of the economy is only around a quarter what it is in the US.

Addressing these root causes behind the underperformance of European businesses will require significant action at both the EU and domestic levels.
Deepening the European single market would lift constraints to growth for Europe’s most productive firms. Removing remaining barriers to trade within the EU and advancing the capital markets union would incentivize firms to undertake R&D and other investments that only pay off with a large customer base. For example, investing more in physical infrastructure to connect EU countries and deeper services trade liberalization can expand firms’ market access within Europe. Easing the constraints that inhibit venture capital would increase the availability of equity financing for startups and young firms. Measures include harmonizing regulations that hinder investments in larger venture funds; and having the European Investment Fund play a catalytic role by providing a quality seal, including through due diligence as a public good.
Improving business dynamism also requires strong domestic efforts that match EU-level ambitions. Easing remaining administrative barriers to entry would help more people start businesses, especially in services sectors. Facilitating the entry of new, innovative firms also calls for labor market regulations that protect workers, not jobs. This means combining more flexible layoff procedures with adequate unemployment benefits and strong active labor market policies that support job search and skill development. Tax and regulatory incentives for small firms should be made temporary to incentivize firm growth. Finally, supporting tertiary education and addressing skill mismatches are critical to foster ideas creation through new firms and technology adoption by existing businesses.
The EU must find common ground for removing barriers to goods, services, capital, and labor flows within the single market. The efforts will need to span multiple areas, opening protected sectors, lowering regulatory costs of operating across borders, expanding the capital market for innovative ventures, and investing in education. A thriving business sector is key to reducing Europe’s large productivity and income per capita gap.
See full post here.
 
Compliments of the IMFThe post IMF | How to Awaken Europe’s Private Sector and Boost Economic Growth first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

NEW YORK—The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Center for Microeconomic Data today released the August 2024 Survey of Consumer Expectations, which shows inflation expectations remained unchanged at the short- and longer-term horizons, and rebounded somewhat at the medium-term horizon after a sharp decrease last month. Labor market expectations were mixed, but largely stable. Households were more optimistic about the availability of credit a year from now. Delinquency expectations rose slightly again, to the highest level since April 2020.
The main findings from the August 2024 Survey are:
Inflation

Median inflation expectations at the one- and five-year horizons remained unchanged in August at 3.0% and 2.8%, respectively. Median inflation expectations at the three-year horizon rebounded somewhat from the low July reading, increasing from 2.3% to 2.5%. The survey’s measure of disagreement across respondents (the difference between the 75th and 25th percentile of inflation expectations) increased at all three horizons.
Median inflation uncertainty—or the uncertainty expressed regarding future inflation outcomes—was unchanged at the one-year horizon and declined at the three- and five-year horizons.
Median home price growth expectations increased to 3.1% from 3.0% in July.
Median year-ahead expected price changes increased by 0.1 percentage point to 3.6% for gas, by 0.2 percentage point to 7.3% for rent, and 0.4 percentage point to 8.0% for medical care, but declined by 0.3 percentage point to 4.4% for food and 1.3 percentage points to 5.9% for the cost of a college education.

Labor Market

Median one-year-ahead expected earnings growth increased to 2.9% from 2.7%, just above its 12-month trailing average of 2.8%. The increase was most pronounced for respondents in households with less than $50,000 annual income.
Mean unemployment expectations—or the mean probability that the U.S. unemployment rate will be higher one year from now—increased to 37.7% from 36.6% in July.
The mean perceived probability of losing one’s job in the next 12 months decreased by 1.0 percentage point to 13.3%, falling below the 12-month trailing average of 13.7%. The mean probability of leaving one’s job voluntarily in the next 12 months also decreased, to 19.1% from 20.7%, falling slightly below the 12-month trailing average of 19.4%.
The mean perceived probability of finding a job if one’s current job was lost decreased by 0.2 percentage point to 52.3%, remaining below the 12-month trailing average of 53.9% and well below its year-ago reading of 55.7%.

