We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the strategic objective of a free, independent, democratic, and sovereign Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders, capable of defending itself and deterring future aggression.
We affirm that the security of Ukraine is integral to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region.
We consider Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine to be a threat to international peace and security, a flagrant violation of international law, including the UN Charter, and incompatible with our security interests. We will stand with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression, for as long as it takes.
We stand united in our enduring support for Ukraine, rooted in our shared democratic values and interests, above all, respect for the UN Charter and the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Today we are launching negotiations with Ukraine to formalize — through bilateral security commitments and arrangements aligned with this multilateral framework, in accordance with our respective legal and constitutional requirements — our enduring support to Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity, rebuilds its economy, protects its citizens, and pursues integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. We will direct our teams to begin these discussions immediately.
We will each work with Ukraine on specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements towards:
a) Ensuring a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future, through the continued provision of:

security assistance and modern military equipment, across land, air, and sea domains – prioritizing air defense, artillery and long-range fires, armored vehicles, and other key capabilities, such as combat air, and by promoting increased interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners;
support to further develop Ukraine’s defense industrial base;
training and training exercises for Ukrainian forces;
intelligence sharing and cooperation;
support for cyber defense, security, and resilience initiatives, including to address hybrid threats.

b) Strengthening Ukraine’s economic stability and resilience, including through reconstruction and recovery efforts, to create the conditions conducive to promoting Ukraine’s economic prosperity, including its energy security.
c) Providing technical and financial support for Ukraine’s immediate needs stemming from Russia’s war as well as to enable Ukraine to continue implementing the effective reform agenda that will support the good governance necessary to advance towards its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
In the event of future Russian armed attack, we intend to immediately consult with Ukraine to determine appropriate next steps. We intend, in accordance with our respective legal and constitutional requirements, to provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment across land, sea and air domains, and economic assistance, to impose economic and other costs on Russia, and to consult with Ukraine on its needs as it exercises its right of self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. To this end, we will work with Ukraine on an enhanced package of security commitments and arrangements in case of future aggression to enable Ukraine to defend its territory and sovereignty.
In addition to the elements articulated above, we remain committed to supporting Ukraine by holding Russia accountable. This includes working to ensure that the costs to Russia of its aggression continue to rise, including through sanctions and export controls, as well as supporting efforts to hold to account those responsible for war crimes and other international crimes committed in and against Ukraine, including those involving attacks on critical civilian infrastructure. There must be no impunity for war crimes and other atrocities. In this context, we reiterate our commitment to holding those responsible to account, consistent with international law, including by supporting the efforts of international mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).
We reaffirm that, consistent with our respective legal systems, Russia’s sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it has caused to Ukraine. We recognize the need for the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation of damages, loss or injury caused by Russian aggression and express our readiness to explore options for the development of appropriate mechanisms.
For its part, Ukraine is committed to:
a) Contributing positively to partner security and to strengthen transparency and accountability measures with regard to partner assistance;
b) Continuing implementation of the law enforcement, judiciary, anti-corruption, corporate governance, economic, security sector, and state management reforms that underscore its commitments to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and media freedoms, and put its economy on a sustainable path;
c) Advancing defense reforms and modernization including by strengthening democratic civilian control of the military and improving efficiency and transparency across Ukraine’s defense institutions and industry.
The EU and its Member States stand ready to contribute to this effort and will swiftly consider the modalities of such contribution.
This effort will be taken forward while Ukraine pursues a pathway toward future membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.
Other countries that wish to contribute to this effort to ensure a free, strong, independent, and sovereign Ukraine may join this Joint Declaration at any time.
Compliments of the European Delegation to the United States.The post G7: Joint declaration of support for Ukraine first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

SPEECH by Governor Christopher J. Waller at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, New York |
Thank you. Whenever I get such a warm welcome, I always say to myself, “Waller, they really aren’t here for you or your sparkling personality. They’re here for your outlook.”1 Which is fine, because accurately communicating my economic outlook is an important part of my job. Tonight, in addition to providing new information about my outlook based on new data, I also want to clarify my views on how the economy has been operating over time and my view of appropriate monetary policy. Doing so can help the public anticipate how I will react to new developments, not just at the next meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), but further into the future. That’s crucial, because monetary policy works mostly by influencing the public’s view of financial and economic conditions well into the future, affecting spending and investment decisions. Whether I say so or not, every time I speak, I am trying to better explain how and why I make policy decisions.
