Under the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Commission is empowered to impose a fee on providers under its supervision, which is expected to be levied for the first time in autumn 2023.  The Commission has now set the detailed rules and procedures for such supervisory fees to be levied.
The delegated regulation aims to provide legal certainty to the service providers designated as Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) or Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) under the DSA. It specifies the methodology and procedures to calculate and levy the supervisory fee, provides further details on the calculation of the overall estimated costs to be covered with the levied fees and on the determination of the individual fees.
The DSA entered into force on 16 November 2022. The obligations for service providers designated as VLOPs or VLOSEs will become applicable four months after their formal designation in accordance with the DSA.
The delegated regulation proposed today follows a public consultation on the draft which took place between 22 December 2022 and 19 January 2023.
Following today’s adoption, the delegated act will now be transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council, which have 3 months to scrutinise it. At their request, the scrutiny period can be extended by 3 months.
More information

Delegated regulation
Digital Services Act package

Compliments of the European Commission.
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Following a dialogue with EU consumer protection authorities and the European Commission (CPC network), WhatsApp committed to being more transparent on changes to its terms of service. Moreover, the company will make it easier for users to reject updates when they disagree with them, and will clearly explain when such rejection leads the user to no longer be able to use WhatsApp’s services. Also, WhatsApp confirmed that users’ personal data are not shared with third-parties or other Meta companies – including Facebook – for advertising purposes. The dialogue was coordinated by the Swedish Consumer Agency and the Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Commission and facilitated by the Commission.
Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, said: “I welcome WhatsApp’s commitments to changing its practices to comply with EU rules, actively informing users of any changes to their contract, and respecting their choices instead of asking them each time they open the app. Consumers have a right to understand what they agree to and what that choice entails concretely, so that they can decide whether they want to continue using the platform.”
The CPC Network first sent a letter to WhatsApp in January 2022, following an alert by the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) and eight of its member associations on alleged unfair practices in the context of WhatsApp’s updates to their terms of service and privacy policy. In June 2022, the CPC Network sent a second letter to WhatsApp reiterating their request that consumers must be clearly informed about WhatsApp’s business model and, in particular, whether WhatsApp derives revenues from commercial policies relating to users’ personal data. Following discussions among the CPC Network, the Commission and WhatsApp, the company confirmed that it does not share users’ personal data for advertising purposes.
Overview of commitments
For any future policy updates, WhatsApp will:

 explain what changes it intends to make to the users’ contracts and how they could affect their rights;
include the possibility to reject updated terms of service as prominently as the possibility to accept them;
ensure that the notifications informing about the updates can be dismissed or the review of the updates can be delayed, as well as respect users’ choices and refrain from sending recurring notifications.