Household Finance

Median expected growth in household income increased by 0.1 percentage point to 3.1%, remaining within the narrow range of 3.0% to 3.1% the series has maintained for the past year.
Median household spending growth expectations increased by 0.1 percentage point to 5.0%. The series has moved within a narrow range of 4.9% to 5.2% since November 2023, remaining well above its February 2020 level of 3.1%.
Perceptions of credit access compared to a year ago improved with a smaller share reporting tighter conditions compared to a year ago. Expectations about future credit access also improved, with a smaller share of respondents expecting tighter credit conditions a year from now, and a larger share expecting easier conditions. The shares reporting or expecting worse credit conditions are at their lowest levels since early 2022, while the share expecting improved credit availability is at its highest level since September 2021.
The average perceived probability of missing a minimum debt payment over the next three months increased by 0.3 percentage point to 13.6%, its third consecutive increase. The current reading is the highest since April 2020.
The median expected year-ahead change in taxes at current income level declined by 0.1 percentage point to 3.9%.
Median year-ahead expected growth in government debt decreased to 9.1% from 9.3%.
The mean perceived probability that the average interest rate on saving accounts will be higher in 12 months increased by 1.5 percentage points to 26.6%.
Perceptions about households’ current financial situations deteriorated slightly with fewer respondents reporting being better off than a year ago and more respondents reporting being worse off. Year-ahead expectations also deteriorated somewhat, with a larger share of respondents expecting to be worse off. Overall, respondents remain considerably more optimistic about their financial situation compared to a year ago.
The mean perceived probability that U.S. stock prices will be higher 12 months from now remained unchanged at 39.3%.

About the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)

The SCE contains information about how consumers expect overall inflation and prices for food, gas, housing, and education to behave. It also provides insight into Americans’ views about job prospects and earnings growth and their expectations about future spending and access to credit. The SCE also provides measures of uncertainty regarding consumers’ outlooks. Expectations are also available by age, geography, income, education, and numeracy.
The SCE is a nationally representative, internet-based survey of a rotating panel of approximately 1,300 household heads. Respondents participate in the panel for up to 12 months, with a roughly equal number rotating in and out of the panel each month. Unlike comparable surveys based on repeated cross-sections with a different set of respondents in each wave, this panel allows us to observe the changes in expectations and behavior of the same individuals over time. For further information on the SCE, please refer to an overview of the survey methodology, the interactive chart guide, and the survey questionnaire.
 
For more information, please contact:

Connor Munsch, Corporate Communications Analyst, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
The post NY Fed | Consumers’ Inflation and Labor Market Expectations Remain Largely Stable first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Lord Mayor, Ambassadors, Governor Bailey, distinguished guests, it is a great honour to be here with you this evening.
Thank you Lord Mayor for the invitation, and thanks to the City of London corporation for this opportunity in this storied venue.
As a proud Irishman and European, my connections with the United Kingdom and London in particular run very deep, both personally and professionally.
London is very much a home away from home for me. It is where I first moved to from Dublin, it’s where I started my first job, and it’s where lifelong friendships and relationships were formed.
Standing here amidst the timeless grandeur of Guildhall, we are reminded of London’s rich history where every corner tells a story of a city that has shaped the world.
As part of my preparation for tonight, I was reading about the history of Guildhall. This remarkable backdrop is a place where court was held, taxes collected, and laws and regulations fine-tuned. Indeed, I read that ‘guildhall’ probably comes from the Saxon word ‘gild’, meaning a payment. It is a resilient demonstration of what has gone before.
It is appropriate then to set out what I see as a key issue for our economies in the future. And one that is common for Europe, for the UK and indeed for the global economy – namely, how to pay for and meet the very large investment needs which our societies face in the years to come, and do so in a way that reduces inequalities within our countries.
We are in a period of historic change, with new technologies fundamentally changing how we live, wars across the world, and having recently emerged from a global pandemic. All of this is occurring while our ecology and environment is being reshaped by climate change.
The lesson from history is that any of one of these changes would have restructured the societies and economies that have gone before. All of these changes are happening together for us.
This is why we are close to an inflection point among Western economies as we look at the fiscal positions of the EU, the US and the UK and critically the demands on those budgets.
So this evening, I will hone in on three specific areas:

first, making the case for market based economies;
second, how this in turn fits the rationale for the European Union; and
third, why a sea-change in capital markets union in Europe is underway, which leaves great grounds for optimism.

I will then conclude with some thoughts looking ahead from the shared perspectives faced by the UK and Europe.
 
