4 May 2023 |
The inflation outlook continues to be too high for too long. In light of the ongoing high inflation pressures, the Governing Council today decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Overall, the incoming information broadly supports the assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook that the Governing Council formed at its previous meeting. Headline inflation has declined over recent months, but underlying price pressures remain strong. At the same time, the past rate increases are being transmitted forcefully to euro area financing and monetary conditions, while the lags and strength of transmission to the real economy remain uncertain.
The Governing Council’s future decisions will ensure that the policy rates will be brought to levels sufficiently restrictive to achieve a timely return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target and will be kept at those levels for as long as necessary. The Governing Council will continue to follow a data-dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. In particular, the Governing Council’s policy rate decisions will continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission.
The key ECB interest rates remain the Governing Council’s primary tool for setting the monetary policy stance. In parallel, the Governing Council will keep reducing the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme (APP) portfolio at a measured and predictable pace. In line with these principles, the Governing Council expects to discontinue the reinvestments under the APP as of July 2023.
Key ECB interest rates
The Governing Council decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Accordingly, the interest rate on the main refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility will be increased to 3.75%, 4.00% and 3.25% respectively, with effect from 10 May 2023.
Asset purchase programme (APP) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)
The APP portfolio is declining at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem does not reinvest all of the principal payments from maturing securities. The decline will amount to €15 billion per month on average until the end of June 2023. The Governing Council expects to discontinue the reinvestments under the APP as of July 2023.
As concerns the PEPP, the Governing Council intends to reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the programme until at least the end of 2024. In any case, the future roll-off of the PEPP portfolio will be managed to avoid interference with the appropriate monetary policy stance.
The Governing Council will continue applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions coming due in the PEPP portfolio, with a view to countering risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism related to the pandemic.
Refinancing operations
As banks are repaying the amounts borrowed under the targeted longer-term refinancing operations, the Governing Council will regularly assess how targeted lending operations are contributing to its monetary policy stance.
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The Governing Council stands ready to adjust all of its instruments within its mandate to ensure that inflation returns to its 2% target over the medium term and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission. The ECB’s policy toolkit is fully equipped to provide liquidity support to the euro area financial system if needed. Moreover, the Transmission Protection Instrument is available to counter unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics that pose a serious threat to the transmission of monetary policy across all euro area countries, thus allowing the Governing Council to more effectively deliver on its price stability mandate.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 14:45 CET today.
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Brussels, 26 April 2023 |
Today, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Department of Defense of the United States of America (DoD) have formalised a framework for cooperation through the signing of an Administrative Arrangement (AA). The EDA-DoD AA provides for stronger transatlantic cooperation in defence in specific areas, including in the exchange of information.
The conclusion of this AA is a strong political signal, delivering on the tasking of EU and U.S. leaders in the June 2021 EU-US Summit Statement. The arrangement confirms the value of a transatlantic partnership in security and defense to confront shared security challenges, and the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence that is complementary to and interoperable with NATO.
Head of the Agency, High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell, said: “At a time when war has returned to Europe, we need to open every avenue for cooperation with our closest partners. The EDA-U.S. Administrative Arrangement provides another pillar to strengthen transatlantic cooperation and the link between the EU and the U.S. The European Defence Agency, as the hub for EU defence cooperation, plays a unique role in raising our level of defence cooperation and contributing to make the EU a stronger defence actor and partner.”
United States Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin said: “The signature of the Administrative Arrangement with EDA is evidence of the strengthening U.S.-European Union relationship.  DoD and EDA’s dedicated dialogue and engagement will further contribute to transatlantic and global security.  Russia’s aggression against Ukraine underlines the importance of strong U.S.-European ties in NATO and with the European Union. Deepening dialogue and cooperation will only strengthen this key strategic partnership moving forward.”
Scope, collaboration and exchange: Progressive development of the AA
The two parties have reached an understanding on an initial scope of cooperation, which may, upon mutual consent, progressively develop in the future.

Forum of exchange and dialogue: The AA will enable a substantial defence dialogue on all topics within EDA’s remit, and invitations for U.S. DoD to attend relevant meetings of EDA’s Steering Board and for EDA to attend meetings convened by the U.S. DoD, as appropriate.
Activities of cooperation: Initial activities include consultations on the impact of EU Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) regulation; military mobility; supply chain issues; and the impact of climate change on defence. It also allows for U.S. participation in the open session of the European Defence Standardisation Committee.

The AA was signed today in Brussels by Jiři Šedivý, EDA Chief Executive, and Dr. William LaPlante, United States Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment.
Further Information

Signed text of EDA -U.S. DoD AA
Questions and Answers on Administrative Arrangement
Photos from signing ceremony – Photos can be used with reference to © European Defence Agency
Website EDA – European Defence Agency
Website U.S. Department of Defense – Releases (defense.gov)

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Today, the Commission adopted the first designation decisions under the Digital Services Act (DSA), designating 17 Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and 2 Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) that reach at least 45 million monthly active users. These are:
Very Large Online Platforms:

Alibaba AliExpress
Amazon Store
Apple AppStore
Booking.com
Facebook
Google Play
Google Maps
Google Shopping
Instagram
LinkedIn
Pinterest
Snapchat
TikTok
Twitter
Wikipedia
YouTube
Zalando

Very Large Online Search Engines:

Bing
Google Search

The platforms have been designated based on the user data that they had to publish by 17 February 2023.
Next steps for designated platforms and search engines
Following their designation, the companies will now have to comply, within four months, with the full set of new obligations under the DSA. These aim at empowering and protecting users online, including minors, by requiring the designated services to assess and mitigate their systemic risks and to provide robust content moderation tools. This includes:

More user empowerment:

Users will get clear information on why they are recommended certain information and will have the right to opt-out from recommendation systems based on profiling;
Users will be able to report illegal content easily and platforms have to process such reports diligently;
Advertisements cannot be displayed based on the sensitive data of the user (such as ethnic origin, political opinions or sexual orientation);
Platforms need to label all ads and inform users on who is promoting them;
Platforms need to provide an easily understandable, plain-language summary of their terms and conditions, in the languages of the Member States where they operate.