Next steps
The Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC) will actively monitor how WhatsApp implements these commitments when making any future updates to its policies and, where necessary, enforce compliance – including by the possibility of imposing fines.
Moreover, a recent Commission study and the last CPC sweep on “dark patterns” showed that many companies use “dark patterns”, for example making it more difficult to unsubscribe from a service than to subscribe to it. The CPC Network, with the support of   the Commission, will continue to intensify their efforts to addres such illegal practices where they occur.
Background
The new Digital Services Act foresees i.a. an obligation for services to have clear terms and conditions, explaining to the user in comprehensible language when their content or their account can be affected by certain restrictions, and an obligation to apply such restrictions in a diligent, objective and proportionate manner. The DSA will complement rules such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or the General Data Protection Regulation, ensuring that no regulatory gap is left for platforms to manipulate users.
The Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) is a network of authorities responsible for the enforcement of EU consumer protection laws. To tackle cross-border issues, their actions are coordinated at EU level.
National authorities are responsible for the enforcement of EU consumer protection laws. Thanks to the  Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation, they  have a common toolbox of strong powers to detect irregularities and take speedy and coordinated action against non-compliant traders.
Moreover, the new Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules, amended existing EU consumer law instruments by further enhancing transparency for consumers when they buy on online marketplaces.
Cooperation applies to consumer rules covering various areas such as unfair commercial practices, e-commerce, geo-blocking, package holidays, online selling, and passenger rights.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Consumer protection: WhatsApp agrees to comply fully with EU rules, informing users better and respecting their choices on contract updates first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The word “recyclable” shows up in a lot of environmental claims for consumer products, but what do people understand the term to mean? Does that perception reflect the current state of recycling practices? And have there been changes in perception or practices that might suggest updates to the FTC’s Green Guides? Those are some of the topics on the table at Talking Trash at the FTC: Recyclable Claims and the Green Guides, a half-day workshop scheduled for May 23, 2023.
The FTC announced the workshop as part of the ongoing review of its Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims. Panelists will discuss the kinds of “recyclable” claims consumers are seeing in the marketplace, including new representations that may have emerged since the FTC’s last review of the Green Guides in 2012; what research shows about how people perceive those claims; and the current state of recycling practices.
The workshop is set for Tuesday, May 23rd, from 8:30 AM to 12:30 PM at the FTC’s Constitution Center conference room in Washington, DC. You can attend in person or follow the webcast online. Watch this space for more information about the agenda.
You’re also invited to file public comments on the subject of “recyclable” by June 13, 2023. The Federal Register Notice includes details about how to file online.
Compliments of the Federal Trade Commission.
The post Next step in FTC’s Green Guides review: A closer look at “recyclable” claims first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Today, the European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom reached a political agreement in principle on the Windsor Framework. This constitutes a comprehensive set of joint solutions aimed at addressing, in a definitive way, the practical challenges faced by citizens and businesses in Northern Ireland, thereby providing them with lasting certainty and predictability.
The joint solutions cover, amongst other things, new arrangements on customs, agri-food, medicines, VAT and excise, as well as specific instruments designed to ensure that the voices of the people of Northern Ireland are better heard on specific issues particularly relevant to the communities there. These new arrangements are underpinned by robust safeguards to ensure the integrity of the EU’s Single Market, to which Northern Ireland has a unique access.
Today’s political agreement in principle allows the two sides to open a new chapter in our partnership, based on mutual trust and full cooperation, also allowing to unlock the full potential of their relationship.
President Ursula von der Leyen said: “The Windsor Framework was made possible by genuine political will and hard work guided by the fundamental principle that the interests and needs of people should always come first. Supporting and protecting the hard-earned gains of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement was the prerequisite of our endeavour. Today, our achievement allows us to put forward definitive solutions that work for people and businesses in Northern Ireland and that protect our Single Market. It also allows us to turn the page towards a bilateral relationship that mirrors the one of close allies standing shoulder to shoulder in times of crisis.”
The joint solutions, found within the framework of the Withdrawal Agreement, are based on the following starting points:

A comprehensive, cross-cutting and definitive solution, addressing practical difficulties in the operation of the Protocol;
A balance between flexibilities for the movement of goods for end use in Northern Ireland and effective safeguards guaranteeing the protection of the EU’s Single Market;
A clear distinction between goods at risk and goods not at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market.