Markets work, but we need to keep on making the case for them
So to begin, I want to set out the case for market economies and how this can help us approach the financing or investment gaps that we now confront.
From my student days right through to being a Minister, I have seen first-hand how easily opinions become divided between ardent and unapologetic advocates for unbridled laissez-faire on the one side and advocates of a State of the Leviathan on the other.
The market economy is under intense scrutiny, with the current political environment shining a lens on many of its deficiencies.
The needle of public opinion is fragile, perhaps due to the ‘permacrisis’ narrative that has gained traction in recent years.
The risk of such trends taking on nationalistic and protectionist hues is very real. Most of us will recall our economic history, in particular the great British classical liberals of the 19th century. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and many others warned of the inherent dangers that such protectionism could bring in the form of vested interests and economic inefficiencies that ultimately fail to deliver on the benign intentions behind such policies.
Their insights are still very relevant today.
Yet I do not believe we face a binary choice here between State dominance and laissez-faire economics.
These arguments are well made in Martin Wolf’s excellent book, ‘The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism’, where he says “people expect the economy to deliver reasonable levels of prosperity and opportunity to themselves and their children. When it does not, relative to those expectations, they become frustrated and resentful”.
This encapsulates well the role of markets within democracies and the need to work to maintain the social licence and support for those values. Wolf also emphasises the large extent to which an economy which rewarded people for developing new commercial ideas in competition with one another has been a “driving force behind the transformation in prosperity over the past two centuries”.
However, it is clear that there is dissatisfaction in how market economies are delivering within democracies and this is clearly affecting political outcomes.
Faith in the economy’s ability to deliver for households has ebbed and eroded in recent times. Eurobarometer survey data shows that while 47% of Europeans are satisfied with the situation of the economy – the highest level since 2019 – 73% expect their standard of living to decrease in the time ahead. This echoes similar surveys carried out elsewhere in the Western world. For example, the Edelman Trust Barometer last year showed a significant collapse in economic optimism across Western liberal democracies, confidence levels at their bleakest in Western Europe (France (12%), Germany (15%), Italy (18%), the Netherlands (19%), the UK (23%), Spain (26%), Sweden (29%), Ireland (31%)) and Japan (just 9%) in terms of expectations of being better off in five years, with levels also low in Canada (28%), Australia (30%) and the United States (36%).
In instances of recent market failures or disruptions, it has been the State – in many cases through coordinated action at the international level – that has stepped in, whether through the response to the financial crisis of 2008, the Covid pandemic or the recent energy price shock.
But this is simply not sustainable. Addressing our future priorities which relate to health care, the climate transition and security implies substantial funding needs.
As outlined by the IMF earlier this year, we have a policy trilemma (see IMF report):

first, spending demands and pressures remain very high – for wages, for pensions, for health care, etc,
second, there is an inherent resistance to higher levels of taxation,
third, there is a need to bring deficit and debt levels down to safer levels, to create space for investment and to rebuild budgetary buffers.

In this environment and facing these issues, the challenge is to more than making the case for market based economies. This is more than a communication challenge. This is about how markets are organised. This is why there is a new imperative to harness private savings and investment and to rekindle faith in the private sector’s capacity to effectively respond to public demand for societal transformations.
This is vital because the public purse and the tax payer cannot fund on their own, the investments that societies need to respond to the many changes that we now confront.
As Wolf argued so clearly, the success of the market economy rests very much on the support of the public. This consideration needs to be present in our policy-making. We should not lose sight of how our decisions are communicated and explained to our citizens in an environment where public opinion so easily becomes a victim of false narratives and misinformation.
 
Evolving the EU Single Market to deliver market change 
As President of the Eurogroup, it will be no surprise to this assembled audience to know that the following questions are top of my mind in a European context, namely:

how to support the development of markets within the EU, in a way that is beneficial to EU citizens and to the common good; and
how to communicate appropriately with the public about how the EU operates.