My plan is to cover three issues. First, by looking over the past few FOMC meetings, I want to describe how my outlook has been shaped by both economic data and uncertainty—what we have learned at each point and what we don’t yet know about the economy. Second, I will discuss how I think about lags with which policy affects economic activity and inflation and the impact on the appropriate path of policy. And third, I will review the recent data and discuss how I see policy evolving over the remainder of this year.
Recent Policy Actions
At the June meeting, I supported keeping the policy rate unchanged. Based only on the economic data that was coming in showing a tight labor market and stubbornly high inflation, I believe that raising the policy rate 25 basis points was justified. However, I had lingering doubts about when or if an abrupt tightening of credit conditions would occur. I viewed the lingering effects of the banking stresses from March as a downside risk to cause a tightening of credit conditions. Although there did not appear to be a lot of evidence that a substantial credit crunch was in the works, I felt that waiting another six weeks was prudent risk management. In the end, I believed that risk management concerns slightly outweighed hiking based on the incoming data.
I also felt more comfortable with this decision given that the median of the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) signaled two additional rate hikes by the end of this year. Early in March, prior to the March FOMC meeting, I had planned to raise my terminal rate 50 basis points given the hot data that had come in at that point. But then came the turmoil in the banking sector. My thought was that credit conditions were going to tighten a lot as a result of the banking turmoil. I believed this tightening would effectively replace some of the tightening that otherwise would have been needed through monetary policy. The net result was that in the March SEP, I left my projection of the terminal policy rate unchanged from December. But by June, there was little evidence that credit conditions were tightening more than would be expected as a result of monetary policy that had already tightened significantly. This led me to believe policy needed to be tighter relative to what I thought in March. So, I marked up my projected path for the federal funds rate at the end of 2023 by 50 basis points.
So why did I walk you through this evolution of my thinking of the appropriate setting of policy? First, it highlights how the appropriate setting for monetary policy shifts over time. Second, it shows that managing uncertainty and risks is a big part of my job. Third, I hope it allows you to better consider how policymakers will adjust the setting of policy in response to incoming data going forward.
Monetary Policy Lags
A second issue for the FOMC is how long it takes for changes in monetary policy to affect economic activity and inflation. As reported in the minutes of various FOMC meetings, the Committee often discusses these lags. There is a wide range of views among researchers and policymakers as to how long it takes for the full effect of monetary policy to register in the economy.
What I would like to discuss is expectations for how long it will take for last year’s sizable monetary policy tightening to show up in the economic data. While there is no consensus on an exact length of time, traditional rules of thumb say that the maximum effect of an unexpected policy change, what economists call a “shock,” on the real economy is between 12 and 24 months. There is tremendous uncertainty around this estimate. Furthermore, commentary sometimes treats lagged effects as a “Wile E. Coyote” moment where nothing happens for a long time and then wham…off the cliff we go as the full force of past policy actions suddenly take effect.
When considering applying this 12- to 24-month rule to last year’s policy actions, we need to ask two questions: (1) When did the policy shock occur? (2) Does the size of the shock matter? What I want to do in the next few minutes is push back against the view that the bulk of the effects from last year’s policy hikes have yet to hit the economy.
Let me start by setting the stage with how the economic models that estimate these lags are developed. Some of this discussion may be a bit geeky, so bear with me. Economists typically use linear or log-linear statistical models that capture how past changes in a variable affect the current realization of that variable. The impact of past realizations of an economic variable on current values is estimated using constant coefficients. For example, if gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a 1 percent annual rate last quarter, a model might estimate that 0.9 of that increase will carry through to GDP in the current quarter and .8 of it will carry forward into the next quarter. These estimates of 0.9 and 0.8 are constant across time and are independent of how big the change is in GDP last quarter—if last quarter’s GDP increased at a 2 percent rate, 0.9 of that would carry through to the current quarter and 0.8 of it would carry forward into the next quarter. In short, the speed at which past changes feed into current and future values does not change over time and does not depend on the size of past changes.
Once these models are estimated using historical data, the policy exercise then is to feed an unexpected, temporary 25 basis point increase in the federal funds rate into this system of linear equations and simulate the effects on key economic variables. The idea is to capture a causal response of the economy to the policy shock. Based on this process, we can trace out the change over time in a variable, say GDP. Economists call this an impulse response function.
