As Emelia asked in Act V of Comedy of Errors, do “mine eyes deceive me?” Sorry to get all Shakespearean, but our eyes (and face, fingerprints, etc.) can reveal a lot of information about us – data that can be misused in deceptive or unfair ways. The FTC just issued a Policy Statement on Biometric Information and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and it’s a must-read for businesses.
The increasing use of consumers’ biometric information – and the marketing of technologies that use it or claim to use it – raises significant concerns about data security, privacy, and the potential for bias and discrimination. This isn’t a new issue for the FTC. We’ve been looking at the consumer protection implications of biometric data for more than a decade – for example, at the FTC’s Face Facts: A Forum on Facial Recognition Technology and in the report, Facing Facts: Best Practices For Common Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies. More recently, the FTC has brought enforcement actions against photo app maker Everalbum and Facebook, charging they misrepresented their uses of facial recognition technology.
During this time, some biometric information technologies have made significant advances. NIST found that between 2014 and 2018, facial recognition had become 20 times better at finding a matching photo in a database. Many of these technologies have also become a lot less expensive to use. So it’s no surprise that the use of these technologies is showing up everywhere from retail stores to arenas.
But as rapidly as the technologies and risks are evolving, important guiderails remain in place to protect consumers: the FTC Act’s prohibitions on unfair or deceptive practices. The Policy Statement demonstrates how established legal requirements apply and lists examples of practices the agency will look at in determining whether a company’s use of biometric information or biometric information technology could violate the FTC Act.
You’ll want to read the Policy Statement for the full story, but on the deception side of Section 5, companies shouldn’t make “false or unsubstantiated marketing claims relating to the validity, reliability, accuracy, performance, fairness, or efficacy of technologies using biometric information.” What’s more, “deceptive statements about the collection and use of biometric information” could be actionable, too.
Turning to unfairness, the Policy Statement includes factors the Commission will consider in assessing whether a use of biometric information is potentially unfair:

failing to assess foreseeable harms to consumers before collecting biometric information;
failing to promptly address known or foreseeable risks;
engaging in surreptitious and unexpected collection or use of biometric information;
failing to evaluate the practices and capabilities of third parties who will have access to consumers’ biometric information;
failing to provide appropriate training for employees and contractors whose duties involve interacting with biometric information; and
failing to conduct ongoing monitoring of a business’ technologies that use biometric information to ensure they’re functioning as anticipated and they’re not likely to harm consumers.

There’s no need to read between the lines to discern the FTC’s message to your company and clients. As the Policy Statement makes clear:
The Commission wishes to emphasize that – particularly in view of rapid changes in technological capabilities and uses – businesses should continually assess whether their use of biometric information or biometric information technologies causes or is likely to cause consumer injury in a manner that violates Section 5 of the FTC Act. If so, businesses must cease such practices, whether or not the practices are specifically addressed in this statement.
Compliments of the Federal Trade Commission.The post Body language? FTC issues policy statement about misuse of biometric data first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The European economy continues to show resilience in a challenging global context. Lower energy prices, abating supply constraints and a strong labour market supported moderate growth in the first quarter of 2023, dispelling fears of a recession. This better-than-expected start to the year lifts the growth outlook for the EU economy to 1.0% in 2023 (0.8% in the Winter interim Forecast) and 1.7% in 2024 (1.6% in the winter). Upward revisions for the euro area are of a similar magnitude, with GDP growth now expected at 1.1% and 1.6% in 2023 and 2024 respectively. On the back of persisting core price pressures, inflation has also been revised upwards compared to the winter, to 5.8% in 2023 and 2.8% in 2024 in the euro area.
Lower energy prices lift the growth outlook
According to Eurostat’s preliminary flash estimate, GDP grew by 0.3% in the EU and by 0.1% in the euro area in the first quarter of 2023. Leading indicators suggest continued growth in the second quarter.
The European economy has managed to contain the adverse impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, weathering the energy crisis thanks to a rapid diversification of supply and a sizeable fall in gas consumption. Markedly lower energy prices are working their way through the economy, reducing firms’ production costs. Consumers are also seeing their energy bills fall, although private consumption is set to remain subdued as wage growth lags inflation.
As inflation remains high, financing conditions are set to tighten further. Though the ECB and other EU central banks are expected to be nearing the end of the interest rate hiking cycle, the recent turbulence in the financial sector is likely to add pressure to the cost and ease of accessing credit, slowing down investment growth and hitting in particular residential investment.
Core inflation revised higher but set to gradually decline
After peaking in 2022, headline inflation continued to decline in the first quarter of 2023 amid a sharp deceleration of energy prices. Core inflation (headline inflation excluding energy and unprocessed food) is, however, proving more persistent. In March it reached a historic high of 7.6%, but it is projected to decline gradually over the forecast horizon as profit margins absorb higher wage pressures and financing conditions tighten. The April flash harmonised index of consumer prices estimate for the euro area, released after the cut-off date of this forecast, shows a marginal decline in the rate of core inflation, which suggests that it might have peaked in the first quarter, as projected. On an annual basis, core inflation in the euro area in 2023 is set to average 6.1%, before falling to 3.2% in 2024, remaining above headline inflation in both forecast years.
Labour market remains resilient against economic slowdown
A record-strong labour market is bolstering the resilience of the EU economy. The EU unemployment rate hit a new record low of 6.0% in March 2023, and participation and employment rates are at record highs.
The EU labour market is expected to react only mildly to the slower pace of economic expansion. Employment growth is forecast at 0.5% this year, before edging down to 0.4% in 2024. The unemployment rate is projected to remain just above 6%. Wage growth has picked up since early 2022 but has so far remained well below inflation. More sustained wage increases are expected on the back of persistent tightness of labour markets, strong increases in minimum wages in several countries and, more generally, pressure from workers to recoup lost purchasing power.
Public deficits set to decrease especially in 2024
Despite the introduction of support measures to mitigate the impact of high energy prices, strong nominal growth and the unwinding of residual pandemic-related measures led the EU aggregate government deficit in 2022 to fall further to 3.4% of GDP. In 2023 and more markedly in 2024, falling energy prices should allow governments to phase out energy support measures, driving further deficit reductions, to 3.1% and 2.4% of GDP respectively. The EU aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to decline steadily to below 83% in 2024 (90% in the euro area), which is still above the pre-pandemic levels. There is a large heterogeneity of fiscal trajectories across Member States.
While inflation can support the improvement in public finances in the short term, this effect is bound to dissipate over time as debt repayment costs increase and public expenditures are progressively adjusted to the higher price level.
Downside risks to the economic outlook have increased
More persistent core inflation could continue restraining the purchasing power of households and force a stronger response of monetary policy, with broad macro-financial ramifications. Moreover, renewed episodes of financial stress could lead to a further surge in risk aversion, prompting a more pronounced tightening of lending standards than assumed in this forecast. An expansionary fiscal policy stance would fuel inflation further, leaning against monetary policy action. In addition, new challenges may arise for the global economy following the banking sector turmoil or related to wider geopolitical tensions. On the positive side, more benign developments in energy prices would lead to a faster decline in headline inflation, with positive spillovers on domestic demand. Finally, there is persistent uncertainty stemming from Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
The forecast publication includes for the first time an overview of the economic structural features, recent performance and outlook for Ukraine, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were granted candidate status for EU membership by the Council in June and December 2022.
Background
This forecast is based on a set of technical assumptions concerning exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices with a cut-off date of 25 April. For all other incoming data, including assumptions about government policies, this forecast takes into consideration information up until, and including, 28 April. Unless new policies are announced and specified in adequate detail, the projections assume no policy changes.
The European Commission publishes two comprehensive forecasts (spring and autumn) and two interim forecasts (winter and summer) each year. The interim forecasts cover annual and quarterly GDP and inflation for the current and following year for all Member States, as well as EU and euro area aggregates.
The European Commission’s Summer 2023 Economic Forecast will update GDP and inflation projections and is expected to be presented in July 2023.
Compliments of the European Commission.The post Spring 2023 EU Economic Forecast: An improved outlook amid persistent challenges first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