Strong protection of minors:

Platforms will have to redesign their systems to ensure a high level of privacy, security, and safety of minors;
Targeted advertising based on profiling towards children is no longer permitted;
Special risk assessments including for negative effects on mental health will have to be provided to the Commission 4 months after designation and made public at the latest a year later;
Platforms will have to redesign their services, including their interfaces, recommender systems, terms and conditions, to mitigate these risks.

More diligent content moderation, less disinformation:

Platforms and search engines need to take measures to address risks linked to the dissemination of illegal content online and to negative effects on freedom of expression and information;
Platforms need to have clear terms and conditions and enforce them diligently and non-arbitrarily;
Platforms need to have a mechanism for users to flag illegal content and act upon notifications expeditiously;
Platforms need to analyse their specific risks, and put in place mitigation measures – for instance, to address the spread of disinformation and inauthentic use of their service.

More transparency and accountability:

Platforms need to ensure that their risk assessments and their compliance with all the DSA obligations are externally and independently audited;
They will have to give access to publicly available data to researchers; later on, a special mechanism for vetted researchers will be established;
They will need to publish repositories of all the ads served on their interface;
Platforms need to publish transparency reports on content moderation decisions and risk management.

By 4 months after notification of the designated decisions, the designated platforms and search engines need to adapt their systems, resources, and processes for compliance, set up an independent system of compliance and carry out, and report to the Commission, their first annual risk assessment.
Risk assessment
Platforms will have to identify, analyse and mitigate a wide array of systemic risks ranging from how illegal content and disinformation can be amplified on their services, to the impact on the freedom of expression and media freedom. Similarly, specific risks around gender-based violence online and the protection of minors online and their mental health must be assessed and mitigated. The risk mitigation plans of designated platforms and search engines will be subject to an independent audit and oversight by the Commission.
A new supervisory architecture
The DSA will be enforced through a pan-European supervisory architecture. While the Commission is the competent authority for supervising the designated platforms and search engines, it will work in close cooperation with the Digital Services Coordinators in the supervisory framework established by the DSA. These national authorities, which are responsible as well for the supervision of smaller platforms and search engines, need to be established by EU Member States by 17 February 2024. That same date is also the deadline by which all other platforms must comply with their obligations under the DSA and provide their users with protection and safeguards laid down in the DSA.
To enforce the DSA, the Commission is also bolstering its expertise with in-house and external multidisciplinary knowledge and recently launched the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT). It will provide support with assessments as to whether the functioning of algorithmic systems is in line with the risk management obligations. The Commission is also setting up a digital enforcement ecosystem, bringing together expertise from all relevant sectors.
Access to data for researchers
Today, the Commission also launched a call for evidence on the provisions in the DSA related to data access for researchers. These are designed to better monitor platform providers’ actions to tackle illegal content, such as illegal hate speech, as well as other societal risks such as the spread of disinformation, and risks that may affect the users’ mental health. Vetted researchers will have the possibility to access the data of any VLOP or VLOSE to conduct research on systemic risks in the EU. This means that they could for example analyse platforms’ decisions on what users see and engage with online, having access to previously undisclosed data. In view of the feedback received, the Commission will present a delegated act to design an easy, practical and clear process for data access while containing adequate safeguards against abuse. The consultation will last until 25 May.
Background
On 15 December 2020, the Commission made the proposal on the DSA together with the proposal on the Digital Markets Act (DMA) as a comprehensive framework to ensure a safer, more fair digital space for all. Following the political agreement reached by the EU co-legislators one year ago, in April 2022, the DSA entered into force on 16 November 2022.
The DSA applies to all digital services that connect consumers to goods, services, or content. It creates comprehensive new obligations for online platforms to reduce harms and counter risks online, introduces strong protections for users’ rights online, and places digital platforms under a unique new transparency and accountability framework. Designed as a single, uniform set of rules for the EU, these rules will give users new protections and businesses legal certainty across the whole single market. The DSA is a first-of-a-kind regulatory toolbox globally and sets an international benchmark for a regulatory approach to online intermediaries.
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The finish line for US dollar (USD) LIBOR transition at end-June 2023 is now less than three months away. There has been significant progress made to date, and market participants must continue to act in order to ensure an orderly transition and to support the foundations necessary for a sustainable and stable financial system going forward. Given the limited time ahead, the FSB stresses that it is critical that market participants act expeditiously to ensure that their legacy contracts are prepared to transition by end-June 2023.
The FSB also emphasises the ongoing importance of market participants choosing to use robust reference rates in their contracts, as it is essential that the financial system is anchored in these robust reference rates that reflect deep, credible, and liquid underlying markets.
Transition of legacy contracts ahead of end-June 2023
There has been significant progress so far, and important work needs to be done to complete USD LIBOR transition globally. The FSB encourages market participants to complete the transition of any remaining USD LIBOR-linked contracts now, in order to avoid a ‘pile-up’ towards end-June 2023 that could introduce operational risks and wider market disruption.
The USD LIBOR panel will cease at end-June this year. On 5 March 2021, ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) and the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) formally confirmed that panel bank submissions for overnight, 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 12-month USD LIBOR settings will cease as of end-June 2023, immediately after which representative LIBOR rates will no longer be available.
The FSB report published in December 2022 noted positive progress in transitioning legacy contracts. Progress was particularly notable in FSB jurisdictions, with the report acknowledging important work still to be done and highlighting potential for further progress elsewhere, where awareness of USD LIBOR transition is relatively low.1 The report noted that over 90% of USD LIBOR exposures are in derivatives, which can be addressed through adherence to the ISDA Protocol and CCP conversion events. The FSB continues to encourage wide adoption of the ISDA protocol and engagement with CCP conversion processes as critical mechanisms for ensuring orderly transition of the derivatives market.2 Between now and end-June 2023, firms with remaining USD LIBOR exposures should take the steps set out in the FSB’s Global Transition Roadmap and maintain the momentum in transitioning to robust reference rates.
Market participants should be acting now to remediate legacy LIBOR contracts. Such action can help reduce uncertainty upon the end of the USD LIBOR panel and avoid unintended outcomes, and can help avoid operational risk in the event of a pile up of outstanding contracts.
For contracts referencing USD LIBOR that cannot be otherwise amended to have a clearly defined and practicable benchmark replacement, federal legislation (the LIBOR Act) has been enacted in March 2022 in the United States for contracts under US law. Under the LIBOR Act, references to overnight, 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-month USD LIBOR in these contracts will be replaced, by operation of law, with a SOFR-based benchmark replacement identified by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).3