In the sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) area, the joint solutions ensure that the same food will be available on supermarket shelves in Northern Ireland as in the rest of the UK. In practice, agri-food retail products for end consumption in Northern Ireland will be able to move from Great Britain with minimal certification requirements and controls. UK public health standards will apply for those agri-food retail goods for end consumption in Northern Ireland, whilst EU plant and animal health rules remain applicable for the protection of the EU Single Market. This arrangement is commensurate with a set of existing and new safeguards, including SPS inspection facilities and labelling which will be introduced gradually. When these safeguards are fully in place, identity checks will be reduced to only 5%. Physical checks will follow a risk-based and intelligence-led approach. Moreover, travelling with pets will be easy, thanks to a simple pet travel document, a microchip, and a declaration by the owner that the pet will not travel to the EU.
New arrangements in the area of customs are based on an expanded trusted trader scheme that will also be open to businesses in Great Britain. Goods moved by trusted traders and not at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market will benefit from dramatically simplified procedures and drastically simplified declarations with reduced data requirements. Substantial facilitations were found for freight and the movement of all types of parcels, i.e., business-to-business, business-to-consumer, and consumer-to-consumer, with consumer-to-consumer parcels being entirely exempt from the main customs requirements. These new solutions are made possible especially by new data-sharing arrangements allowing for risk assessments, which would constitute the principle basis for controls. Robust authorisation and monitoring of the trusted trader scheme, and increased market surveillance and enforcement by UK authorities also act as safeguards. Full customs procedures will apply to goods at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market.
A permanent solution has also been found to ensure that people in Northern Ireland have access to all medicines, including novel medicines, at the same time and under the same conditions as people in the rest of the UK. This complements the solution the EU adopted in April 2022 for the supply of generic medicines to Northern Ireland. These new arrangements are made possible by new safeguards, notably labelling, designed to ensure that the medicines do not enter the EU’s Single Market.
New flexibilities were also found for certain VAT and excise rules, accompanied by safeguards protecting the EU from fraud risks or potential distortion of competition. These arrangements include a possibility to set UK VAT rates below EU VAT minima rates for immovable goods with no risk that these goods enter the EU Single Market (e.g., a heat pump for a house). A UK SME VAT exemption scheme is now applicable to both goods and services if the UK respects the EU threshold for the size of SMEs. There is now also a possibility to tax all alcoholic beverages according to their alcoholic strength, and to set reduced duty rates to alcoholic beverages, if served for immediate consumption in hospitality venues in Northern Ireland, as long as the applied rates are not below EU minima duty rates.
With regard to governance, the voices of Northern Ireland people and stakeholders will be better heard through regular engagement at each level of the Withdrawal Agreement structures. There will be enhanced engagement with Northern Ireland stakeholders on Protocol-related matters. New thematic subgroups within the Joint Consultative Working Group will be set up. A new emergency mechanism, the Stormont Brake, will allow the UK government, at the request of 30 Members of the Legislative Assembly in Northern Ireland, to stop the application in Northern Ireland of amended or replacing provisions of Protocol-related EU law that may have a significant and lasting impact specific to the everyday lives of communities there. This mechanism would be triggered under the most exceptional circumstances and as a matter of last resort, in a very well-defined process set out in a Unilateral Declaration by the UK.
The Court of Justice of the European Union remains the sole and ultimate arbiter of EU law.
The joint solutions also address implementation difficulties related to tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for the most sensitive categories of steel and clarify the application of State aid rules.
These new arrangements have been carried out within the framework of the Withdrawal Agreement of which the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland is an integral part. Within these pre-established legal parameters, a number of targeted amendments to the Protocol address, in a definitive way, unforeseen circumstances or deficiencies that have emerged since the start of the Protocol.
Next steps
The European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom will proceed, within the remit of their respective powers, with the necessary steps to translate the joint solutions into legally binding instruments and to implement these swiftly and in good faith. To that effect, a meeting of the EU-UK Joint Committee on the Withdrawal Agreement, co-chaired by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, will also take place in the coming weeks. The Commission has today made proposals to the Council for a Union position as regards, amongst other things, the decisions that need to be adopted in that meeting.
In addition, the Commission has today tabled legislative proposals in the SPS, medicines and TRQs areas, which will now be submitted to the European Parliament and Council.
The respective roles of the European Parliament and Council will be fully respected.
The new arrangements are not compatible with the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill. The Commission welcomes that the UK government is stopping the process of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, and is not proceeding with it, so that it will fall in the UK Parliament at the end of the Parliamentary session. These arrangements, when implemented, mean that there will no longer be grounds for the existing Commission legal proceedings against the United Kingdom relating to the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland.
Background
The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, as an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement, was agreed jointly and ratified by both the EU and the UK. It has been in force since 1 February 2020 and has legal effects under international law. The aim of the Protocol is to protect the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in all its dimensions, maintaining peace and stability in Northern Ireland, avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland, while preserving the integrity of the EU Single Market.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post A new way forward on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: political agreement in principle on the Windsor Framework first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

This week we marked one year of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. At the UN, an overwhelming majority of 141 members voted for a just peace for Ukraine. With only 7 countries voting against, it showed, once more, how isolated Russia is. In a briefing to the Security Council, I also underlined the EU’s track record of promoting peace not just in Ukraine but around the world. Many countries look to the EU as a reliable partner with strong multilateral credentials. But they want reassurance that we will stay engaged on the full range of global challenges.

“With an overwhelming majority of 141 countries voting for a just peace for Ukraine and only 7 voting against, the United Nations General Assembly showed, once more, how isolated Russia is.”

Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission

The United Nations was the nerve centre of global diplomacy this week, with many Foreign Ministers in New York. The main purpose was to discuss and vote on a resolution in the General Assembly that put the spotlight on who is responsible for the war against Ukraine as well as setting out the principles for a just peace.
On Wednesday at an emergency session of the General Assembly, Ukraine tabled the text and I spoke on behalf of EU member states. I stressed that the war was not ‘a European issue’, but affected core global principles like sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right for countries to live in freedom and security. Everyone would be less safe in a world where the illegal use of force would somehow be normalised.
“It is clear that the world wants peace and that Ukrainians deserve peace. But not just any peace”, I said, “we want a just peace, based on international law and respect for the UN Charter”. Supporting Ukraine and searching for peace go together. It is not either or, but both end.
The next day, the resolution was put to a vote. This was a key moment for every UN member to take a stand and be counted. Frankly speaking, there was a lot of speculation whether we would be able to reach a similar level of support as previous Ukraine-related UNGA resolutions (in February 2022 condemning the aggression and in October 2022 on the illegal annexations). These had passed with majorities of 141 and 143 respectively. Was there ‘Ukraine-fatigue’ and resentment over ‘double standards’ among the so-called Global South, as some argued? Would Russia be able to peel away support with its disinformation campaigns? In the end, the result was impressive: 141 vs 7 with 32 abstentions. Russia was only supported by Belarus, DPRK, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua and Syria, which is quite a remarkable club…
The outcome was a resounding success, sending a clear message that the world wants the war to stop – and to stop now. It was a vote for a just peace in Ukraine and for upholding international principles against Russia’s systematic attacks. It was also a success for EU diplomacy: we played a key role in New York but also doing outreach around the world, with good coordination among member-states. At the stake out to the press after the vote, I was glad to be joined by the many EU Foreign Ministers present in New York: showing this was collective success of ‘Team Europe’.
The next day, which marked exactly one year since the start of the war, there was a special session in the Security Council, again with many ministers present. Secretary General Guterres opened and he did not mince his words, making clear that Russia’s invasion was illegal and a direct breach of the UN Charter. He recounted the horrible costs this war entails, for Ukrainians first, but also for the wider world, through rising prices for food, energy and fertilisers. He recalled the clear call for a just peace as enshrined in the UNGA resolution passed the day before.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba reminded everyone of the Russian lies that had preceded the invasion and the horrors that followed. He underlined that how and why Ukraine had resisted and would continue to do so, with the support of all its partners. Ukraine’s victory would also mean the victory of international law, the UN Charter and the principles it contains. He called for a minute of silence to mark the victims in Ukraine. Everyone stood up, apart from the Russian delegation. They said they would only agree to a commemoration of all victims – and only then did they join the rest of the audience in marking their respect.
After that, 13 members of the Security Council echoed many of the points made by the SG, with understandable nuances. Russia for its part launched yet another diatribe, mixing baseless accusations with historical fabrications. It only showed, once again, how the Russian leadership is living in a parallel universe. China introduced its ‘position paper’ on a political settlement. It is not really a peace plan and mostly reiterates well-known Chinese positions, some of which we share while important ones are missing. Of course, we will analyse it, but it is already clear that the key problem is that it does not really distinguish aggressor from the victim, putting the parties at an equal level.
From my side I underlined two points: why Russia’s war of choice matters to all of us and how we should get to peace, building on the UNGA resolution and President Zelensky’s peace plan. I also reiterated that the EU is committed to uphold international law everywhere and that we would continue our global engagement to reduce suffering and work for peace around the world.
The broader picture
These three days in New York confirmed the old saying that the UN is a pretty good mirror of the state of the world. If we look beyond Ukraine, it is clear that global crises are accumulating but the global response is either blocked or inadequate. Leadership and unity are lacking. The Russian war and tensions between China and the US are tearing at the fabric of what we often refer to as the “rules-based international order”.
But equally, a vast major of countries still look to the UN to provide solutions. Like us, they are keen to see multilateral action. Many of them see potential in a stronger role for the EU. They see us as a preferred partner, be it as a counterbalance to China or a more reliable and consistent partner than the US. They see us as more faithful to international norms and the multilateral system and more mindful of the interests of the developing world.
Many also see an international system that they regard as outdated, paralysed and unequal. They want more action on climate finance, reform of the multilateral development banks to leverage more risk and more effective debt relief and restructuring and a better African representation in global decision-making including the G-20, Security Council and in the Bretton Woods institutions. Many are looking to the EU to help deliver at least on some of this long list. The urgency with which we addressed the pandemic or the war in Ukraine is seen by many as an example of the kind of commitment they want to see on other, urgent issues.
We need to think hard what we can do more on this broader agenda. The EU has been flexible on SDRs and shown leadership on the loss and damage issue at COP27.  But how do we move forward a reform of the global financial architecture that is more equitable, fair and effective? We should not forget that this is not all about solidarity, it is also about our enlightened self-interest and geopolitical positioning. I will put these issues on the agenda of the upcoming informal meeting of EU development ministers in March to forge a joint way forward.
In addition, we need to keep reminding people just how much the EU does to support the UN around the world. When others are backing away from multilateralism, we keep investing in multilateral solutions everywhere, financially and politically. For this reason, I was glad to brief the Security Council on Thursday on the full range of EU-UN cooperation.
I pointed to our track-record of being the largest collective contributor to the UN budget; the biggest source of public climate finance at € 23 billion a year and that we have more than 5,000 women and men deployed on 21 crisis management operations on three continents, always working with the UN as their main partner. The most recent missions we launched are a partnership mission in Niger and another in Armenia.
There are not many crises on which we are not active and that are no other partner is offering more systematically support to the UN’s work than we do. Of course, judged against the needs, it is never enough, but it is something and maybe more than we tend to get credit for.
I leave New York encouraged by the strong resolve and support that the world has shown for Ukraine. But also convinced that there is a broader global agenda on which we need to be more proactive and attentive to the growing needs and expectations of a world that is full of crises.
Compliments of the European External Action Service, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union.
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Bank lending grew faster in countries with policy packages combining large fiscal, monetary, and prudential measures.