Typically, these impulse response functions illustrate how the variables move relative to their long-run values. The impulse response functions are normally hump-shaped—there is a small effect initially and the effect grows over time with the maximal impact occurring several quarters after the policy surprise. After the peak impact, the effect of the policy change on the real economy fades away, with the variables returning to their long run steady state values. The hump-shaped impulse response function illustrates that there are lagged effects from a policy surprise. There are a wide variety of statistical models one can use for this exercise but looking across these models, one gets the rule of thumb that the maximal effects of monetary policy changes will hit the economy with a 12-month to 24-month lag.
There are two key takeaways from this discussion. First, the hump-shaped response means there are no “cliff effects”—a policy change is not associated with a long period of no effect that is then followed by an abrupt change in the variable. Second, economic variables respond sluggishly to unexpected policy changes and the sluggishness is what generates a lagged response to a policy action. There are many explanations as to why households and businesses respond sluggishly, such as adjustment costs, sticky prices and wages, nominal contracts, habit persistence in consumption, or the fact that there is an option value of waiting when deciding to invest.
Given this basic description of how lags are estimated, let me now turn to my questions. First, when did the policy shock occur? In these statistical models, it occurs when there is an unexpected change in the federal funds rate. In short, from the point of view of the model, the FOMC wakes up one morning and surprises markets with a 25-basis point hike.2 While this is a fun exercise to see what happens, it doesn’t really capture how monetary policy works in practice. Only rarely do policymakers try to surprise markets, and in fact, we usually specify our policy intentions well ahead of time through the use of forward guidance. As I said earlier, forward guidance is one of the purposes of this speech. Forward guidance is used to signal future policy actions and, when it is credible, financial markets price those expected actions into today’s interest rates. By instantly pricing in future policy, promised rate hikes immediately affect many of the costs of financing for households and firms, even though the actual policy rate hasn’t moved. As a result, policy tightening occurs with the announcement of policy tightening, not when the rate change actually happens.
As an illustration, look at how the two-year Treasury yield moved between late 2021 and March 2022, a time when the FOMC was talking about lifting the policy target range above zero. I have argued in the past that the two-year Treasury yield is a good proxy for the stance of monetary policy and captures announcement effects.3 The 2-year yield went from 25 basis points in September 2021 to around 200 basis points by the March 2022 FOMC meeting. Even though we had not raised the policy rate nor did we get the policy rate up to 200 basis points until August 2022, the markets priced in a nearly 200 basis point increase in the expected policy rate before we actually raised it. This forward guidance effectively shaved off about 6 months from the usual 12- to 24-month lag that one might conjecture would be needed to see the 200 basis points of actual tightening affect the economy.4 That is, forward guidance shortens the lag time between when the policy rate changes and when the effects of actual policy tightening occur.
Now let me turn to the second question, whether the size of the shock matters for estimating lags in policy. In the standard linear models used for these exercises, the size of the shock doesn’t matter. The size of the shock basically scales the effect proportionately without changing the timing of when past changes affect current values of a variable.
What I am going to argue is that the size of the shock may lead to changes in economic behavior that change the coefficients in the statistical models. In less jargony words, the degree of sluggish behavior of economic variables to a policy surprise is not constant but can change with the size and nature of the shock.5
There are a lot of reasons to think that “big shocks travel fast,” meaning they elicit a change in economic behavior that would not be associated with small shocks. In the past year the FOMC has raised rates faster than it has in forty years, so we should be skeptical about whether statistical models based on historical experience will be reliable in estimating lags for such an unusual event. To support this line of reasoning, let me use some examples to illustrate the concept that big shocks travel fast.
First, a large area of economic research focuses on the idea of “rational inattention.”6 The basic idea is that households and firms have a limited amount of attention that they can dedicate to processing information. It is costly and time consuming to constantly adjust behavior and portfolios in response to small changes in prices or interest rates. Consequently, people must decide which data to focus on and how often they look at it. Because households and firms “rationally ignore” certain data and only look at them infrequently, their behavior looks sluggish in how they respond to small shocks.
But this sluggishness does not apply when big shocks hit. For example, large changes in interest rates will get a lot of attention and have a much faster and dramatic impact on consumption, saving and portfolio allocation. The apparently “sluggish behavior” based on small shocks disappears, and households and firms change their behavior much more quickly. Big changes in policy rates will tend to cause more rapid changes in behavior, which implies monetary policy lags will be shorter when changes to the policy rate are large and rapid.