To help address outstanding legacy contracts that are not covered under the United States federal legislation and may require a short period of extra time to complete transition, the UK FCA, has announced that it will require continued publication of the 1-, 3- and 6-month USD LIBOR settings following the end of the USD LIBOR panel, using a robust, unrepresentative synthetic methodology based on the CME Term SOFR Reference Rate and the ISDA fixed spread adjustment. The FCA will permit use of the synthetic settings in all legacy contracts except cleared derivatives. The FCA intends that publication of these synthetic USD LIBOR settings will cease on 30 September 2024.4 These decisions are consistent with its consultation of market participants in November 2022.5
The FSB reminds market participants that they should not rely on the availability of synthetic LIBOR rates in place of active transition of legacy contracts. Any synthetic LIBOR provides only a short-term, temporary bridge to alternative robust reference rates. Market participants need to continue to take active steps to address existing legacy contracts in preparation for the permanent cessation of USD LIBOR rates.
For synthetic sterling LIBOR, the FCA has announced its intention that the remaining 3-month setting will cease at end-March 2024.6 The FSB reminds those market participants who still have remaining legacy contracts referencing 3-month sterling LIBOR to take necessary steps to ensure that they are prepared for its permanent cessation.
Use of Robust Reference Rates
Firms should continue to transition activity to robust reference rates, including the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) for the USD, to support a sustainable transition and to promote financial stability.
Since December 2019, supervisors across various FSB jurisdictions have issued guidance and rules on ceasing new use of USD LIBOR by end-2021.7 Market participants have taken steps to stem the flow of new LIBOR exposures and to support the deep and liquid markets referencing risk-free or nearly risk-free reference rates (RFRs), which provide more robust foundations for interest rate markets.
Globally, there has been strong progress in the transition away from USD LIBOR to SOFR to date. Adoption of SOFR, the Alternative Reference Rates Committee’s (ARRC) recommended replacement for USD LIBOR, has been significant. In both cash and derivatives markets, SOFR is now the predominant reference rate.
As the FSB has noted, it is essential that the transition is anchored in RFRs that are robust and underpinned by deep, credible and liquid markets to avoid the vulnerabilities experienced with LIBOR. The FSB has recognised that term RFRs may be a useful transition tool but has emphasised the need for their use to remain limited in order to avoid diminishing the underlying RFR market which, in turn, would undermine the construction of Term RFRs.8 The FSB is aware that certain administrators of term RFRs have placed restrictions on use within their licensing agreements. For example, the FSB welcomes the recommendation from the Canadian Alternative Reference Rate (CARR) working group and the administrator of term CORRA to restrict the rate’s use in financial contracts through its licensing agreement to the use cases recommended by CARR.9
The FSB continues to encourage all administrators of these rates to strongly consider matching their licensed scope of use to the recommendations of the official sector and National Working Groups.
To support a globally consistent shift away from USD LIBOR to robust alternatives, IOSCO has also launched a one-time review of ‘credit sensitive rates’ (CSRs) and SOFR term rate alternatives to USD LIBOR that present themselves as compliant with IOSCO’s Principles for Financial Benchmarks. The aim of the review is to assess how these benchmarks align with IOSCO Principles 6, 7 and 9 relating to design, data sufficiency and transparency, and whether such rates provide users with robust and reliable benchmarks and sufficient information to enable them to assess their suitability. The recent period of market stress underscores the potential fragility of the wholesale unsecured funding markets that underpin CSRs and reinforces the importance of this review. IOSCO’s review is expected to be finalised by June 2023.
Notes to editors
International cooperation through the FSB has been vital to the success of LIBOR transition to date and will continue to play a key role in ensuring an orderly wind-down of USD LIBOR in the remaining months ahead.
The FSB’s Official Sector Steering Group (OSSG) has served as a forum for cooperation among authorities that have leading roles in interest rate benchmark reforms and transition preparedness.
The OSSG is currently led by co-chairs John C. Williams, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Nikhil Rathi, Chief Executive Officer of the UK Financial Conduct Authority.
John Williams made the following statement: “When we undertook this effort a decade ago, we knew that transitioning off of a fundamentally flawed and deeply embedded reference rate like LIBOR would be complicated and require significant effort. Our goals were to both avoid the very serious disruptions that could have occurred with a disorderly end to LIBOR and provide a stronger foundation for the financial system by replacing LIBOR with a much more robust reference rate. Through the many years of hard work and collaboration between the public and private sectors in the United States and around the world, we are approaching the last milestone in this work.
As we enter the final stage of the LIBOR transition, the official sector has been clear that market participants should already be prepared for the end of June 2023. They should have plans to remediate legacy contracts with new reference rates. As we think about the future, it is important to remember the lessons of the past and maintain a robust reference rate environment.”
Nikhil Rathi made the following statement: “In 2017, my predecessor Andrew Bailey set out the serious issues regarding the lack of active underlying markets for LIBOR. Since then, there has been significant progress in the transition away from LIBOR to more robust risk-free or near risk-free reference rates, including SOFR and SONIA. I would like to thank all FSB members, and financial market participants around the world, for their continued efforts to ensure the success of this process.
We are now at the final leg of transition. At the end of June this year, the USD LIBOR panel will cease. As we prepare for this milestone, I remind financial market participants to maintain their focus, especially considering the global importance of USD LIBOR. They should continue to actively transition any remaining USD LIBOR contracts, as synthetic USD LIBOR is only a temporary bridge to alternative robust reference rates.”
Jean-Paul Servais, Chair of IOSCO, noted: “IOSCO underscores the importance of a solid transition from LIBOR to alternative rates, which must not replicate the same weaknesses as LIBOR. As part of its benchmark transition efforts, IOSCO is currently reviewing alternative benchmarks to USD LIBOR, including “Credit Sensitive Rates”, that present themselves as in adherence to the IOSCO Principles for Financial Benchmarks.”
The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.
The FSB is chaired by Klaas Knot, President of De Nederlandsche Bank. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland, and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.
Compliments of the Financial Stability Board.
1. A similar observation was highlighted in FCA (2022) Consultation on ‘synthetic’ US dollar LIBOR and feedback to CP22/11, November, which noted the potentially slower transition in USD LIBOR lending agreements in developing countries. [←]
2. LCH and CME intend to convert cleared USD LIBOR referencing derivatives in H1 2023. [←]
3. FRB (2022) Regulation Implementing the Adjustable Interest Rate (LIBOR) Act, December. [←]
4. FCA (2023) FCA announces decision on synthetic US dollar LIBOR, April. [←]
5. FCA (2022) CP22/21: Consultation on ‘synthetic’ US dollar LIBOR and feedback to CP22/11, November (cit). [←]
6. FCA (2023) FCA announces decision on synthetic US dollar LIBOR, April (cit). Further, 1- and 6-month synthetic sterling LIBOR have ceased as of 31 March 2023. [←]
7. FSB (2019), FSB Progress Report on Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, December. [←]
8. FSB (2021), Interest rate benchmark reform: Overnight risk-free rates and term rates, June. [←]
9. The Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average (CORRA) is the Canadian RFR. CORRA, or Term CORRA where appropriate, will replace the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR) as the primary interest rate benchmark in Canada with the ceasing of CDOR’s publication on June 28, 2024. [←]The post FSB Statement to encourage final preparations for the USD LIBOR transition first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Textile products must last longer and be easier to reuse, repair and recycle
The destruction of unsold or returned textiles should be banned
Human, social and labour rights must be respected during production
Need for binding targets and measures addressing the entire lifecycle of textiles