Economists will be studying the pandemic for generations to learn from the dramatic global downturn and the ensuing credit crunch, but one important lesson about the scope of action needed to contain the next global crisis is already coming into focus.
During the pandemic, countries often used all-out responses that combined large fiscal, monetary, and prudential policies like grants, credit facilities, and relaxed capital requirements. As we demonstrate in a new working paper, this kind of expansive response may be needed to support corporate borrowing and credit growth in major future crises that combine global supply and demand shocks.
Our findings are based on an analysis using a dataset we made available last year tracking national announcements of economic and financial policy responses to the pandemic. Over the course of 2020, countries most frequently used packages of more than one fiscal, monetary, or prudential policy, while standalone policy announcements were rare.

As credit growth tanked early during the pandemic, policymakers in many countries aimed to stabilize bank lending to support their economies. Our analysis indicates that all-out packages boosted credit growth by a sizable 5 percentage points per quarter. Both size and scope were critical: even packages combining all types of policies, but where only some were large, were less effective.

Highlighting the importance of broad policy packages, all granular policy tools we tracked were more prevalent in successful packages than in others.
These all-out responses may have been effective because—faced by a large, unexpected, global shock—they pulled all levers relevant for credit growth. They eased binding constraints by shifting regulatory requirements. They incentivized incremental lending by addressing heightened concerns about credit risk. And they supported credit demand by lowering borrowing costs.
Within banks, the impact of policies was greater for those constrained by thin capital buffers.
Packages combining large fiscal, monetary, and prudential measures also translated into additional access to liquidity for bank-dependent firms. This allowed them to cover expenses—like wage bills—for two additional months while health measures limited sales.
While COVID-19 economic and financial policy packages were broadly targeted, they do not appear to have disproportionately benefited firms with poor performance prior to the pandemic.
Lessons for future crises
Our results underscore the importance of decisive action in terms of breadth and intensity of pandemic policy responses. In future crises that combine—as the pandemic did—negative supply and demand shocks with significant uncertainty, a similarly concerted, coordinated, all-out approach may have an important role to play in supporting the economy.
While there are benefits of an aggressive approach in response to a global shock like COVID-19, not all countries could respond in such a fashion. In particular, emerging and developing economies will likely continue to be more constrained, as they were in this episode.
To be sure, an all-out approach could also have unintended consequences. Large fiscal and monetary packages could support credit and the economy but also fuel sharp inflationary pressures. In countries with high debt, an increase in discretionary spending could strain debt sustainability. More work is needed to better understand how to calibrate the appropriate all-out response to minimize such costs.

Authors:

Divya Kirti
Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
Prachi Mishra
Jan Strasky
This blog includes research contributions by Yang Liu.

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | In Major Economic Shocks, Best Response Combines All-Out, Large-Scale Policies first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