As a second example, consider the frequency at which firms change their prices. Data show that firms typically adjust their prices once a year, which is usually interpreted to mean that prices are “sticky.” However, recent evidence shows that because of the big inflation shock that occurred over the past two years, prices have changed more frequently as firms tried to keep their relative prices in line with rapidly changing market conditions. This fact has important implications for the Phillips curve model that economists use to link unemployment and inflation. The shift in frequency of price setting will affect the slope (the coefficient), which indicates how sensitive inflation is to a change in unemployment.
I addressed this issue in a speech earlier this year.7 Using historical data, where the frequency of price adjustment was about once a year, this had the effect of pinning down the slope of the Phillips curve. The Phillips curve was estimated to be very flat. The implication is that unemployment has to increase a lot to bring inflation down by a small amount. But, with the more frequent price changes lately, the Phillips curve has steepened. This steepening implies that monetary policy will affect inflation faster and with less effect on the unemployment rate than would occur if price changes were slower. So once again, the lags between changes in monetary policy and inflation should be shorter than historical experience tells us, and as is reflected in models.
What is the implication of this economic research? The effects of policy tightening last year are feeding through to market interest rates faster than typically thought because of announcement effects, and on top of this we have had policy rate changes that have been more dramatic and faster than in the past which most likely has led to a more rapid adjustment in the behavior of households and firms. These two points suggest that the effects of the large policy changes that we undertook last year should hit economic activity and inflation much faster than is typically predicted.
If one believes the bulk of the effects from last year’s tightening have passed through the economy already, then we can’t expect much more slowing of demand and inflation from that tightening. To me, this means that the policy tightening we have conducted this year has been appropriate and also that more policy tightening will be needed to bring inflation back to our 2 percent target. Pausing rate hikes now, because you are waiting for long and variable lags to arrive, may leave you standing on the platform waiting for a train that has already left the station.
Economic Outlook
Let me now turn to my third topic: how I see things standing today. Economic activity reportedly grew 2 percent in the first quarter, and based on economic data through early July, the Atlanta Fed’s GDP projection suggests growth was a touch higher in the second quarter. Recent Institute for Supply Management surveys suggest some continued slowing in the manufacturing sector, but activity outside that sector is still growing at a solid pace.
Turning to the labor market, it has been very tight for a long time and the most recent jobs report showed that employers added 209,000 jobs in June. This number came in a little lower than expected, and it is down noticeably from this time last year. Meanwhile, data on job openings showed some welcome signs of cooling. The ratio of job vacancies to the number of people counted as unemployed has declined on balance so far this year, and the number of people quitting their jobs, which I tend to think of as moving for higher wages, has moved down from its peak last year. However, despite these welcome signs of softening, the labor market is still very robust. Job growth is still well above the pre-pandemic average, the unemployment rate remains quite low, and wage growth continues to be above what would support returning inflation to 2 percent.
Yesterday, we received new data on consumer price index (CPI) inflation. After 5 consecutive monthly readings of core inflation of 0.4 percent or above, this rate dropped by half in June, to 0.2 percent. This is welcome news, but one data point does not make a trend. Inflation briefly slowed in the summer of 2021 before getting much worse, so I am going to need to see this improvement sustained before I am confident that inflation has decelerated.
In terms of the latest banking data, the Federal Reserve’s weekly release of assets and liabilities of commercial banks (the H.8 data release) suggests that banks are responding in a way that is consistent with monetary policy tightening but not banking stress. For example, growth in core loans on banks’ books has decelerated since late 2022, as banks tightened lending standards and demand slowed amid lagged effects from monetary policy tightening. The deceleration in core loan balances was especially pronounced in early 2023 even before the Silicon Valley Bank collapse and has continued afterwards. And we did see discrete effects in deposit outflows in mid-March, but those flows have stabilized. Moreover, banks have been able to replace core deposit outflows with large time deposits, Federal Home Loan Bank advances and other sources of funding. These actions are leading to a slowdown in credit growth, but one that is in line with monetary policy tightening.
So, what does this mean for monetary policy? With the banking sector sound and resilient, fighting inflation remains my top priority, and I believe we will get there. What will get us there is setting the stance of policy at a level that will continue to help bring supply and demand in the economy into better balance. While I expect inflation to eventually settle near our 2 percent target because of our policy actions, we have to make sure what we saw in yesterday’s inflation report feeds through broadly across goods and services and that we do not revert back to what has been persistently high core inflation. The robust strength of the labor market and the solid overall performance of the U.S. economy gives us room to tighten policy further.