Environment Committee MEPs adopted their recommendations today for EU measures to ensure that textiles are produced in a circular, sustainable and socially just way.
MEPs say textile products sold in the EU should be more durable, easier to reuse, repair and recycle, made to a great extent of recycled fibres, and free of hazardous substances. They underline that textiles should be produced in a manner that respects human, social and labour rights, the environment and animal welfare throughout their supply chain.
Driving fast fashion out of fashion
To tackle overproduction and the overconsumption of clothes and footwear, the Committee calls on the Commission and EU countries to adopt measures that put an end to “fast fashion”, starting with a clear definition of the term based on “high volumes of lower quality garments at low price levels”. Consumers should be better informed to help them make responsible and sustainable choices, including through the introduction of a “digital product passport” in the upcoming revision of the ecodesign regulation.
Reducing emissions, water and energy use, increasing collection and reuse
MEPs want ambitious science-based targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the entire lifecycle of the textiles sector. They request the Commission and member states to ensure that production processes become less energy- and water-intensive, avoid the use and release of harmful substances, and reduce material and consumption footprints. Ecodesign requirements on all textile and footwear products should be adopted as a priority.
MEPs also want the revision of the Waste Framework Directive to include specific separate targets for textile waste prevention, collection, reuse and recycling, as well as the phase out of the landfilling of textiles.
Other recommendations include:

The inclusion of an explicit ban on the destruction of unsold and returned textile goods in the EU ecodesign rules;
Clear rules to put an end to greenwashing practices, through the ongoing legislative work on empowering consumers in the green transition and regulating green claims;
Ensure fair and ethical trade practices through enforcing EU trade agreements;
The launch without further delay of the Commission initiative to prevent and minimise the release of microplastics and microfibers into the environment.

The own initiative report was adopted with 68 votes in favour, none against and one abstention.
Quote
Rapporteur Delara Burkhardt (S&D, DE) said: “Consumers alone cannot reform the global textile sector through their purchasing habits. If we allow the market to self-regulate, we leave the doors open for a fast fashion model that exploits people and the planet’s resources. The EU must legally oblige manufacturers and large fashion companies to operate more sustainably. People and the planet are more important than the textile industry’s profits. The disasters that have occurred in the past, such as the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh, growing landfills in Ghana and Nepal, polluted water, and microplastics in our oceans, show what happens when this principle is not pursued. We have waited long enough – it is time to make a change!”
Next steps
The report is expected to be adopted in plenary before the summer.
Background
The Commission presented the EU Strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles on 30 March 2022 to address the entire lifecycle of textile products and propose actions to change how we produce and consume textiles. It aims to implement the commitments of the European Green Deal, the new circular economy action plan and the industrial strategy for the textiles’ sector.
Contact:

Dana Popp, Press Officer | dana.popp@europarl.europa.eu

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Success will require tighter macroeconomic policies tailored to changing financial conditions, strong financial supervision and regulation, and bold supply-side reforms

Following a strong exit from the pandemic, Europe was hit hard by the economic impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Growth slowed drastically, inflation shot up, and episodes of financial stress materialized. But as a result of decisive policy action, most economies narrowly avoided a recession this winter. Europe now faces the difficult task of sustaining the recovery, defeating inflation, and safeguarding financial stability.
Growth in Europe’s advanced economies will slow to 0.7 percent this year from 3.6 percent last year, while emerging economies (excluding Türkiye, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine) will also see a sharp decline to 1.1 percent from 4.4 percent. According to our latest Regional Economic Outlook, there will be a mild rebound in growth to 1.4 and 3 percent, respectively, in these two country income groups next year as real wages catch up and external demand picks up.