One year ago, Putin’s Russia started its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.
The Ukrainian people have shown incredible strength in defending their homeland and the core principles of international law against the Russian aggression. They have shown resolve in defending democracy and freedom, resilience in the face of hardship and dignity when confronted with Russia’s crimes.
The Ukrainian people have shown the world that the future of Ukraine is for the Ukrainians to decide. No country has the right to invade its neighbour or violate its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This aggression is a crime against peace. It violates the UN Charter, the UN principles and the values of mankind. We cannot and should not remain passive in front of such crimes.
Russia has systematically targeted civilians, destroyed cities and attacked Ukrainian identity. We are determined to ensure that all those who are responsible for war crimes and other most serious crimes committed in connection with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are held to account.
Russia has weaponised food and energy, made deeply irresponsible nuclear threats and spread false narratives about the war. Russia’s war of aggression and its consequences have significantly affected many countries notably through its impact on the global economy, food and commodity prices. The European Union will continue to work with partners to mitigate these effects and to provide assistance to the countries and people most in need.
The European Union and its partners have acted swiftly and in unity. And we will continue to stand firmly and in full solidarity with Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes. All Ukrainians deserve to live in peace and choose freely their own destiny. Ukraine is part of our European family. Ukrainians have expressed their wish for a future within the European Union and we have acknowledged that by granting Ukraine the status of candidate country. The choice of the people of Ukraine is one of peace, democracy, rule of law, respect for fundamental rights and prosperity.
The European Union will continue to support Ukraine in political, economic, humanitarian, financial and military terms, including through swift coordinated procurement from European industry. We will also support Ukraine’s reconstruction, for which we will strive to use frozen and immobilised Russian assets in accordance with EU and international law. We will further increase collective pressure on Russia to end its war of aggression. To this end we will adopt a tenth sanctions package and we will take steps against those who attempt to circumvent EU measures.
We support President Zelenskyy’s peace formula. Together with our international partners, we will make sure that Ukraine prevails, that international law is respected, that peace and Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders are restored, that Ukraine is rebuilt, and that justice is done.
Until that day, we will not rest.
Compliments of the European Council, Council of the European Union.
The post Statement by the Members of the European Council first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The EU Commission welcomes the Council’s adoption of a 10th package of sanctions against Russia and those that support it in its illegal aggression against Ukraine. 24 February marks one year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and 9 years since the beginning of Russia’s illegal invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory. This package is turning up the pressure in response to Putin’s brutal war, including viciously targeting civilians and critical infrastructure. In order to further increase the effectiveness of EU sanctions, today’s package contains new listings plus trade and financial sanctions, including further export bans worth more than €11 billion, depriving the Russian economy of critical tech and industrial goods. It also steps up enforcement and anti-circumvention measures, including a new reporting obligation on Russian Central Bank assets.
Specifically, this package contains the following elements:
Additional listings
The EU has added about 121 individuals and entities to our sanction list, including Russian decision-makers, senior government officials and military leaders complicit in the war against Ukraine, as well as proxy authorities installed by Russia in the occupied territories in Ukraine, among others. The list also includes key figures involved in the kidnapping of Ukrainian children to Russia, as well as organisations and individuals, who are polluting the public space with disinformation, adding to the military warfare through information warfare. Measures are also taken against individuals in Iran who are involved in the elaboration of drones and components supporting Russia’s military. In addition, members and supporters of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group and its activities in other countries, such as Mali or Central African Republic, are also targeted.
Additional EU export bans and restrictions
New export restrictions have been introduced on sensitive dual-use and advanced technologies that contribute to Russia’s military capabilities and technological enhancement, based on information received from Ukraine, our Member States and our partners. This includes additional electronic components used in Russian weapons systems (drones, missiles, helicopters, other vehicles), as well as bans on specific rare earths and thermal cameras with military applications. Moreover, we are also listing 96 additional entities associated to Russia’s military-industrial complex, bringing the total of military end-users that are listed to 506. This includes, for the first time, seven Iranian entities that have been using EU components and providing Russia with military “Shahed” drones to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Importantly, we are working in close coordination with partners, and are adding Australia, Canada and New Zealand and Norway to the list of our partner countries.
Additional export bans are now also imposed on goods that can be easily redirected to be used to support the Russian war effort including:

Vehicles: heavy trucks not yet banned (and their spare parts), semi-trailers, and special vehicles such as snowmobiles;
Goods easily directed to the Russian military: including electric generators, binoculars, radars, compass, etc.;
Construction goods such as bridges, structures for buildings tower-like, fork-lifts trucks, cranes, etc.;
Goods that are critical for the functioning and enhancement of Russian industrial capacity (electronics, machine parts, pumps, machinery for working metals, etc.);
Complete industrial plants: this category has been added to avoid loopholes;
Goods used in the aviation industry (turbojets).

These new bans and restrictions cover EU exports worth EUR 11.4 billion (2021 data). They come on top of the €32.5 billion worth of exports already sanctioned in the previous packages. With today’s package, the EU has sanctioned in total nearly close to half (49%) of its 2021 exports to Russia.
Additional imports bans into the EU
Today’s package imposes import bans on the following Russian high-revenue goods:

Bitumen and related materials like asphalt;  and
Synthetic rubber and carbon blacks.

These new import bans cover EU imports worth almost EUR 1.3 billion and they come on top of €90 billion already sanctioned, representing altogether 58% of the EU’s 2021 imports.
Financial sector
Three Russian banks have been added to the list of entities subject to the asset freeze and the prohibition to make funds and economic resources available.
Other measures include the following:

A ban on Russian nationals from serving on governing bodies of Member States’ critical infrastructure companies;
Prohibition on Russian nationals and entities to book gas storage capacity in the Union (LNG excluded);
Measures to facilitate the divestment from Russia by EU operators;

A third country shipping company, suspected of helping Russia circumvent sanctions on oil exports, has also been listed.
Enforcement and anti-circumvention measures
Today’s package imposes new reporting obligations on Russian Central Bank assets. This is especially important regarding the possible use of public Russian assets to fund the reconstruction of Ukraine after Russia is defeated.
Other measures include the following:

reporting obligations on frozen assets (including for dealings before listings) and assets which should be frozen;
Private flights between the EU and Russia, directly or via third countries, should be notified in advance;
Prohibition to transit dual use goods and firearms via the territory of Russia to third countries.