1 Introduction
It has been almost two and a half years since the United Kingdom signed its post-Brexit trade deal with the European Union (EU), which was expected to have multifaceted impacts on the UK economy. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was signed on 30 December 2020 and came into effect provisionally on 1 January 2021. Leaving the EU’s Single Market and the EU Customs Union represented a profound change in the economic relationship. This change was expected to have an impact on trade flows between the EU and the United Kingdom, but also on migration flows, foreign direct investment, regulation, the financial sector, science and education, and other areas of the UK economy.
While it will take some time for all the effects to emerge, this article focuses on recent developments in UK trade and labour markets, where the impacts of Brexit have been widely discussed. The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is a confounding factor, but the available data allow a first stocktake of the effects of Brexit. While significant uncertainties regarding the precise magnitudes remain, the available evidence suggests that Brexit has been a drag on UK trade and has contributed to a fall in labour supply, both of which are likely to weigh on the United Kingdom’s long-run growth potential.[1]
Access the full report here
Authors:

Katrin Forster-van Aerssen
Tajda Spital

Compliments of the European Central Bank.The post ECB | The impact of Brexit on UK trade and labour markets first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Once approved, they will be the world’s first rules on Artificial Intelligence
MEPs include bans on biometric surveillance, emotion recognition, predictive policing AI systems
Tailor-made regimes for general-purpose AI and foundation models like GPT
The right to make complaints about AI systems

To ensure a human-centric and ethical development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Europe, MEPs endorsed new transparency and risk-management rules for AI systems.
On Thursday, the Internal Market Committee and the Civil Liberties Committee adopted a draft negotiating mandate on the first ever rules for Artificial Intelligence with 84 votes in favour, 7 against and 12 abstentions. In their amendments to the Commission’s proposal, MEPs aim to ensure that AI systems are overseen by people, are safe, transparent, traceable, non-discriminatory, and environmentally friendly. They also want to have a uniform definition for AI designed to be technology-neutral, so that it can apply to the AI systems of today and tomorrow.
Risk based approach to AI – Prohibited AI practices
The rules follow a risk-based approach and establish obligations for providers and users depending on the level of risk the AI can generate. AI systems with an unacceptable level of risk to people’s safety would be strictly prohibited, including systems that deploy subliminal or purposefully manipulative techniques, exploit people’s vulnerabilities or are used for social scoring (classifying people based on their social behaviour, socio-economic status, personal characteristics).
MEPs substantially amended the list to include bans on intrusive and discriminatory uses of AI systems such as:

“Real-time” remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces;
“Post” remote biometric identification systems, with the only exception of law enforcement for the prosecution of serious crimes and only after judicial authorization;
Biometric categorisation systems using sensitive characteristics (e.g. gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship status, religion, political orientation);
Predictive policing systems (based on profiling, location or past criminal behaviour);
Emotion recognition systems in law enforcement, border management, workplace, and educational institutions; and
Indiscriminate scraping of biometric data from social media or CCTV footage to create facial recognition databases (violating human rights and right to privacy).