Graphic courtesy of the IMF.
Headline inflation continues to decline, but underlying inflation (excluding energy and food) will remain persistent and uncomfortably above central bank targets even by the end of next year. Recent and projected declines in energy prices will feed into lower underlying inflation, but not enough to bring it down quickly.
This projection assumes that everything falls into place. The European Central Bank and other monetary authorities will succeed in steadily bringing down inflation. Any renewed bouts of financial stress will remain contained. There will be no further escalation of Russia’s war in Ukraine and associated sanctions, keeping energy prices in check. Broader geoeconomic fragmentation, another growth-reducing and inflation-increasing “stagflationary” risk, will also be kept at bay.
Yet things could get worse on all fronts—with growth, inflation, and financial stability risks all complicating policy choices.
Inflation risks
Take inflation, which could stay higher for longer. Energy prices could spike again. Wage growth could pick up more than projected as workers obtain greater compensation for recent purchasing power losses in tight labor markets. In turn, faster wage gains would make underlying inflation more persistent—a material risk across much of Emerging European economies, where nominal wage growth is in double digits.
We also might still underestimate how much the two back-to-back COVID and energy crises have damaged Europe’s productive capacity and further heightened inflation risks. While companies have found ways to improve energy efficiency in the past year, persistently higher energy prices will reduce euro area output by more than 1 percent on average in the medium term, with larger losses in more energy-intensive economies such as Germany or Italy.
Likewise, shifting worker preferences away from long hours, and more workdays lost to sickness related to long COVID, may durably reduce labor supply and complicate the matching of workers with job vacancies. More broadly, economists’ real-time calculations tend to underestimate the permanent damage from crises—and thereby to overestimate the extent of economic slack—realizing their full extent only with a lag. Historically, in recovery periods, estimates of economic slack in European countries were revised downwards by a full percentage point one year after the fact and by even more later.

Graphic courtesy of the IMF.
Tight monetary policy for longer
Faced with such uncertainty, central banks should maintain tight monetary policy until core inflation is unambiguously on a downward path back to central bank inflation targets. Further increases in policy rates are required in the euro area, while central banks in emerging European economies should stand ready to tighten further where real interest rates are low, labor markets are tight, and underlying inflation is sticky.
In fact, high uncertainty strengthens the case for tight monetary policy. If the inflation outlook is uncertain, there is more to lose from reacting too late rather than too early, because underestimating persistence would entrench high inflation and force central banks to tighten later for longer. This would likely require a sharp recession to bring inflation back to target.
Similarly, when the extent of economic slack is uncertain, monetary policymakers should place more weight on inflation and labor market dynamics, both of which now favor higher interest rates. Furthermore, even accounting for elevated uncertainty, policy rates in a number of countries are at the lower end of commonly used benchmarks suggesting that higher rates may be needed to rein in inflation.

Graphic courtesy of the IMF.
Should financial conditions tighten due to forces such as banking sector problems, central banks would not need as tight a monetary policy to achieve their objectives. However, it would be misguided to pause or reverse tightening prematurely on the legitimate concern that higher interest rates come with higher financial stability risks.
Work in concert
Central banks across Europe cannot succeed alone, however. To defeat sticky inflation while avoiding financial crisis and a recession, all macroeconomic, financial and structural policies need to work in concert.
Maintaining financial stability will require close supervision and monitoring of both banks and nonbank financial intermediaries, contingency planning, and prompt corrective action. In the European Union, stability could be bolstered by extending the reach of bank resolution tools, clarifying availability of the Single Resolution Fund’s resources, ratifying the European Stability Mechanism’s amended treaty, and agreeing on a pan-European deposit insurance.
Defeating inflation also calls for European governments to pursue more ambitious fiscal consolidation than embedded in their current plans. A good starting point would be to phase out most energy relief measures and target any remaining ones more narrowly to vulnerable households. Tighter fiscal policy would also help central banks meet their objectives at lower interest rates. This would reduce debt service costs and further bolster financial stability, by reducing euro area economies’ vulnerability to financial fragmentation risks, and emerging European economies’ vulnerability to spillovers from ECB monetary policy tightening and higher global interest rates more broadly.
Finally, supply-side reforms could help sustain economic growth amid restrictive macroeconomic policies. Those that could ease underlying inflation pressures come at a premium, such as reducing labor market tensions by raising female and older workers’ labor force participation and enhancing job matching. In the EU, progress implementing the Recovery and Resilience Plans and the Capital Markets Union could unlock investments needed to raise crisis-hit productive capacity, achieve the EU’s climate goals, and enhance energy security.