The EU policies that provide the most tangible and practical benefits are the most popular among citizens. Given my role as President of the Eurogroup, I will take the single currency, the euro, as an example.
The euro, certainly in relation to Guildhall, is in its absolute infancy. Despite its infancy it is not without its own trials and tribulations.
This magnificent structure standing since 1411, survived both the Great Fire of London and the Blitz. The euro too has evolved, surviving existential crises like the financial and sovereign debt crisis.
Just this year, we marked the 25th anniversary since the euro came into force as a single currency. In the space of only two decades, the euro has grown to become the second largest reserve currency in the world.
The euro area, its’ institutions and functioning have been modified and improved to address deficiencies in the original construct – a clear example is the establishment of centralised banking supervision following the financial crisis.
The periods in between shocks have also been marked by solid and sustained growth and convergence, perhaps best encapsulated by the recent record levels of employment and activity across European labour markets, where jobless numbers have never been lower, even in spite of a war on our continent.
The success of the euro is not just evident in economic data but it is also recognised by its citizens – with 79% of citizens living in the euro area believing that having the euro is a good thing for the EU, while 69% believe that it is a good thing for their own country (source:  Eurobarometer, November 2023).
The EU and its member states must continually challenge themselves to ensure that we are indeed delivering on its promise, in a way which truly benefits our citizens in a meaningful and tangible way.
A good starting point is the recognition that a number of critical aspects to the four basic freedoms remain partial or incomplete.
In the period ahead, there will continue to be a lot of focus on breaking down unnecessary impediments to creating a truly integrated single market in Europe.
Despite free movement of capital being one of the fundamental pillars of the EU single market, we have not yet realised a truly single market for capital.
The simple reality is that entrepreneurs and businesses in Europe are more likely to seek bank funding than their counterparts in the United States.
Banks play a critical role enabling deeper and more liquid markets. But we know banks typically are more conservative in their lending and also more focused on domestic rather than international markets.
Similarly, if you are an investor and you need capital, the main players tend to be US firms and agencies and the equity market in Europe is less than half the size of the US.
We need to be able to better provide the opportunities and conditions for our companies to find the financing they need to grow, innovate and become more competitive within Europe. We need to take down the barriers which prevent them from fully benefiting from a single market for capital where a business in one European country can easily access financing opportunities in another. We need more competition and greater diversification of risks across the Union.
That is why capital markets union has to be central to our agendas.
 
Why doing more on CMU is back on the agenda
It is because we are at ‘an inflection point’ in relation to the public finances and investment needs.
Debt levels, partly as a result of the pandemic, remain high, and potentially stretched in some cases.
At the same time, the demands for spending are at all-time highs and will only get larger as our populations age.
That is the uncomfortable but obvious truth.
At a time of growing dissatisfaction about the role of market-based solutions and at a time of such widespread budget challenges, making further progress on Capital Markets Union is essential.
The EU itself has the answer to these questions – in this case, the Capital Markets Union. I truly believe that making progress on the Capital Markets Union will bring tangible benefits to our businesses, and better opportunities for our citizens to provide and save for future projects.
This is all the more important at a time of growing dissatisfaction about the role of capitalism and market economies.
Our capital markets are vital as a means of unlocking funding sources – to close the gap between demand and supply, addressing the needs of citizens, communities and society as a whole.
The reality of course is that this is ‘simple economics but difficult politics’. To quote what is known as the ‘Juncker dilemma’, we all know what to do we just don’t know how to get elected if we do it!
Or maybe this is a case of ‘we know what we need to do, we just can’t see why it’s important to getting us elected’. If this conundrum catches on, Lord Mayor, I will christen it the ‘Mainelli dilemma’, in honour of you!
But I am increasingly optimistic on the prospects of real progress towards a true capital markets union in Europe as there is a sea change in attitudes and political determination in recent months.
At the origin has been the recent work by the Eurogroup, the body that I am privileged to Chair, done at the request of EU leaders. Following extensive engagement with industry we agreed on a set of proposals on the future of European Capital Markets in March.
These are ambitious but realistic proposals that I believe will deliver tangible progress.
Our pragmatic proposals centre on three pillars of action around the rubric of ‘ABC’, with thirteen priority measures comprising 42 actions, as follows:

A for Architecture – that is, how we can reduce barriers, how we can develop a better regulatory and supervisory system that works for businesses, investors and savers,
B for Business – ensuring that businesses, especially SMEs looking to grow quicker, have access as well as the knowledge and capacity to benefit from the appropriate funding to grow and remain competitive in Europe, and
C for Citizens – how we can create better opportunities for citizens to save for future projects, investments and retirement, and facilitate access to capital markets for retail investors.