As things stand now, my outlook for the stance of monetary policy that will get inflation near the FOMC’s 2 percent target is roughly consistent with the FOMC’s economic projections in June. I see two more 25-basis-point hikes in the target range over the four remaining meetings this year as necessary to keep inflation moving toward our target. Furthermore, I believe we will need to keep policy restrictive for some time in order to have inflation settle down around our 2% target. Since the June meeting, with another month of data to evaluate lending conditions, I am more confident that the banking turmoil is not going to result in a significant problem for the economy, and I see no reason why the first of those two hikes should not occur at our meeting later this month. From there, I will need to see how the data come in. If inflation does not continue to show progress and there are no suggestions of a significant slowdown in economic activity, then a second 25-basis-point hike should come sooner rather than later, but that decision is for the future.
Compliments of the U.S. Federal Reserve.
1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
2. Typically, economists look at the difference between the actual policy rate change and the expected change from federal funds rate futures. So, if the FOMC raised the policy rate by 25-basis points and the market expected a 10-basis point hike (meaning the market pricing reflected a 40 percent probability of a 25 basis point hike and 60 percent probability of no change) this would correspond to a policy surprise of 15 basis points. Return to text
3. See Christopher J. Waller (2022), “Reflections on Monetary Policy in 2021,” speech delivered at the 2022 Hoover Institution Monetary Conference, Stanford, Calif., May 6. Return to text
4. Recent analysis by Fed economists shows the announcement effects of policy have in fact led to a shortening in monetary policy lags. See Taeyoung Doh and Andrew T. Foerster (2022), “Have Lags in Monetary Policy Transmission Shortened?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Bulletin, December 21. Return to text
5. Most economists will recognize this application of the Lucas Critique. Return to text
6. See the recent survey article by Bartosz Maćkowiak, Filip Matějka, and Mirko Wiederholt (2023), “Rational Inattention: A Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 61 (March), pp. 226–73. Return to text
7. See Christopher J. Waller (2023), “The Unstable Phillips Curve,” speech delivered at Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy, a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, Calif., March 31. Return to textThe post U.S. FED | Big Shocks Travel Fast: Why Policy Lags May Be Shorter Than You Think first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

When the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors meet in Gandhinagar next week, the world will be looking for joint action to address rising economic fragmentation, slowing growth, and high inflation. Agile multilateral support is vital to tackle common challenges posed by debt vulnerabilities, climate change, and limited concessional financing—especially for countries hit by shocks not of their making.
Outlook: resilience amid challenges
In April, the IMF projected global growth at 2.8 percent in 2023, down from 3.4 percent in 2022. The bulk of it–over 70 percent–is expected to come from the Asia-Pacific region.
Yet, recent high frequency indicators paint a mixed picture: weakness in manufacturing contrasts with resilience in services across the G20 countries and strong labor markets in advanced economies. At the same time, financial fragilities uncovered by tight monetary policy require careful management—particularly as restoring price stability remains a priority.
Global headline inflation seems to have peaked, and core inflation has eased somewhat, particularly in India. But in most G20 countries—especially advanced economies—inflation remains well above central banks’ targets.

Tackling inflation and boosting growth
In the fight against inflation there are some early signs of monetary policy transmitting to activity, with bank lending standards tightening in the euro area and the United States. That said, policymakers should avoid “premature celebrations”: lessons from previous inflationary episodes show that easing policy too early can undo progress on inflation.
That’s why it is vital to stay the course on monetary policy until inflation is durably brought down to target, while closely monitoring financial sector risks. Here, clear central bank communication and financial sector oversight are needed to reduce the risk of disruptive shifts in financial conditions.
Fiscal policy must also play its part. Tightening the purse strings after a period of pandemic-related exceptional support can support disinflation, rebuild buffers, and enhance debt sustainability, while temporary and targeted measures may be needed to help vulnerable people cope with the immediate cost-of-living crisis.
At the same time, consolidation efforts should protect growth-enhancing investments where space allows. Why? Because while prospects are mixed in the near term, the medium-term outlook for the global economy remains bleak.
The IMF forecast for global growth over the medium-term is around 3 percent—well below the historical average of 3.8 percent during 2000-19. Moreover, economic fragmentation will both undermine growth and make it harder to tackle pressing global challenges, from rising sovereign debt crises to the existential threat of climate change.