In addition to today’s package, the EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan is reaching out to third countries, to ensure strict implementation of sanctions and prevent circumvention. On 23 February, the first Sanctions Coordinators Forum took place in Brussels, gathering our international partners and Member States, to strengthen enforcement efforts.
Additional bans on Russian disinformation outlets
Two additional Russian media outlets have been added to the media ban.
Technical amendments

Amendment to allow the provision of pilot services necessary for maritime safety ;
 Definition of the term “import” to avoid goods being “stranded” in long customs procedures;

Background
The EU’s sanctions against Russia are proving effective. They are limiting Russia’s ability to wage the war against Ukraine, including to manufacture new weapons and repair existing ones, as well as hinder its transport of material.
The geopolitical, economic, and financial implications of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine are clear, as the war has disrupted global commodities markets, especially for agrifood products and energy. The EU continues to ensure that its sanctions do not impact energy and agrifood exports from Russia to third countries.
As guardian of the EU Treaties, the European Commission monitors the enforcement of EU sanctions across the EU.
The EU stands united in its solidarity with Ukraine, and will continue to support Ukraine and its people together with its international partners, including through additional political, financial, military and humanitarian support for as long as necessary.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post EU agrees 10th package of sanctions against Russia first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

A creature is formed of clay. A puppet becomes a boy. A monster rises in a lab. A computer takes over a spaceship. And all manner of robots serve or control us. For generations we’ve told ourselves stories, using themes of magic and science, about inanimate things that we bring to life or imbue with power beyond human capacity. Is it any wonder that we can be primed to accept what marketers say about new tools and devices that supposedly reflect the abilities and benefits of artificial intelligence (AI)?
And what exactly is “artificial intelligence” anyway? It’s an ambiguous term with many possible definitions. It often refers to a variety of technological tools and techniques that use computation to perform tasks such as predictions, decisions, or recommendations. But one thing is for sure:  it’s a marketing term. Right now it’s a hot one. And at the FTC, one thing we know about hot marketing terms is that some advertisers won’t be able to stop themselves from overusing and abusing them.
AI hype is playing out today across many products, from toys to cars to chatbots and a lot of things in between. Breathless media accounts don’t help, but it starts with the companies that do the developing and selling. We’ve already warned businesses to avoid using automated tools that have biased or discriminatory impacts. But the fact is that some products with AI claims might not even work as advertised in the first place. In some cases, this lack of efficacy may exist regardless of what other harm the products might cause. Marketers should know that — for FTC enforcement purposes — false or unsubstantiated claims about a product’s efficacy are our bread and butter.
When you talk about AI in your advertising, the FTC may be wondering, among other things:
Are you exaggerating what your AI product can do?  Or even claiming it can do something beyond the current capability of any AI or automated technology? For example, we’re not yet living in the realm of science fiction, where computers can generally make trustworthy predictions of human behavior. Your performance claims would be deceptive if they lack scientific support or if they apply only to certain types of users or under certain conditions.
Are you promising that your AI product does something better than a non-AI product? It’s not uncommon for advertisers to say that some new-fangled technology makes their product better – perhaps to justify a higher price or influence labor decisions. You need adequate proof for that kind of comparative claim, too, and if such proof is impossible to get, then don’t make the claim.
Are you aware of the risks? You need to know about the reasonably foreseeable risks and impact of your AI product before putting it on the market. If something goes wrong – maybe it fails or yields biased results – you can’t just blame a third-party developer of the technology. And you can’t say you’re not responsible because that technology is a “black box” you can’t understand or didn’t know how to test.
Does the product actually use AI at all? If you think you can get away with baseless claims that your product is AI-enabled, think again. In an investigation, FTC technologists and others can look under the hood and analyze other materials to see if what’s inside matches up with your claims. Before labeling your product as AI-powered, note also that merely using an AI tool in the development process is not the same as a product having AI in it.
This message is not new. Advertisers should take another look at our earlier AI guidance, which focused on fairness and equity but also said, clearly, not to overpromise what your algorithm or AI-based tool can deliver. Whatever it can or can’t do, AI is important, and so are the claims you make about it. You don’t need a machine to predict what the FTC might do when those claims are unsupported.
Compliments of the Federal Trade Commission.
The post FTC | Keep your AI claims in check first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