High-risk AI
MEPs expanded the classification of high-risk areas to include harm to people’s health, safety, fundamental rights or the environment. They also added AI systems to influence voters in political campaigns and in recommender systems used by social media platforms (with more than 45 million users under the Digital Services Act) to the high-risk list.
General-purpose AI – transparency measures
MEPs included obligations for providers of foundation models – a new and fast evolving development in the field of AI – who would have to guarantee robust protection of fundamental rights, health and safety and the environment, democracy and rule of law. They would need to assess and mitigate risks, comply with design, information and environmental requirements and register in the EU database.
Generative foundation models, like GPT, would have to comply with additional transparency requirements, like disclosing that the content was generated by AI, designing the model to prevent it from generating illegal content and publishing summaries of copyrighted data used for training.
Supporting innovation and protecting citizens’ rights
To boost AI innovation, MEPs added exemptions to these rules for research activities and AI components provided under open-source licenses. The new law promotes regulatory sandboxes, or controlled environments, established by public authorities to test AI before its deployment.
MEPs want to boost citizens’ right to file complaints about AI systems and receive explanations of decisions based on high-risk AI systems that significantly impact their rights. MEPs also reformed the role of the EU AI Office, which would be tasked with monitoring how the AI rulebook is implemented.
Quotes
After the vote, co-rapporteur Brando Benifei (S&D, Italy) said: “We are on the verge of putting in place landmark legislation that must resist the challenge of time. It is crucial to build citizens’ trust in the development of AI, to set the European way for dealing with the extraordinary changes that are already happening, as well as to steer the political debate on AI at the global level. We are confident our text balances the protection of fundamental rights with the need to provide legal certainty to businesses and stimulate innovation in Europe”.
Co-rapporteur Dragos Tudorache (Renew, Romania) said: “Given the profound transformative impact AI will have on our societies and economies, the AI Act is very likely the most important piece of legislation in this mandate. It’s the first piece of legislation of this kind worldwide, which means that the EU can lead the way in making AI human-centric, trustworthy and safe. We have worked to support AI innovation in Europe and to give start-ups, SMEs and industry space to grow and innovate, while protecting fundamental rights, strengthening democratic oversight and ensuring a mature system of AI governance and enforcement.”
Next steps
Before negotiations with the Council on the final form of the law can begin, this draft negotiating mandate needs to be endorsed by the whole Parliament, with the vote expected during the 12-15 June session.
Compliments of European Parliament.The post EU Parliament | AI Act: a step closer to the first rules on Artificial Intelligence first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

A coordinated approach, including toward subsidies, is needed to tackle climate change successfully

Governments across the world are using subsidies to support the green transition. Green subsidies can be helpful where there are market failures. When carbon emissions are underpriced in relation to their true cost to society or preferable policy solutions (such as carbon pricing) are not in place, subsidies can steer businesses and consumers towards clean technologies that are less polluting while also lowering the costs of those technologies.
But subsidies should be carefully targeted to correct market failures and they should not discriminate between firms, be they foreign or domestic, old or new, large or small. They must be consistent with World Trade Organization rules, too.
The risk now is a harmful subsidy race between the world’s largest economies to lure green investment. This could undermine the level playing field in global trade, contribute to geoeconomic fragmentation and impose large fiscal costs. It would ultimately reduce efficiency and undermine the rules-based global trading system that has served the world economy well over several decades.
Richer nations with greater fiscal firepower might emerge as winners in a subsidy race even if the global economy is worse off. Emerging market and developing economies with scarcer fiscal resources would find it particularly difficult to compete for investments with advanced economies in a more protectionist world, which could also hinder the transfer of technology to these nations. Ultimately, the cost of the green transition might go up.
Europe’s Green Deal
The European Union is discussing a Green Deal industrial plan, proposed by the Commission in January, some elements of which have been adopted already. The plan relaxes European competition rules temporarily to allow for expanded subsidies to clean-tech firms. This was partly a response to some measures in the US Inflation Reduction Act, which the EU fears will put its firms at an increasing cost disadvantage and lead to an exodus of companies to the country that provides the largest tax break or subsidy.
As policymakers develop the EU’s Green Deal, they could take several steps to maximize its benefits and avoid pitfalls.

The EU should continue to work with other countries to develop a common, inclusive multilateral approach to stopping climate change. This could take the form of a climate club or international carbon price floor. It could also take the form of an agreement on the appropriate use and design of subsidies, underpinned by thorough analysis of the effects of various types of subsidies on climate and economic outcomes, including competitiveness, resource allocation, and cross-border trade. In the interim, green subsidies can be used cooperatively through open and nondiscriminatory plurilateral initiatives.
Preserving the integrity of the EU’s single market is paramount. EU state aid rules rightly put strict limits on the support governments can provide to their companies to ensure a level playing field. This prevents bigger EU countries, or those with more financial heft, from providing more generous support to their companies to the detriment of competitors elsewhere in the bloc. The relaxation of state aid rules should thus be limited in scope, duration and size. It should be coupled with some EU-level funding to help address the differing ability of members to deploy subsidies. Coordinating fiscal support for clean-tech industries across EU countries, perhaps under a centrally funded scheme, could be an option. Over the medium term, the EU would also benefit from creating a climate investment fund to help coordinate and finance the additional public investment needed to achieve emission-reduction goals more cost effectively.
The EU should focus any subsidies on activities where the interventions might have the largest climate benefits. This includes subsidizing the creation of new clean technologies and the deployment of existing ones that are still in their infancy.

To support and accelerate the green transition, capital, labor and knowledge must flow freely to where they are most needed in the single market. The Commission has estimated that an additional 4 trillion euros in investment is needed between 2021 and 2030 to meet the EU’s 2030 emission-reduction goals, three-quarters of which needs to be privately financed. Faster progress toward a strong Capital Markets Union remains a priority as it would help ensure sufficient private-sector financing for the green transition across the bloc. On the labor side, the Commission’s plan is encouraging as it would help better integrate labor markets within the EU and provide more training in clean-tech sectors. These aims are critical, as the green transition will require workers to have the right mix of skills and are able to move from shrinking industries to growing ones. It is also welcome that the EU has reaffirmed its commitment to using part of the new carbon pricing revenues from the road transport and building sectors for a new Social Climate Fund, which will support vulnerable households during the energy transition.

Author:

Alfred Kammer, Director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund 

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You repeatedly mentioned at the last press conference that the inflation outlook continues to be “too high for too long”. How strong is the upside risk of inflation in the eurozone?
There are factors that can induce significant upside risks to the inflation outlook. And we are still in a situation where uncertainty about the path of inflation is high, so we have to be extremely attentive to those potential risks, the exact list of which you will find in our latest monetary policy statement, in particular in relation to wage increases in various European countries.
We now see waves of strikes across Europe. How serious is the risk of a wage-price spiral as a second-round effect?
The protests, collective bargaining and, in some cases, strikes that we observe in Europe are not surprising, because last year was one where real wages went down significantly. And there is now a process of catching up and making up for the lost ground in real wage terms.
The numbers appear large on the face of it. Take for example the recent wage agreements in Germany and Spain, which are both in double digits over a period of two and three years respectively. It’s a catch-up process that is taking place, but we have to remain very vigilant.
Europe’s macroeconomic situation now seems to be better. Do you think the eurozone could avoid recession and that the growth rate will remain positive?
We do not have a recession in our baseline projection for 2023, and we are in a better position than what we feared six months ago. Back then everybody was talking about at least a technical recession, and we have avoided that over the winter.
This is attributable to various factors, but two are key: first, the fall in energy prices; second, the easing of the supply bottlenecks, which have impacted manufactured goods in particular. We’re seeing that easing in shipping, the price of freight, delays indicated by corporations, the level of inventories – all of these indicators are pointing in the same direction. And if you add to that some still-lagging effects of the recovery that took place a few months ago, we have a series of factors which point to more positive growth than we had anticipated. But we still have a lot of uncertainty out there, including what will happen in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and some emerging signs of weakness in demand for manufactured goods.
How significant do you think geopolitical risk is for Europe’s future? Are you concerned about the impact on energy supplies of the Russian aggression?
Even without any Russian supplies, the European position is solid. We went through the winter season without rationing, without massive disruption. That was down to three factors. First, in part, the mild weather. Second, our ability to find alternative sources of supply, particularly gas. And third, the capacity of Europeans to actually reduce their demand. But we have to be attentive, and energy remains one of the uncertainties that can affect future output as well as inflation numbers.
How long will you keep your tightening cycle? Can we exclude a rate hike in the autumn?
Given the process that we have adopted and the environment in which we operate, we’ve decided two things: one, we will be data-dependent; and two, our reaction function will determine the data that will be important to us. Our reaction function will be anchored in the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission, and this will dictate our decisions going forward.
Between core inflation and headline inflation, which is the most important statistic for the European Central Bank (ECB) to analyse monetary policy?
Headline inflation is the measure that we target and that we have agreed will determine whether or not we deliver price stability. This is because what ultimately matters are the prices that people directly experience, and that means we need to target a measure that includes food and energy. That’s our thermometer, that’s what we are committed to doing.
We do, however, look at measures of underlying inflation. “Core” is one such measure, but there are also others – for example, those that exclude more volatile items or focus more on domestic inflation pressures. And why do we filter inflation in that way? It’s to arrive at the “heart” of inflation, the most persistent element in those price indexes that can help us understand where headline inflation is likely to settle in the medium term. That’s a good way to identify in real time whether our policy action is actually biting, and whether we see supporting evidence that, yes, we have attacked inflation hard enough.
There is some criticism that the ECB reacted too late when beginning to raise interest rates. What is your response?
We were coming from ten years of very accommodative monetary policy. But we completely changed tack – and rapidly. We started changing our policies already in December 2021, when we announced that we would discontinue net asset purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) and gradually reduce net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP). We later announced that we would conclude net purchases under the APP and started rate hikes in July 2022. Since then we have raised rates by 375 basis points in less than a year – the fastest increase in our history. So we have moved in a very deliberate and decisive way in order to fight inflation. Could it have been done a little earlier? Possibly. Would it have made a huge difference? Probably not. What I know is that we are determined to tame inflation, to bring it back to our 2% medium-term target in a timely manner, and we have made a sizeable adjustment already. But we still have more ground to cover.
Regarding the APP, do you think it is necessary to go further and start selling assets? Regarding the PEPP, the ECB intends to reinvest until at least the end of 2024. Do you have any plans to accelerate the end of these reinvestments?
We have just announced that we expect to discontinue the reinvestments under the APP as of July 2023. Nothing further has been discussed by the Governing Council – neither a proposal to sell assets under the APP, nor a change to the forward guidance that we have given in relation to the PEPP. We have also mentioned that we would use flexibility in relation to the PEPP, if necessary to facilitate the smooth transmission of monetary policy, and there is no change to that at all.
What lessons can you draw from the financial market turmoil triggered by Credit Suisse and US banks, and how do you account for them in financial regulation and ECB stress tests of European banks? What do you think of risks from non-banks?
A first lesson, probably, will be that we have to apply the existing regulatory framework scrupulously. I’m talking here about Basel III. Second, the Basel III set of rules needs to apply to a large set of banking institutions, not to a narrow group. Third, supervision needs to be intrusive and as granular as possible. Fourth, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision should look very carefully at the non-bank financial sector to make sure that we do not have significant risks on the horizon.
How do you deal with Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds?
Concerning AT1, in the EU we have clarified that we have a pecking order which requires equity holders to be the first port of call in the event of losses. And we have made clear that there is no possibility for this to be changed, even by contractual arrangement, because it’s the Capital Requirements Directive that applies throughout the EU.
When do you plan to launch the digital euro? Is 2027 the goalpost for launching?
The next step will be in October 2023 when the Governing Council will have to decide whether we move into the next phase – experimenting with the digital euro. During that next phase we will be checking all the potential errors, the potential traps, the potential shortfalls, the way in which it will operate on a cross-border basis. After this phase is over, the decision will be made to finally launch it or not. I don’t have a set date, but it would not surprise me if it was 2026 or 2027.
Compared to the Bank of Japan, the Federal Reserve System or the Bank of England, one of the characteristics of the ECB is that the eurozone includes smaller markets that depend on communicating with bigger markets. Is fighting euro scepticism a difficulty in your job?
You are right that in Europe we have a fragmented capital market. We do not yet have a capital markets union, and it’s an added difficulty because we are talking to multiple markets that are smaller than the market Governor Ueda is talking to – he is talking primarily to the Tokyo market – and then of course to all the other markets in the world, because we’re not addressing only one geographic market. Markets are cross-border.
You now have 20 Member States in the eurozone, which could increase in the future. Is there any dilemma, as you always have to seek consensus in your Governing Council?
I think overall, in very tough and uncertain times, in almost all cases, we have managed to rally enough consensus around the table. I would like to think that it is because of me, but I think it has more to do with the fact that we are all driven by the same objective, which is our mandate. We are all driven by the public interest of the European Union and the euro area, and we are prepared to make compromises. There are different perspectives and intellectual backgrounds as well as macroeconomic circumstances. If you look at, for instance, Latvia and compare it with Malta, you are talking about completely different inflation rates. The structure of the German economy is different from that of Italy or Spain. This has to do with the way in which those economies were built over the course of history. It is that very rich diversity that comes together around the table to form a common view on the optimal policy to arrive at price stability. And so far it’s worked. And it’s also my way of working; I’m not a dictatorial central bank governor.
The G7, especially Europe, has a role in leading the discussion on sanctions against Russia. How can the effectiveness of sanctions be improved? How can the ECB contribute to this?
We can spot unusual flows of funds in and out and we can mention to the appropriate authorities what we observe. That’s our contribution to the sanctions. In addition to finding loopholes, it’s important for the Member States and the European Commission to identify the ways in which some people try to circumvent and to bypass the sanctions so that they can be implemented with full efficiency.
What impact will “greenflation” and “decarbonisation” have on monetary policies in the long term?
In the long run, if our economies rely more substantially on renewable energies, the impact will be disinflationary. But in the short term, we know that investments will be needed in significant amounts, both to invest in these renewable energy production facilities and also to invest in fossil energy – such as liquified natural gas terminals – in order to transition smoothly to the green energy that everybody is calling for. So, in the first instance, there is likely to be an element of price increases as a result of this massive flow of investment.
In the very short term, what has caused energy prices to go up is not so much green policies but the increase in electricity prices caused by the sudden cut-off of Russian gas. So, the contribution to high prices is to be found in the fossil fuel industry, not “greenflation”.
Over the past decade the political pressure on central banks, including the ECB, has been increasing, because the central bank can avoid parliamentary decisions and react very quickly. Could this lead to difficulties in maintaining independence?
Number one, the independence of the ECB is enshrined in the Treaty that founded the EU. It’s in the hardest law that we can have. And it’s very, very specifically mentioned that European leaders cannot try to influence me or my colleagues in any particular shape or form. This would be against the law. Second, we have a mandate, which assigns us one objective, not two like at the Federal Reserve. Our objective is price stability. And third, I’m accountable to the European Parliament. Every quarter I present our policy decisions, our assessment of the macroeconomic situation, and I take all the questions that they have for me to explain and document and justify the decisions that we’ve made. So you have a combination of independence, narrow mandate and accountability, and the three of them form the operational framework in which we function.
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Diversity is a matter of sound governance for banks and leads to better decision-making. That is why Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, and Elizabeth McCaul, Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, are encouraging banks to improve the diversity of their boards.