In addition to the three pillars of our statement, there is another ‘3’ I’d like to mention – the three avenues through which progress will need to be made going forward.
First, there is the EU legislative track, and our statement, which represents the political consensus and identifies recommended areas of focus for initiatives to be brought forward by the European Commission.
Second, measures which can be progressed at the national level, with the aim of developing and deepening European capital markets.
The third and final avenue is industry, which has a crucial role to play in the development of Europe’s capital markets. So while we cannot instruct industry, our statement does include a number of areas which I hope industry will consider over the coming months and years.
Our agreement was endorsed by EU Leaders at the March Euro Summit, and also served as the foundation for the April European Council conclusions.
At the Eurogroup, Ministers agreed a high-level work programme which will ensure that the implementation of our agreement remains at the top of the political agenda over the course of the next year. There is a political consensus and I am determined to keep the pressure on and ensure implementation.
What does this mean?
It means building institutional momentum on CMU within European institutions and also within member states.  And we see progress already, not least in political guidelines for the next European Commission outlined in July by President von der Leyen.
To maintain momentum within member states we will hold regular follow-up sessions at technical and Ministerial level to monitor progress on national initiatives to deepen capital markets.
We must act now to take advantage of this momentum.
To play the ‘devil’s advocate’, without a true capital markets union in Europe, I think the green transition as one prime example, is far less likely to happen. This would likely weaken further the case for market based economies, I spoke about at the beginning of my remarks.
We need to make the case for the potential within our economies and the necessity of unblocking funding sources and recent agreements in Europe give me a real sense of hope.
Change is happening and we have the necessary political momentum.
 
Common challenges
Of course, it is not just the EU which is looking at these questions – I know that the UK is also keen to make the most of its capital markets with the right architecture within the financial services sector to provide security for investors, as well as capital for businesses.
There are common challenges faced by both the EU and UK financial sectors. These include issues prioritised by Chancellor Reeves like reforming the pensions system, an area which the Eurogroup has also identified as a priority and where we intend to make progress in the coming months and years. Enlarging the use of longer-term savings and investment products, including through occupational and personal pension schemes will be critical to the success of CMU. Just today I met the Chancellor and discussed these common issues and I look forward to working with her at the G7.
More broadly it is particularly welcome that the UK-EU Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Services was signed last year, paving the way for the first two meetings of the Joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum.
This Forum provides the opportunity to exchange views on key issues of importance for both jurisdictions, with the aim of preserving financial stability, market integrity and the protection of investors and consumers.
Of course, the UK and EU each have to make their own decisions about how to make progress. However, it is really welcome that we have moved onto a new footing in our relationship which allows us to exchange views on these important topics for our citizens and businesses.
Financial instability does not respect borders, so we have to work closely together in partnership to build resilience and safeguard stability.
More broadly, l strongly welcome the UK Government’s intention to strengthen and deepen relations with the EU.
Ireland has always supported the closest possible relationship between the EU and the UK and we will continue to do so. I hope the ‘first steps’ taken to re-build trust and develop relationships turn into a ‘steady walk’.
 
The case for optimism
I have covered a lot of ground and I want to conclude on an optimistic note.
I strongly believe that our economies and societies have fared well in the face of a pretty severe set of shocks.
If I was to pick one word to encapsulate how the euro area has fared, it would be ‘resilience’.
The pandemic for one was, I hope, a once in a lifetime shock – a black swan event. The forecasts for our future, at that point, were so bleak.
In fact, the euro area economy bounced back very quickly and multiple times faster than the slow dis-jointed recovery that marked the post financial crisis era. The UK economy also showed very strong GDP numbers following the pandemic. These are foundations that we build upon.
However, we need to do more. Europe and the United Kingdom need to double down on our shared democratic values and priorities.
Democracies and economies need to change, and how our capital markets change is part of that in order to address the societal transformations underway. They need to change to address the big issues we face – our investment needs for climate change, digital transformation, defence spending and ageing.
This is the benchmark against which we need to judge the success of the market economy we are developing and communicating about.
So to return to where I began – the remarkable backdrop of this centre of City government since the Middle ages and central to the City’s development since the Romans founded Londinium here 2000 years ago – this Guildhall.
When building the architecture of our financial future, we can draw inspiration from this building, which has stood the trials and tribulations and tests of time.
We need strong foundations to underpin our market, we need sturdy pillars to support it, we need talented craftsmen shape it and carve it, and importantly we need merchants to operate it.
Let the building begin.
 