Authors:

Alfred Kammer is the Director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund

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The president vows to make the European Economic and Social Committee a true civil society gateway and open its doors to the EU accession countries. In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the Committee will take on a more active role to stand up for democracy and strive for a more resilient, prosperous and inclusive Europe.
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) has elected Austria’s Oliver Röpke as the 34th president in its 65-year history. Former head of the Brussels office of the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) and the most recent president of the EESC Workers’ Group, Mr Röpke will lead the EU body representing organised civil society for the next two and a half years.
Joining him at the helm of the EESC are Polish member Krzysztof Pater, as vice-president for the budget, and Romanian member Aurel Laurenţiu Plosceanu, as vice-president for communication. With the EESC presidency changing halfway through the term of office, Mr Röpke takes over from his fellow Austrian, Christa Schweng, who led the EESC through the first half of its 2020–2025 mandate.
Political manifesto of president Röpke
An advocate for workers’ rights, Mr Röpke is determined to consolidate the EESC’s role as a forum for dialogue between a wide range of actors, playing a key part in shaping EU policies and restoring citizens’ trust in the EU project.
“In these testing times, the support of civil society in gathering the voices of European citizens is key to building democratic resilience and shaping the future of Europe. Over the next term, I will step up the unique role of EESC as an interface between citizens, civil society and EU institutions, acting as a true platform for honest and inclusive debate. I will reach out to our partners in the Western Balkans and Eastern neighborhood to foster closer cooperation and engage with youth to make sure we are building the future they want to live in – inclusive, prosperous and democratic”, the president said.
For his presidency, Mr Röpke has chosen the motto Stand up for democracy, speak up for Europe. The four pillars of his programme – the Manifesto – embody his vision of a more social, representative and inclusive Europe which also reaches out to its neighbours to help them pave the way towards a more stable and peaceful future. The pillars are:

standing up for democracy at home;
standing up for democracy abroad;
speaking up for Europe by making the EESC more representative; and
speaking up for Europe by strengthening the quality of the EESC’s outreach and its forward-looking work.

The Manifesto includes a list of actions that the new president intends to implement during his mandate. Among others, the actions include:

appointing Honorary Enlargement Members from EU accession countries to involve them in the daily advisory work of the Committee;
a robust participation of the EESC in campaigns and activities to increase voter participation in the 2024 European elections;
greater involvement of citizens in the EU project, in particular youth, through citizen panels, implementation of the EU Youth Test in EESC opinions and establishment of a Youth Advisors’ Council to the President;
boosting of gender balance in EESC’s own ranks and of transparency by taking part in the EU transparency register and supporting the EU ethics body;
embedding a foresight dimension and developing a forward-looking perspective to EESC work;
institutional reform in order to strengthen the EESC’s voice and prepare it for a greater role if the EU Treaties are revised.

The new EESC president is also adamant that the EU must focus on driving forward its social agenda and safeguarding sustainable competitiveness, pushing for social inclusion and greater social and economic equality.
Mr Röpke will present the programme during his speech at the inaugural plenary session on 26 April. It can be followed here.
Background

Oliver Röpke (AT): EESC president, president of the EESC’s Workers’ Group from 2019 to 2023, Workers’ Group – president’s webpage
Krysztof Pater (PL): vice-president of the EESC, president of the Labour Market Observatory (LMO) from 2010 to 2013 and 2018 to 2020, Civil Society Organisations’ Group – vice-president’s webpage (budget)
Aurel Laurenţiu Plosceanu (RO): vice-president of the EESC, president of the EESC Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship and EU chair of the EU-Serbia Joint Consultative Committee (2020-2023), Employers’ Group – vice-president’s webpage (communication)
2023–2025 Manifesto, “Stand up for democracy, Speak up for Europe”, Oliver Röpke, president of the EESC

More information

The president and two vice-presidents are elected by a simple majority during the inaugural session of the assembly. They are chosen from each of the EESC’s three groups (Employers’ Group, Workers’ Group and Civil Society Organisations’ Group) in turn for two‑and‑a‑half‑year terms. This means that two elections are held during each EESC term of office – at the beginning and halfway through. The president is responsible for the orderly conduct of the Committee’s business and represents the EESC in its relations with other institutions and bodies. The two vice-presidents – elected from the two groups to which the president does not belong – are responsible for communication and the budget respectively.
The EESC is made up of 329 members from its 27 Member States. They are nominated by their national governments and appointed by the Council of the European Union for a period of five years. They then work independently in the interests of all EU citizens. These members are not politicians but employers, trade unionists and representatives of various sectors of society, such as farming, consumer and environmental organisations, the social economy, SMEs, professionals, and associations representing persons with disabilities, the voluntary sector, gender equality, youth, academia, and so on.

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The EU has a problem with climate catastrophe insurance: only a quarter of the losses from climate-related disasters are covered. Greater coverage could reduce the economic damage that results from them. This joint ECB-EIOPA post for The ECB Blog looks at ways to make this happen.

Drought affected two-thirds of the European Union in 2022, likely the worst episode in 500 years.[2] Agricultural production withered, river transport was disrupted and hydroelectric power generation fell, which exacerbated the energy crisis. Just a year earlier, severe flooding across the continent killed hundreds and caused substantial damage. Climate change will make catastrophes like these more frequent and more severe.
Putting the brake on climate change by accelerating the green transition remains vital. But we also need policies to lessen the impact of catastrophes when they occur. Insurance plays an important role in this. By promptly providing funds for reconstruction, insurance allows economic activities to return to pre-catastrophe levels more quickly.[3] So high rates of coverage and speedy pay-outs can substantially mitigate the economic damage. They can also reduce financial stability risks and lower the cost to taxpayers of government relief to cover uninsured losses.
So, are we covered when disaster strikes? No, the EU actually has a major climate insurance protection gap. Only a quarter of climate-related catastrophe losses are insured. In some countries, the figure is less than 5% (Figure 1). Moreover, the growing effects of climate change mean that coverage is likely to shrink as rising premiums choke demand and insurers withdraw from particularly exposed areas.

Figure 1
The insured share of economic losses related to catastrophes in Europe is low and expected to decline

Average share of insured economic losses caused by weather-related events in Europe
1980-2020 percentages

Sources: EIOPA Protection Gap Dashboard, European Environment Agency (EEA) CATDAT.