Banking is still a man’s world. Out of the 361 CEO appointments made between 2020 and 2022 at the significant institutions (SIs) directly supervised by the ECB, as well as at their subsidiaries, more than 300 were men, as the ECB has observed. Also, in the same period, only 36% of members of boards newly appointed in SIs were women. Why is that an issue? For one thing, diverse boards make better business decisions. And as supervisors it is our job to check that banks take steps to create the best conditions for making good decisions.
So, we have been gathering information about governance in SIs. Unfortunately, the data reveal a mixed picture. On the one hand, there have been improvements in banks’ diversity policies, which include education, experience, geographical provenance and age in addition to gender. Last year, we addressed a number of banks directly about their lack of such policies, and it’s good to see that they have acted on this. Other banks that did already have diversity policies in place have raised their targets. On the other hand, when we look at the actual targets set, we can only express our disappointment. On average, banks only raised their diversity targets for management bodies from 32% in 2020 to 34% at the end of 2022.
In addition to the actual targets being disappointing, what can we say about how banks are meeting them? Overall, around one third of SIs have not met their own targets and are planning to do so within the next 3 years. While 28 of the banks that we directly supervise increased the number of women on their boards in 2022, 16 made appointments that actually reduced gender diversity. Moreover, the share of female board members appointed was low, at around 34%. With these numbers we doubt that these targets could be reached anytime soon.[1]
This is just not good enough. For the sake of sound governance banks have to push for faster improvement. That is why we added gender diversity considerations to our Guide to fit and proper assessments in 2021. The Guide lays out the checks we conduct to ensure that newly hired top managers are ready and qualified to run a bank and it now asks banks to respect their gender diversity targets. We also made management body effectiveness and diversity part of our 2022-24 supervisory priorities in an effort to boost the speed at which improvements are being made.[2] This commitment has now been reaffirmed in our 2023-25 priorities, in particular in terms of making banks better able to deal with the growing challenges they face.[3] When we identify shortcomings in diversity policies during the fit and proper process, we send recommendation letters to banks about how they can address any shortcomings identified and meet the targets set. In 2021 and 2022, we raised diversity issues in 36 cases, most of which we addressed by making recommendations. In addition, we monitor how banks perform in terms of gender diversity during the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process – in which we check banks’ ability to deal with potential risks. Overall, we continue to see diversity as a priority when it comes to internal governance.
Let’s look at a recent example of how we used our supervisory tools to address banks’ shortcomings. In one case, we identified a bank whose board was not functioning well, partly due to a lack of diversity of thought and experiences. This finding resulted in an on-site inspection of the bank. In addition, we suggested that the bank conduct an external review of its board to compare it to industry best practice. The review confirmed that there were weaknesses at board level, in particular with the members collectively not having the relevant experiences needed and a lack of independence, thus limiting the ability of the board to oversee the bank’s activities. We then required the bank to review the composition of its board. In the end, the bank changed the composition of its board to increase the diversity of its members’ experiences and backgrounds. We will continue to assess cases like these as part of our ongoing supervision and the fit and proper process in relation to future board appointments.
We want to see gender-balanced boards, not only because it is fair but because it improves governance. One reason is that gender-balanced management encourages a broader range of views, opinions, experiences, perceptions, values and backgrounds. This is crucial for avoiding groupthink or herd mentalities, and may also be beneficial for the soundness of the bank.
“Women on Boards”
Striving for gender balance is not only a priority for the ECB. Change is also coming at the European level. At the end of 2022, the co-legislators formally adopted the Women on Boards Directive.[4] This set a clear target: the corporate board of a publicly listed bank can only be considered balanced when each gender makes up at least 40% of its composition.[5] While some countries have already set a target and others have not, all EU Member States are expected to incorporate this EU directive into national law within the next two years. Around 35 SIs will then have to meet the target by June 2026 at the latest. Once the target has been incorporated into national law, we hope that benchmarking and peer pressure will become even more powerful tools that will help to improve banks’ governance.
We will use the supervisory tools already available within the bounds of national legislation to insist that banks improve and address any internal governance shortcomings relating to gender diversity. We will also work relentlessly to ensure that banks set more credible and ambitious diversity targets for themselves, and that they then achieve them. Improving diversity is in banks’ best interests because it can help to improve decision-making. More importantly, doing so is also in the best interests of the general public because it guarantees strong bank governance through sound, more informed decision-making. And that means safer banks for everyone in Europe.
Authors:

Frank Elderson, Member of the ECB’s Executive Board
Elizabeth McCaul, Board Member, ECB

Compliments of the European Central Bank.