For more information, please contact:

Kornelia Kozovska, Spokesperson for the Eurogroup President

 
Compliments of the European CouncilThe post European Council | Keynote speech by the Eurogroup President, Paschal Donohoe, to the City of London Corporation on ‘Financing Our Future’, 3 September 2024 first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

By Alexander Al-Haschimi, Lorenz Emter, Vanessa Gunnella, Iván Ordoñez Martínez, Tobias Schuler and Tajda Spital | Euro area exporters are facing tougher competition from China. But why is that? The ECB Blog looks at the important role played by price competitiveness and the ongoing industrial upgrades being made in China.
Euro area manufacturers have long benefited from Chinese exports, such as using cheap parts to produce their own finished products. In recent years, however, China has increasingly become an exporter of final goods itself. This has coincided with significant decline in the euro area’s share in the global export market, while China’s share has steadily increased (Chart 1). In this post, we look at what is behind this and what it means for euro area exporters.
 
Chart 1
Global non-energy goods export market shares (percentages)

Source: Trade Data MonitorNotes: Market shares in values of manufacturing exports excluding energy and other specific and non-classified products (HS2 sectors 25, 26, 27, 97, 98, 99). The euro area export market share shows extra-euro area trade. Latest observation: 2023.
China’s export strength is of course not the only reason for the euro area’s declining share, which has fallen by eleven percentage points since 2000, a similar but more gradual than the decline of the share of the United States. Two additional factors play a role: Europe’s gradual transition from a manufacturing-based to a more services-oriented economy and the rising integration of China and other emerging economies into the global market drive the longer-term trend.
Additionally and more recently, global preferences shifted during the pandemic, with demand moving away from goods and markets in which the euro area has historically specialised, i.e. capital goods like machinery and electrical equipment.[1] Supply disruptions, also brought on by the pandemic, compounded these difficulties because of European exporters’ deep integration in regional and global supply chains.[2] Finally, the energy shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine meant higher energy and other input costs, eroding euro area exporters’ price competitiveness further.
Euro area and China are now in direct competition
Our analysis indicates that recent losses in euro area price competitiveness are particularly linked to competition from China. Since 2021, China has accounted for the euro area’s entire appreciation in the real effective exchange rate based on producer prices (Chart 2). This measure lets us compare price developments vis-à-vis other countries and regions. Since the nominal CNY-EUR exchange rate remained broadly stable over this period, the euro area’s competitiveness loss is primarily due to an unfavourable evolution of the relative Producer Price Index (PPI). Simply put, euro area products became more expensive vis-à-vis Chinese products, for reasons we discuss in more detail below.
 
Chart 2
Euro area real exchange rates

(index, 2021Q1=100, increase=worsening price competitiveness)Source: ECB.Notes: China’s share in manufacturing trade is used as weight to exclude China from the real effective exchange rate. Latest observation: 2024Q2.
 
The impact of shifts in price competitiveness between the euro area and China hinges on their direct competition in export markets. While cheap intermediate products from China make input cheaper for euro area firms, they also pose a challenge if both compete with their end-products in the same markets.[3] Two decades ago, China competed mainly in low-value sectors, such as clothing, footwear, or plastic. That mostly affected southern euro area economies, which were exporting the same types of goods. As China’s exports have moved up the value chain, they are challenging more and more European exporters, including those in high value-added industries like automotive and specialised machinery. Indeed, the number of sectors in which both the euro area and China have a revealed comparative advantage (RCA) – meaning they export more in these sectors than the global average – has increased steadily in recent years (Chart 3).
 
Chart 3
Sectors in which the euro area and China have an RCA compared to rest of the world (percentages)