Even when insurance coverage is affordable, there are various reasons why it is not purchased. For one, people generally underestimate the likelihood and impact of catastrophes. For another, they often believe governments will compensate them for losses and that they therefore do not need their own insurance. This behaviour is a well-known challenge for insurance and is called moral hazard. Broadly speaking, moral hazard is where people do not make the effort to reduce risks themselves because they expect to be compensated for their loss anyway.
A ladder approach to catastrophe insurance
The ECB and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) are working together to find ways to address the problem. Today they published a joint Discussion Paper outlining policy options to reduce the climate insurance protection gap in Europe. Insurance and catastrophe losses come in several layers. The Discussion Paper uses the concept of a ladder to help visualise these layers and tailor the proposed policy options to them (Figure 2).
The first rung of the ladder is private insurance, the initial line of defence to pool risks and cover losses. Carefully designed insurance policies can encourage households and businesses to better adapt to climate change and increase their resilience, for example by setting standards for flood-proofing homes in flood-prone areas.

Figure 2
A ladder approach to catastrophe insurance

Source: Simplified version of figure appearing in ECB-EIOPA discussion paper ”Policy options to reduce the climate insurance protection gap” (2023).

Larger catastrophe risks, however, require a more elaborate framework. The next rung involves reinsurance and greater use of capital market instruments such as catastrophe (“cat”) bonds. Cat bonds can help insurers pass on part of the losses from rarer, but more devastating, catastrophes to a broad set of investors, helping to diversify sources of capital and lower overall premiums. Deepening cat bond markets – which may also be supported by further progress on the EU’s Capital Markets Union – can therefore help to tackle the climate insurance protection gap.
The third rung comprises the important roles played by national governments. As already noted, low insurance coverage means that the public sector often has to provide disaster relief. Public finances would generally benefit from more comprehensive disaster risk management strategies. These make it easier to balance the costs of measures taken before catastrophes occur against the relief provided once they eventually do. Precautionary measures include spending on climate adaptations such as sea walls or irrigation, as well as creating fiscal buffers such as national reserve funds for emergencies. Even with such preparations, fiscal spending will remain an important part of catastrophe relief, especially for cases such as public infrastructure. Governments could also enter into the type of public-private partnerships that already exist in some European countries, either via direct insurance or as reinsurer of last resort. A key objective of policy at this level should be to lower the share of catastrophe losses borne by the public sector, while simultaneously incentivising and improving risk mitigation and adaptation.
The final rung on the ladder is a possible EU-wide public sector scheme covering rarer, but larger, climate-related catastrophes. By providing meaningful reconstruction support to Member States, it could complement and reinforce national measures, and help to more efficiently pool catastrophe risks, which typically hit individual EU countries at different times. Such a scheme would complement the EU’s wider climate policies and existing tools for disaster relief, such as the EU Solidarity Fund, that cannot singlehandedly meet the increasing needs from climate-related catastrophes.
As set out in the Discussion Paper, all these policy options must be carefully designed and implemented so that the behaviour that generates moral hazard does not simply move to a different rung in the ladder. The EU-wide public sector scheme, for example, would need safeguards to ensure Member States also act to improve resilience to catastrophes rather than solely relying on relief from the EU. These safeguards could include partially linking contributions to actual risk exposure and only granting access once Member States have implemented agreed adaptation strategies and met their emissions reduction targets.
It will not be possible to fully insure against all future catastrophe risks, nor would doing so be a good idea if we want to encourage adaptation to climate change. Nonetheless, considering the steps outlined here should help to make Europe more resilient to future catastrophes, and lessen their macroeconomic, financial and fiscal impacts.
Authors:

Casper Christophersen, Margherita Giuzio, Hradayesh Kumar, Miles Parker, Hanni Schölermann et al.[1]

Contact:
The ECB and EIOPA welcome comments and feedback on all aspects of the Discussion Paper. Comments should be sent to ecb_eiopa_staff_protection_gap@eiopa.europa.eu, ideally by 15 June 2023.
For information: The ECB and EIOPA are jointly hosting a workshop on 22 May 2023 where these policy options will be discussed with regulators, policymakers, academics and representatives from the private sector.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.