1. See also European Banking Authority (2023), “Report on the benchmarking of diversity practices and the gender pay gap”, 7 March.
2. ECB Banking Supervision (2022), “Supervisory Priorities for 2022-24”.
3. Af Jochnick, K. and Quagliariello, M. (2022), “Charting the course: our supervisory priorities”, The Supervision Blog, ECB Banking Supervision, 12 December.
4. Official Journal of the European Union (2022), Directive 2022/2381 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 November 2022 on improving the gender balance among directors of listed companies and related measures.
5. European Commission (2022), “Gender Equality: The EU is breaking the glass ceiling thanks to new gender balance targets on company boards”, 22 November.
The post ECB | Diversity at the top makes banks better first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The EU Council today adopted an assistance measure worth €1 billion under the European Peace Facility (EPF) that will further contribute to strengthening the capabilities and resilience of Ukraine to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and protect the civilian population against the ongoing Russian military aggression.
The assistance measure will finance the provision to the Ukrainian Armed Forces of 155-mm-calibre artillery rounds and, if requested, missiles which will be jointly procured by EU member states from the European defence industry.

Today’s decision is another major step to deliver more ammunition to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces need substantial amounts of ammunition to defend the Ukrainian people and territory. They need it fast. Together with the previous decision to swiftly provide ammunition from existing stocks, we are committing €2 billion to this purpose, bringing the total EU military support to Ukraine to €5.6 billion.
Josep Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