Sources: UNCTAD and ECB staff calculations. Notes: Sectors with RCA>1 in both the euro area and China, as a share of the number of sectors in which the euro area has RCA>1.In total, 259 sectors are being considered for each year. Euro area aggregate computed as a weighted average based on export value weights. Latest observation: 2023.
With Chinese and euro area firms increasingly competing in similar export markets, price competitiveness differences matter more and more – and China gained significant price competitiveness vis-à-vis the euro area in recent years. Chinese export prices have been declining primarily because of three factors. First, the downturn in the country’s real estate market has dampened demand, resulting in substantial price reductions for certain commodities. Steel export prices, for example, have dropped by more than 50% since the start of the downturn in 2022, as have cement export prices.[4] Second, China’s advanced manufacturing sectors are gaining a significant cost advantage due to substantial government subsidies, in particular in high-tech sectors.[5] Third, excess capacity within China’s domestic market is intensifying domestic competition, leading to a decline in prices and a compression of profit margins inside the country.[6] This makes exports an increasingly important source of revenues as profit margins outside mainland China, and especially in the euro area, can be substantially higher.[7] Chinese electric vehicle makers have already assumed a dominant position in Southeast Asia despite selling at a premium relative to the domestic market. Given their comparatively higher profit margins, Chinese firms also have considerable room to further reduce their prices, thereby enhancing their competitiveness with respect to euro area firms.
The increasing price competitiveness pressures in the last four years have already dampened euro area export performance. Indeed, export market shares fell particularly in sectors in which euro area prices increased relatively more than Chinese prices. This trend is illustrated in Chart 4, which shows euro area export market shares declining sharply in sectors where euro area producer prices have risen more than those of China particularly in high-energy intensive sectors. To understand the chart, keep in mind that the size of the bubbles represents how much each sector contributes to total euro area exports. Bigger bubbles mean the sector is more significant for euro area exports, and their position shows how much prices have changed and how market shares have shifted. For example, the car industry faced between 2019 and 2023 disadvantages in their producer prices relative to Chinese manufacturers of 7.5 percent and a loss of market share by more than 15 percent.
One major reason for this recent shift is the euro area’s struggle with the energy crisis, which has hit energy-intensive sectors like basic metals (iron and steel) and chemicals/plastic products particularly hard. These sectors have seen significant drops in both price competitiveness and market shares. Another factor is China’s excess capacity in several manufacturing sectors. In the motor vehicles sector, for example, China has gained market share from the euro area, especially in battery electric vehicles (BEVs), thanks to its dominance in global battery production and resulting price advantage.
 
Chart 4
China-euro area relative price changes and relative market share changes

x-axis: relative China-euro area PPI change between 2019 and 2023 (percentages), y-axis: relative China-euro area export market share change between 2019 and 2023 (percentage points)
Source: Haver, TDM and ECB staff calculations.Notes: Export market shares in values. The sectors food and wood are excluded from the scatterplot. Size of bubbles based on share of each sector in total extra euro area exports in 2023.
 
Going forward, the competitive pressure from China is set to intensify significantly. Production plans for green energy technology such as BEVs entail a sharp rise in output, which is projected to significantly outpace growth of domestic demand, further compounding existing overcapacities in these sectors. China is also investing substantially in additional export shipping capacity. For instance, the scheduled delivery of additional shipping vessels is projected to significantly increase China’s annual export capacity of cars multiple times over between 2023 and 2026. The global absorption of these additional exports likely necessitates a further compression of profit margins, thereby increasing competitiveness pressures on euro area exports over the coming years.
Euro area manufacturers must adapt to this evolving landscape, not least because the sector employs over 20 million people and makes up 15 percent of euro area GDP. Embracing innovation, investing in sustainable and energy-efficient technologies, and enhancing supply chain resilience are steps that can help bolster competitiveness. Additionally, strategic market diversification and closer collaboration within the euro area could help mitigate the risks posed by the external challenges. Furthermore, policymakers should aim at developing a fair and level playing field for the trade links with China.
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
 

See, e.g., “Global Trade and Value Chains during the Pandemic“, in World Economic Outlook, Chapter 4, April 2022
For more details, see box entitled “The impact of supply bottlenecks on trade” in ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 6, 2021. See “Understanding the impact of COVID-19 supply disruptions on exporters in global value chains”, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 1, 2023.
See Aghion P., Bergeaud A., Lequien M., Melitz M. and Zuber T. (2024), “Opposing Firm-Level Responses to the China Shock: Output Competition versus Input Supply,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pp. 249-269 and Friesenbichler, K. S., Kügler, A., and Reinstaller, A. (2024), “The impact of import competition from China on firm‐level productivity growth in the European Union”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 86(2), pp. 236-256.
China is exerting downward pressure on prices both directly and indirectly. For instance, the decline in steel prices indirectly influences the European market despite anti-dumping measures as Chinese firms are exporting to third countries.
While China is increasingly demonstrating an ability to innovate in high tech sectors, as evidenced in the past with 5G telecommunication technology, EVs, and mobile phones, among others, the Chinese cost of research and production is kept artificially low by state subsidies that are approximately four times higher than in other advanced and major emerging market economies, offered in the form of direct subsidies, tax incentives or below-market credit. See also DiPippo, G. et al. (2022). “Red ink: estimating Chinese industrial policy spending in comparative perspective.” Center for Strategic and International Studies and “Key factors behind productivity trends in EU countries” in ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 268, 2021.
China’s excess capacity can be defined as a level of production that cannot be absorbed by demand at current prices. This excess capacity stems from weak domestic demand following the downturn of the real estate market and from government investment-led policies, boosting the supply side of the economy. Recent survey evidence confirms the existence of overcapacities and their deflationary effects. In a May 2024 survey by the European Chamber of Commerce in China, over one-third of respondents among European companies in China observed overcapacity in their industry over the past year and cited overinvestment as the main reason for overcapacity. See European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. (2024). “Business Confidence Survey”. This is supported by sectoral data on rising inventory-to-sales ratios coupled with declining profitability and a structural Bayesian VAR analysis, demonstrating that export growth in several sectors is increasingly supply driven. See also “The evolution of China’s growth model: challenges and long-term prospects”, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, 2024.
For Chinese EV producers, profit margins in the euro area can be up to 10 times higher than in China. See “Ain’t No Duty High Enough” (2024). Rhodium Group.