Footnotes:
1. Nicholai Benalal, Marien Ferdinandusse, Sujit Kapadia, Linda Rousová, Elisa Telesca and Pär Torstensson (ECB), Luisa Mazzotta, Marie Scholer, Pamela Schuermans and Dimitris Zafeiris (EIOPA).
2. See European Commission Press Release (French) and Global Drought Observatory (2022) Drought in Europe – August 2022.
3. See, for example, von Peter, G., von Dahlen, S. and Saxena, S., (2012), “Unmitigated disasters? New evidence on the macroeconomic cost of natural catastrophes”, BIS Working Paper No. 394; Fache Rousová, L., Giuzio, M., Kapadia, S., Kumar H., Mazzotta, L., Parker, M., Zafeiris, D., (2021), “Climate change, catastrophes and the macroeconomic benefits of insurance”, EIOPA Financial Stability Report, July.
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The Council today adopted five laws that will enable the EU to cut greenhouse gas emissions within the main sectors of the economy, while making sure that the most vulnerable citizens and micro-enterprises, as well as the sectors exposed to carbon leakage, are effectively supported in the climate transition.
The laws are part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which sets the EU’s policies in line with its commitment to reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and to achieve climate neutrality in 2050.
The vote in the Council is the last step of the decision-making procedure.
EU emissions trading system
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a carbon market based on a system of cap-and-trade of emissions allowances for energy-intensive industries, the power generation sector and the aviation sector.
The new rules increase the overall ambition of emissions reductions by 2030 in the sectors covered by the EU ETS to 62% compared to 2005 levels.
Maritime transport emissions
Emissions from shipping will be included within the scope of the EU ETS for the first time. Obligations for shipping companies to surrender allowances will be introduced gradually: 40% for verified emissions from 2024, 70% from 2025 and 100% from 2026.
Most large vessels will be included within the scope of the EU ETS from the start, while other big vessels, namely offshore vessels, will be included in the ‘MRV’ regulation on the monitoring, reporting and verification of CO2 emissions from maritime transport first, and only later included in the EU ETS.
Non-CO2 emissions (methane and N2O) will be included in the ‘MRV’ regulation from 2024 and in the EU ETS from 2026.
Buildings, road transport and additional sectors
A new, separate emissions trading system for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors (mainly small industry) has been established, in order to ensure cost-efficient emissions reductions in these sectors, which have thus far proven difficult to decarbonise. The new system will apply to distributors that supply fuels to the buildings, road transport and additional sectors from 2027. A safeguard has been put in place whereby if the price of oil and gas are exceptionally high in the run up to the start of the new system, this will be postponed until 2028.
Emissions from aviation
Free emission allowances for the aviation sector will be gradually phased out and full auctioning from 2026 will be implemented. Until 31 December 2030, 20 million allowances will be reserved to incentivise the transition of aircraft operators from the use of fossil fuels.
The EU ETS will apply for intra-European flights (including departing flights to the United Kingdom and Switzerland), while CORSIA will apply to extra-European flights to and from third countries participating in CORSIA from 2022 to 2027 (‘clean cut’).
Transparency on aircraft operators’ emissions and offsetting will also be improved and a monitoring, reporting and verification framework for non-CO2 aviation effects will be set up. By 1 January 2028, building on the results of that framework, the Commission will propose, where appropriate, mitigation measures for non CO2 aviation effects.
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a mechanism which concerns imports of products in carbon-intensive industries. The objective of CBAM is to prevent – in full compliance with international trade rules – that the greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts of the EU are offset by increasing emissions outside its borders through the relocation of production to EU countries where policies applied to fight climate change are less ambitious than those of the EU or increased imports of carbon-intensive products.
Until the end of 2025 the CBAM will apply only as a reporting obligation. CBAM will be phased in gradually, in parallel to a phasing out of the free allowances, once it begins under the revised EU ETS for the sectors concerned. Free allowances for sectors covered by the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism – cement, aluminium, fertilisers, electric energy production, hydrogen, iron and steel, as well as some precursors and a limited number of downstream products – will be phased out over a nine-year period between 2026 and 2034.
CBAM promotes the import of goods by non-EU businesses into the EU which fulfil the high climate standards applicable in the 27 EU member states. This will ensure a balanced treatment of such imports and is designed to encourage the EU’s partners in the world to join the EU’s climate efforts.
The Social Climate Fund
The Social Climate Fund will be used by member states to finance measures and investments to support vulnerable households, micro-enterprises and transport users and help them cope with the price impacts of an emissions trading system for the buildings, road transport and additional sectors.
The fund will be funded by revenues mainly from the new emissions trading system up to a maximum amount of EUR 65 billion, to be supplemented by national contributions. It is established temporarily over the period 2026-2032.
Background
The Council today voted on the following laws of the ‘Fit for 55’ package:

Revision of the ETS Directive
Amendment of the MRV shipping Regulation
Revision of the ETS Aviation Directive
Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund
Regulation establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Presented by the European Commission on 14 July 2021 under the European Green Deal, the ‘Fit for 55’ package will enable the EU to reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and achieve climate neutrality in 2050.
The Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on ETS aviation on 7 December 2022, on CBAM on 13 December 2022 and on the EU ETS and the SCF on 18 December 2022. The Parliament formally adopted the laws on 18 April 2023.
Next steps
The laws will now be signed by the Council and the European Parliament and published in the EU’s Official Journal before entering into force.
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President Biden,
Special Envoy Kerry,
Thank you for convening us today and for your continued leadership on climate action. We are the policy makers who can keep global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius. And we have the tools! With innovation, science, technology and industrial capacity to achieve this goal. Last year, we Europeans produced more electricity from sun and wind than from gas and any other source. And the world’s electricity system is now cleaner than ever before. We are on the path towards net-zero. But the speed of our progress must accelerate.
This is why the European Union supports the four objectives that you set for this Major Economies Forum. First, we can achieve a net-zero power sector by 2040. Here in Europe, we have just raised our 2030 target for renewables, from 32% up to over 42%. And we also increased our energy efficiency target. Globally, many countries have chosen the same direction of travel. Just last weekend, G7 Ministers highlighted energy efficiency as a key pillar in the global energy transition. As Fatih Birol just showed us: Now the time has come for global action.
That’s why, today, I would like to launch a new initiative to work together towards global targets for energy efficiency, and renewable energy. We could develop these targets by COP28, together with organisations like the IEA. These targets would complement other goals. Such as the phase out of unabated fossil fuels. And the ambitious goals for zero emission vehicles and ships that you mentioned.
Second, we share the goal of reducing deforestation to net zero by 2030. The EU has joined the Forest and Climate Leaders Partnership. And we will invest one billion euros by next year, including through the Amazon Fund.
Third, 150 countries have now joined the Global Methane Pledge that the EU launched together with the US. Now we must all come up with roadmaps to turn pledges into action. In the EU, we are reducing fluorinated gases beyond what is required under the Kigali amendment. And Team Europe will continue to contribute to the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund.
Finally, we welcome your initiative on carbon management. The European Commission has proposed a binding European target for carbon storage capacity – to store 50 million tonnes of CO2 per year by 2030.
To conclude: Working together to achieve net zero is a must for the climate, a new frontier for technology, an opportunity for businesses and a driver for good jobs. Thank you.

President von der Leyen

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