The measure will support joint procurement of ammunition and missiles from economic operators established in the EU or Norway, and producing these ammunition and missiles in the EU or Norway. The supply chains of these operators may include operators established or having their production outside of the EU or Norway. The measure will also cover deliveries of ammunition and missiles which have undergone an important stage of their manufacturing in the EU or Norway which consists of final assembly.
To be eligible for EPF reimbursement, procurement contracts or purchase orders will need to be concluded before 30 September 2023 in the context of an existing European Defence Agency (EDA) project or through complementary joint acquisition projects led by a member state.
Today’s decision implements track 2 of the Council agreement of 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach intended to speed up the delivery and joint procurement of artillery ammunition with a view to providing one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine within twelve months following the Council agreement.
It was preceded by the approval of another support package under the EPF worth €1 billion that allowed the EU to reimburse member states for ground-to-ground and artillery ammunition as well as missiles donated to Ukraine from existing stocks or from the reprioritisation of existing orders during the period 9 February to 31 May 2023 (track 1). Track 3 of the ammunition package, in the form of an Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), has been adopted by the European Commission on 3 May 2023.
The Council will receive regular updates on the implementation of the assistance measure in order to monitor progress in the implementation of the Council agreement on the three-track approach.
Together with the previous packages of military support, the assistance measure adopted today brings the total EU contribution for Ukraine to support the delivery of military equipment under the EPF to €5.6 billion.
On top of that, the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) continues to enhance the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, reinforced with two EPF assistance measures worth €61 million to finance the provision of equipment necessary for the training.
These efforts prove once more that the EU remains steadfast in its support for the Ukrainian military in defending the country against the illegal Russian aggression.
Background
On 2 March 2023, the High Representative received a request from Ukraine for the EU to assist the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the supply of 155-mm-calibre artillery rounds.
On 20 March 2023, the Council agreed on a three-track approach with a view to speeding up delivery and joint procurement, aiming at one million rounds of artillery ammunition for Ukraine in a joint effort within the following 12 months, and called for the swift implementation of those three tracks.
On 13 April 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/810, to implement track 1, worth EUR 1 billion, under the assistance measure approved in Decision 2022/338. This track will finance the reimbursement of donated materiel from existing stocks or from reprioritisation of existing orders, delivered during the period 9 February 2023 – 31 May 2023, regarding ground-to-ground and artillery ammunition, and, if requested, missiles.
On 3 May 2023, the European Commission adopted the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) thereby implementing track 3 of the approach agreed on 20 March. The Commission proposal introduces targeted measures – including financing – aimed at ramping up the EU’s production capacity and addressing the current shortage of ammunition and missiles as well as their components.
The EPF was created in 2021 to support partners around the world in the areas of military and defence, with the ultimate aim of preventing conflict, preserving peace and strengthening international security and stability.The post EU joint procurement of ammunition and missiles for Ukraine: Council agrees €1 billion support under the European Peace Facility first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Speech by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, State of the Union conference organised by the European University Institute | Florence, 5 May 2023 |
Many thanks for inviting me to address this conference along with so many esteemed speakers. As the cradle of the Renaissance, Florence has a long history of attracting people from different disciplines across Europe. The most gifted individuals in the fields of art, science, politics and finance have long come to this city to make a difference, together unleashing creative forces of a magnitude greater than the sum of their already impressive individual contributions. Just as we have come to Palazzo Vecchio today to unlock the creativity required to address the multidimensional challenges that are affecting the state of the European Union. My contribution will focus on the most pressing challenge requiring urgent action: the ongoing climate and environmental crises.
The problem is clear. The state of the EU is not yet on a transition path that is aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement – to pursue efforts to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and in any case well below 2 degrees. Linear trend extrapolation of global warming puts us going beyond 1.5 degrees in March 2035.[1] Mind you, when country delegates negotiated the Paris Agreement in December 2015, the trend suggested this level would not be breached until March 2045. In other words, on top of the seven-plus years that have passed since the Paris Agreement, we have lost another ten.
Using a more sophisticated approach, the Climate Action Tracker – which was developed by a consortium of climate research organisations – when compiled in November 2022 assessed that the policies and actions taken by the EU were almost sufficient to be consistent with limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. The picture improves if the tracker incorporates policy commitments made but not yet implemented. However, even then it is still not consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. For some existing commitments, the European Council recently endorsed several measures proposed by the European Commission. Nonetheless, more specific commitments are clearly required and all promises need to be kept.
Importantly, under its Fit-for-55 strategy, the EU is committed to lowering carbon emissions by at least 55% by 2030. Moreover, against the backdrop of Russia’s horrific ongoing war against Ukraine, the EU has pledged to become independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030 under its REPowerEU plan.
The European Commission estimates that reaching the Fit-for-55 and REPowerEU objectives requires an average annual investment of €1.25 trillion over the years 2021-30.[2] That estimate would add around €500 billion to the level of annual investment in climate and energy security seen in the previous decade.[3] Most of this additional investment will need to come from the private sector as households and firms adjust to a net-zero economy. However, significant shortcomings in the functioning of the financial system are presently curtailing the flow of investment in green – and therefore truly sustainable – economic development.
Gaps in finance
Most prominently, carbon pricing is still not being used to an adequate extent. Progress has been made: the carbon price in the EU’s emission trading system has been rising since 2021, and the European Council and European Parliament recently agreed on extending the scheme’s scope of application and on a mechanism to equalise the price of carbon between domestic products and imports.[4] However, overall emissions continue to be improperly priced, implying that economic activity – including the flow of finance – remains biased in favour of high-emission activities.
Besides the gap in carbon pricing, a second gap is that capital markets are not playing their potential role in supporting the green transition. ECB research shows that stock markets can strongly encourage investment in greener technologies.[5] However, those markets are still relatively underdeveloped in the EU and a lack of harmonisation limits cross-border flows. Resolving these issues and advancing a capital markets union, as proposed by the European Commission, will boost the efficiency and resilience of the flow of finance in Europe. As ECB President Christine Lagarde has said when speaking about the green transition, developing the capital markets union is “too good an opportunity to pass up”.[6] Today I add: we must seize this opportunity.
A third gap can be identified in the approach banks are taking to climate-related and environmental risks in their activities. In recent years, the ECB has conducted several benchmarking exercises among banks under our supervision to assess their practices against our expectations for a sound management of climate-related and environmental risks. These exercises showed that while almost all banks acknowledge the importance of climate-related and environmental risks and while we are seeing progress, banks’ practices to manage these risks are still underdeveloped and insufficiently applied across the board. Given these shortcomings, at present it is difficult to see how banks can sufficiently help their customers navigate the transition and become resilient to climate change and environmental degradation in a timely manner.
While most financing for the green transition should come from private resources, the public sector also has an important role to play, both directly through public investment and indirectly though co-financing, private-public partnerships or State guarantees.[7] Much of this will be financed at the European level through the EU Member States’ national recovery and resilience plans as part of the Next Generation EU programme that was set up to support the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. How much these EU-financed expenditures will contribute to the EU’s climate objectives is uncertain and depends on how successfully and quickly the individual countries implement their recovery and resilience plans. Earlier this year, the European Commission proposed a Green Deal Industrial Plan intended to support this effort.
Analysis by ECB staff shows that, from a legal and institutional perspective, public investment efforts could well be supplemented by additional EU-financed resources in the form of a European Climate and Energy Security Fund.[8] As in the case of Next Generation EU in response to the pandemic, there are compelling arguments to suggest that the investment efforts required to support an orderly transition are exceptional, one-off and temporary. At the same time, concerns have recently emerged about Member States’ capacity to implement their existing recovery and resilience plans.[9] These concerns can largely be traced back to administrative hurdles at the national and local level and need to be addressed before any additional resources are considered. Moreover, any additional European funds would need to be accompanied by a euro area aggregate fiscal stance that is consistent with the ECB’s fight against high inflation.