A new kind of multilateral platform could improve cross-border payments, leveraging technological innovations for public policy objectives
Crypto assets have been more of a disappointment than a revolution for many users, and global bodies like the IMF and the Financial Stability Board urge tighter regulation.
Some of the rapidly evolving technology behind crypto, however, may ultimately hold greater promise. The private sector keeps innovating and customizing financial services.
But the public sector too should leverage technology to upgrade its payment infrastructure and ensure interoperability, safety, and efficiency in digital finance, as we noted in a recent working paper: A Multi-Currency Exchange and Contracting Platform. Others too are advancing similar views.
Technology has jumped ahead
New payment technologies include tokenization, encryption, and programmability:

Tokenization means representing property rights to an asset, such as money, on an electronic ledger—a database held by all market participants, optimized to be widely accessible, synchronized, easily updatable, and tamper-proof. Anonymity of token balances and transactions is not required (and in fact undermines financial integrity).
Encryption helps decouple compliance checks from transactions so only authorized parties access sensitive information. This facilitates transparency while promoting trust.
Programmability allows financial contracts to be more easily written and automatically executed, such as with “smart contracts,” without relying on a trusted third party.

Private-sector innovation
With these new tools in hand, the private sector is innovating in ways that may be more transformative than the initial wave of crypto assets: tokenization of financial assets, tokenization of money, and automation.
The tokenization of stocks, bonds, and other assets may cut trading costs, integrate markets, and enlarge access. But paying for such assets will require money on a compatible ledger. One example is stablecoins, are one example to the extent they comply with regulation. More importantly, banks are testing tokenized checking accounts. And automation is widespread, allowing third parties to program functionality much as developers build smartphone apps.
While the private sector pushes the boundaries of innovation and customization, it will not ensure that transactions are safe, efficient, and interoperable, even if well regulated. Rather, the private sector is likely to create client-only networks for trading assets and making payments. Open ledgers may emerge in an attempt to bridge private networks, but are likely to lack standardization and sufficient investment given limited profit potential. And using private forms of money to settle transactions would put counterparties at risk.
Central bank role
Central bank digital currencies can help because of their dual nature as both a monetary instrument—a store of value and means of payment—but also as infrastructure essential to clear and settle transactions. Policy discussions have mostly focused on the first aspect, but we believe the second should receive just as much attention.
As a monetary instrument, CBDC provides safety; it alleviates counterparty risks and provides liquidity in payments. But as infrastructure, CBDC could bring interoperability and efficiency among private networks for digital money and even assets.
Payments could be made from one private money to another, through the CBDC ledger or platform. Money could be escrowed on the CBDC platform, then released when certain conditions are met, such as when a tokenized asset is received. And the CBDC platform could offer a basic programming language to ensure smart contracts are trusted and compatible with one another. That too will become a public good in tomorrow’s digital world.
Cross-border payments
The same vision applies to cross-border payments, although governance gets more complicated (an important topic we leave for another time).
A public platform could allow banks and other regulated financial institutions to trade digital representations of domestic central bank reserves across borders, as suggested in our working paper.
Participants could trade safe central bank reserves without being formally regulated by each central bank, nor requiring major changes to national payment systems.
Again, transactions require more than the movement of funds. Risk-sharing, currency exchange, liquidity management—all are part of the package.
Thanks to the single ledger and programmability, currencies could be exchanged simultaneously, so one party does not bear the risk of the other walking away. More generally, risk-sharing contracts can be written, auctions can support thinly traded currency markets, and limits on capital flows (which exist in many countries) can be automated.
Importantly, the platform would minimize risks inherent in such contracts. It would ensure that contracts be fully backed with escrowed money, automatically executed to avoid failed trades, and consistent with one another. For instance, a contract to receive a payment tomorrow could be pledged as collateral today, lowering costs of idle funds.
Beyond the transfer of value, encryption can help manage the transfer of information. For instance, the platform could check that participants comply with anti-money laundering requirements, but allow them to bid anonymously on the platform for, say, foreign exchange, while still seeing the aggregate balance between bids and asks.
Technology can thus support key public policy objectives:

Interoperability among national currencies;
Safety thanks to escrowed central bank reserves, settlement finality, and automatic contract execution;
Efficiency from low transaction costs, open participation, contract consistency, and transparency.

Much remains to be explored, and this vision is still taking shape. Crypto was fueled by an attempt to circumvent intermediaries and public oversight. Ironically, its real value may come from the technology that the public sector can leverage to upgrade payments and financial infrastructure for the public good—to inject interoperability, safety, and efficiency into private sector innovation and customization.
Authors:

Tobias Adrian
Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli
This blog is based on joint research work with Federico Grinberg, Robert M. Townsend, and Nicolas Zhang.

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | Technology Behind Crypto Can Also Improve Payments, Providing a Public Good first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.