The importance of joint action
The good news is that we have seen how the international community can deliver when differences are set aside.
In June, we saw the breakthrough on Zambia‘s debt restructuring. That was a significant milestone for the G20 Common Framework which was born out of efforts from the country authorities as well as both Paris Club members and other countries such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia. The agreement unlocks further financing as part of the $1.3 billion IMF arrangement agreed in August 2022.
In addition to progress on debt restructuring for Chad, this outcome also builds on trust and better understanding among creditors and debtors ushered in through the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable.
But the work is not yet done. More effort is needed to accelerate the debt restructuring process through clear timelines, debt service suspension during negotiations, and improved creditor coordination on debt treatment for countries outside the Common Framework.
The G20 last month also announced the achievement of the $100 billion in pledges of special drawing rights (SDRs) to be channeled from richer to poorer countries. Set by the G20 in the wake of the IMF’s record $650 billion allocation of SDRs in 2021, meeting this target is a strong signal of broad international solidarity. We should also take inspiration from members who lifted the ambition of their pledges for SDR channeling: France and Japan to 40 percent of their allocations, and China to 34 percent.
Such exceptional generosity has allowed the IMF to do even more for our members. Around $29 billion in SDRs pledged to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) since 2020 is helping us deliver higher and larger financial support to low-income countries at zero interest.
Moreover, some $42 billion in SDRs have already been provided to the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) that was launched last year. Nine members have had their RST funding approved and dozens more have submitted requests.
Programs under the RST will support climate reforms, such as integrating climate considerations into fiscal planning in Costa Rica and strengthening climate-related risk management for financial institutions in Seychelles. And in Rwanda and Barbados, resources from the RST are complementing support from multilateral development banks which together are expected to catalyze additional financing from the private sector, including private investment in climate projects.
Supporting vulnerable countries
Important as these milestones are, however, they alone are not enough.
Many vulnerable emerging market and low-income economies are at the sharp end of multiple shocks and fundamental transitions.
Take climate change, where they have contributed very little to the problem, but are most vulnerable to the consequences. Or the cost-of-living crisis and high interest rates, which take a disproportionate toll, pushing more countries toward debt distress and threatening development prospects. Add to this increasing economic fragmentation that could deprive them from the benefits of an integrated global economy that delivered high growth and raised living standards for billions of people.
Taken together, these challenges mean countries will need more support in the months and years ahead—to ensure economic stability and get back on the path to income convergence with advanced economies. Strong multilateral institutions have a vital role to play in providing this support, especially IDA, the World Bank’s fund for low-income countries, and the IMF.
IMF reforms and resources
Many countries have navigated difficult transitions before, and at each turn the IMF has been part of the global response, adapting to help our members and their people confront new challenges. Now – faced by a fresh set of transitions – we will continue to adapt and respond with agility: through both timely policy changes and stronger resources.
The overriding priority is a prompt and successful completion of the 16th quota review: increasing the overall size of the IMF’s quota resources—which are critical for a robust global finance safety net— with mindfulness of how the global economy has evolved.
This must be complemented by decisions to replenish the Fund’s concessional resources for vulnerable countries: a fully funded PRGT and a replenished Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust that provides debt service relief when countries are hit by large shocks.
In parallel, we are exploring reforms to our lending toolkit, including adjustments to precautionary instruments to better suit the needs of our membership. We are also looking at ways to better account for how climate change affects debt sustainability and to enhance our support for countries hit by climate related shocks.
Together, these steps will ensure the IMF remains an inclusive institution capable of serving the needs of its entire membership, especially vulnerable emerging and developing economies.
G20’s key role
In a more shock-prone world and at a time of fundamental transitions—from climate change and debt distress to trade tensions and economic fragmentation—the world has high expectations of international policymakers, and rightly so.
We must act now and act together to get all countries back on a sustainable path to growth and prosperity.
This calls for strong leadership from the G20 to ensure the international financial architecture is fit for purpose with a well-resourced and representative IMF at its center. The global response must be commensurate in size to the world’s challenges.
Compliments of the IMF.The post IMF | Weak Global Economy, High Inflation, and Rising Fragmentation Demand Strong G20 Action first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

When it comes to law enforcement action against unlawful conduct in the cryptocurrency marketplace, the temperature is rising, according to a proposed FTC settlement with crypto platform Celsius Network and a pending complaint against its former corporate officers. The make-no-mistake message for others in the industry: Don’t believe that “wild west” talk. Your sector may be novel, but established FTC consumer protection standards apply to you with full force.