Besides gaps that curtail the transition, there are also gaps in the financial system that are threatening its resilience to increased climate-related and environmental damages. A recent discussion paper by the ECB and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority shows that only around 25% of all climate-related catastrophe losses in the European Union are currently insured.[10] In some countries, including Italy, the figure is below 5%. As natural disasters become both more frequent and more severe, insurance costs are expected to rise. Some insurers may reduce risk coverage or stop providing certain types of catastrophe insurance altogether, which would widen the insurance gap further.
The lack of climate catastrophe insurance can affect the economy and financial stability.[11] If losses are not covered by insurance, households and firms will take more time to resume their activities, slowing economic recovery. Banks’ exposure to credit risk may therefore increase. The fiscal position of governments may be also weakened if they need to provide relief to cover uninsured losses.
All this confirms that, when preparing for the future, we must acknowledge that the world – and therefore the economy – will change. Regardless of whether the gaps that I have described are closed or not, the economy will face profound changes and increasing shocks. Moreover, analyses consistently show that if we fail to deliver on a timely and orderly transition, the macro-financial damage will be more severe than if we act in time. We are in a race against the clock, and so far the clock is winning.
Implications for the ECB
The ECB takes the consequences of the ongoing climate and environmental crises into account in the pursuit of its mandate. We are mindful that if we ignore these consequences we cannot deliver on our objectives of maintaining price stability and preserving the safety and soundness of the banking system. In fact, we are committed to aligning ourselves with a Paris-compatible transition path across all our tasks and responsibilities because this is a precondition for sustainably fulfilling all our tasks and responsibilities.
Let me give two specific examples of actions we are taking within our mandate that show our focus on some of the gaps that I have mentioned.
On the monetary policy side, in an effort to correct for the bias that exists in financial markets in favour of high-emission activities, since October 2022 we have been tilting our corporate bond purchases towards those issuers with a better climate performance.[12] Similarly, we will incorporate climate-related considerations when assessing the collateral that banks can pledge when borrowing from us.
In banking supervision, we have been persistently pushing the banks we supervise to close the gap between their practices and our expectations on the sound management of climate-related and environmental risks. Banks’ practices must be fully aligned with our expectations by the end of 2024 at the latest and we have set interim deadlines for banks to satisfy specific requirements even earlier. If necessary, we will enforce these deadlines, standing ready to use all the supervisory instruments at our disposal. Let me be clear: as Vice-Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board, it is not for me to determine whom banks should lend to. Instead, what I and other banking supervisors around the world have consistently been emphasising is that a failure to adequately manage climate-related and environmental risks is no longer compatible with sound risk management. To manage their own risks, banks need to engage with their customers to gain a deep understanding of how they are being affected by the climate and environmental crises and how they will mitigate and adapt to the consequences.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
Leonardo da Vinci – a resident of Florence when finance first thrived back in the early days of the Renaissance – is believed to have said that “nature never breaks her own laws”. Indeed, nature’s laws are a constraint on human activities that we cannot set aside. After all, we are an integral part of nature. We have been pushing the boundaries of this constraint for far too long and the devastating consequences are now increasingly upon us.
Yet we do have the power to bend this trend we ourselves set in motion. This requires us to be mindful of the gaps that perpetuate the destructive trend and to work relentlessly towards closing them. Only then can we change nature’s current course and ensure a Paris-aligned transition path. Each and every one of us must act in our areas of competence and responsibility. Respecting nature’s laws. Conscious of her precariousness, preserving her preciousness.
Thank you for your attention.
1. Copernicus (2023), “Global temperature trend monitor”.
2. See Figure 1 in Abraham, L., O’Connell, M. and Arruga Oleaga, I. (2023), “The legal and institutional feasibility of an EU Climate and Energy Security Fund”, Occasional Paper Series, No 313, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, March.
3. The exact amounts are subject to uncertainty and depend, among other things, on which other policy measures are taken and which specific objectives are targeted.
5. This mechanism is called the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
6. De Haas, R. and Popov, A. (2019), “Finance and carbon emissions”, Working Paper Series, No 2318, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, September.
7. Lagarde, C. (2021), “Towards a green capital markets union for Europe”, speech at the European Commission’s high-level conference on the proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, 6 May.
8. Avgousti, A. et al. (2023), “The climate change challenge and fiscal instruments and policies in the EU”, Occasional Paper Series, No 315, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, April.
9. Abraham, L., O’Connell, M. and Arruga Oleaga, I. (2023), op. cit.
10. Dorucci, E. and Freier, M. (2023), “The opportunity Europe should not waste”, The ECB Blog, 15 February.
11. ECB and EIOPA (2023), “Policy options to reduce the climate insurance protection gap”, Discussion Paper, April.
12. In the joint discussion paper, the ECB and EIOPA put forward several policy options to improve climate catastrophe insurance on which the institutions will collect feedback and discuss in a workshop with regulators, policymakers, insurers and academics on 22 May 2023.
13. In March 2023 we decided to increase the tilt towards bonds with a better climate performance as we moved from full reinvestment of maturing corporate bonds towards partial reinvestment of maturing corporate bonds to maintain a decarbonisation path for our corporate asset holdings that is compatible with the Paris Agreement.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.The post ECB Speech | Closing gaps to bend the trend: embedding the flow of finance in the transition first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The EDPS has issued five Opinions on the European Commission’s Recommendations to open negotiations for International Agreements on the exchange of personal data between Europol, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement, and the competent authorities of five Latin American countries: Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico to fight serious crime and terrorism.
The EDPS Opinions aim to provide advice on further developing data protection safeguards in these future International Agreements so that individuals’ personal data is protected according to EU standards.
Wojciech Wiewiórowski, EDPS, said: “I am pleased to see that the Commission has established by now – also on the basis of previous EDPS opinions – a well-structured set of objectives to achieve when negotiating agreements on the exchange of personal data between Europol and third country law enforcement authorities. Particular circumstances of each foreign jurisdiction, such as existence of an independent data protection authority, or the accession to Convention 108 of the Council of Europe, should always be duly taken into account”.
Against this background, the EDPS recommends that the future International Agreements explicitly list the criminal offenses and purposes, for which individuals’ personal data may be exchanged. The International Agreements should also provide for a periodic review of the time during which transferred personal data is stored, and to put in place appropriate measures to ensure that these time periods are respected. The EDPS also notes that additional safeguards are put in place for special categories of data (such as personal data revealing ethnic origin or sexual orientation), as well as in the case of automated processing.
Taking into account the risks associated with transfers of personal data from a country outside the European Union/European Economic Area to Europol, especially in light of Europol’s extension of powers in its updated Regulation, the EDPS recommends that the future International Agreements explicitly exclude transfers of personal data that has been obtained in violation of human rights.
The control by independent authorities in charge of overseeing the transfers of personal data in the context of these International Agreements, equipped with effective powers and efficient tools, is crucial to ensure that individuals’ rights to personal data and data protection are protected. To this end, the EDPS suggests that the parties involved in these International Agreements exchange on a regular basis information on the exercise of individuals’ fundamental rights as well as on the application of the relevant oversight and redress mechanisms, to facilitate the enforcement of appropriate data protection measures.
The rules for data protection in the EU institutions, as well as the duties of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), are set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.
About the EDPS: The EDPS is the independent supervisory authority with responsibility for monitoring the processing of personal data by the EU institutions and bodies, advising on policies and legislation that affect privacy and cooperating with similar authorities to ensure consistent data protection. Our mission is also to raise awareness on risks and protect people’s rights and freedoms when their personal data is processed.
Wojciech Wiewiórowski (EDPS) was appointed by a joint decision of the European Parliament and the Council to serve a five-year term, beginning on 6 December 2019.
The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is the independent supervisory authority for the protection of personal data and privacy and promoting good practice in the EU institutions and bodies.
He does so by:

monitoring the EU administration’s processing of personal data;

monitoring and advising technological developments on policies and legislation that affect privacy and personal data protection;

carrying out investigations in the form of data protection audits/inspections;

cooperating with other supervisory authorities to ensure consistency in the protection of personal

Compliments of EDPS – The EU’s Independent Data Protection Authority.The post EDPS | International Agreements to fight crime require strong data protection safeguards first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.