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Following its stress test earlier this year, the Federal Reserve Board on Wednesday announced final individual capital requirements for all large banks, effective on October 1.
Large bank capital requirements are informed by the Board’s stress test results, which provide a risk-sensitive and forward-looking assessment of capital needs. The table shows each bank’s common equity tier 1 capital requirement, which is made up of several components, including:

The minimum capital requirement, which is the same for each bank and is 4.5 percent;
The stress capital buffer requirement, which is based in part on the stress test results and is at least 2.5 percent; and
If applicable, a capital surcharge for the largest and most complex banks, which is updated in the first quarter of each year to account for the overall systemic risk of each of these banks.

If a bank’s capital dips below its total requirement announced today, the bank is subject to automatic restrictions on both capital distributions and discretionary bonus payments.
Also today, the Board announced that it had modified the stress capital buffer requirement for Goldman Sachs, after the firm’s request for reconsideration. Based on an analysis of additional information presented by the firm in its request, the Board determined it would be appropriate to adjust the treatment of particular historical expenses incurred by the bank in the stress testing models’ input data, due to the non-recurring nature of those expenses. As a result, the bank’s stress capital buffer requirement has been adjusted to 6.2 percent from a preliminary 6.4 percent.
The Board is focused on continuously improving the stress testing framework. To that end, the Board will analyze whether to revise regulatory reporting forms to better capture these types of data and to explore possible refinements to certain model components.
 
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New governors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Papua New Guinea lifted the share of central banks with women leaders to 16 percent
Women are leading more central banks than ever before, thanks to appointments in the past year, but recent gains still leave the share of female governors far short of parity.
The number of women in governor roles rose to 29 this year from 23 last year, though that left the share of female leaders at just 16 percent of the world’s 185 central banks, according to an April report by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. Greater gender balance in senior positions may help increase the diversity of thought and checks and balances, in turn contributing to increased economic and financial stability and improved performance, IMF research shows.
Appointments this year in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Papua New Guinea are examples of how smaller economies are driving more progress on gender balance, according to OMFIF, a London-based think tank for monetary, economic and investment issues.
This year’s rise was the biggest gain in more than a decade of surveys, but the Chart of the Week shows how central banks still have much room to make progress toward greater parity in the ranks of top policymakers steering the global economy.

The tally adds to evidence of the struggle of women at central banks as well as in the economics discipline, where they remain underrepresented even after steady gains.
A first-of-its-kind IMF survey of the European Central Bank and its Group of Seven counterparts showed last year that fewer than half of employees at those institutions are women, but on average only a third of women are economists or managers. This survey underscores how policies to eliminate gender gaps have been only partially successful.
ECB Executive Board member Isabel Schnabel has cited a substantial gender imbalance in economics—one that the institution is determined to change among its own staff. Schnabel noted in a 2020 speech that the barriers aren’t insurmountable, and that mentoring opportunities and ensuring childcare can help narrow gender imbalances.
The latest additions to the list of countries naming a woman as central bank chief came in January, when Jasmina Selimović began a six-year term in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Elizabeth Genia was appointed to the top job after serving as acting governor. Last year, Michele Bullock became the first woman to lead the Reserve Bank of Australia.
Cambodia, Georgia, Moldova and Montenegro also appointed women as the heads of their monetary authorities last year, according to OMFIF’s 2024 gender balance index.
 
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