New Jersey-based Celsius Network marketed a broad range of cryptocurrency products and services to consumers – interest-bearing accounts, personal loans secured by cryptocurrency deposits, a cryptocurrency exchange, and the like. Celsius’ promotional claims grabbed the attention of consumers, even those who might have had initial qualms about crypto. Not to worry, consumers were assured. Because Celsius earned profits by making secured crypto loans to other exchanges, the company claimed to be “safer than a bank” and posed “less risk” or even “no risk” to consumers.
According to the complaint, the defendants further enticed people with claims that deposits in their “Earn” program could yield “up to 18.63% APY.” Celsius also told consumers they could withdraw their crypto “at any time” because Celsius maintained sufficient reserves – described as “billions of dollars in liquidity” – to meet customer obligations. To reinforce that representation, Celsius claimed to have a belt-and-suspenders $750 million insurance policy to cover consumers’ assets.
That’s what the defendants promised, but as its June 2022 collapse suggests, Celsius’ fast talk generated a lot more heat than light. The FTC lawsuit alleges that Celsius lured consumers in with deceptive promises and flat-out falsehoods. For example, despite those “safer than a bank” promises, Celsius allegedly took title to customers’ deposits and misappropriated them – in effect, treating other people’s accounts as a piggy bank to borrow against, to pay corporate bills, to fund interest payments to other consumers, and to make high-risk investments.
Consider Celsius’ conduct regarding unsecured loans. One corporate officer claimed in a 2020 promotional video that Celsius didn’t make non-collateralized loans “because that would be taking too much risk on your behalf.” But according to the FTC, in July 2020, Celsius had approximately $160 million in unsecured loans. A year later viewers were told, “We only do asset back[ed] lending meaning you have to give us an asset like crypto or things that we accept.” Yet as of August 2021, the FTC says nearly half of Celsius’ institutional lending portfolio – over $700 million – was unsecured. The FTC alleges that while Celsius was engaging in risky lending practices at odds with its promises, the company had just a small capital reserve on hand and nowhere near the cushion they claimed.
Even as the company’s fiscal health headed south, the complaint alleges that top executives continued to reassure prospective depositors with soothing promises of safety. As one corporate officer said in a May 2022 video, “Celsius is stronger than ever, we have billions of dollars in liquidity”– a message the company continued to convey right up until the time it froze customer accounts and filed for bankruptcy after allegedly squandering customers’ deposits. What Celsius didn’t reveal was that corporate officials allegedly protected themselves by withdrawing significant sums of cryptocurrency from Celsius two months before the company filed for bankruptcy.
The complaint charges multiple violations of the FTC Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which makes it illegal to use deceptive statements to get consumers’ financial information. The proposed settlement with corporate defendant Celsius and affiliated outfits includes a permanent ban on marketing, promoting, offering, or distributing any product or service that could be used to deposit, exchange, invest, or withdraw assets. In addition to prohibiting misrepresentations about the benefits of any product or service, the order imposes a $4.7 billion suspended judgment based on the companies’ financial condition.
The lawsuit against former Celsius CEO and co-founder Alexander Mashinsky, co-founder Shlomi Daniel Leon, and co-founder Hanoch “Nuke” Goldstein is pending in a New York federal court. The FTC is seeking injunctive relief and money back from the defendants to provide refunds for consumers.
Even at this early stage, the FTC’s law enforcement action sends a strong message to those in the crypto marketplace.
Crypto companies: Familiarize yourself with the expansive terms of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  Disabuse yourself immediately of an “anything goes” attitude in the marketing of crypto. The FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices imposes sweeping liability for violations of the law. Like any other business, your claims must be truthful, you must have solid proof for your representations before you convey them to prospective customers, any disclosures necessary to dispel deception must be clear and conspicuous, and you must treat consumers fairly. If there’s any question about how seriously the FTC takes fast-and-loose practices related to consumers’ finances, the permanent ban in the proposed settlement with Celsius should provide an answer.
The scope of the FTC Act’s prohibition on false advertising is similarly broad.  The FTC Act covers misleading statements in traditional TV, radio, print, and online ads, but it doesn’t stop there. What you say about your products and services in social media platforms – including the 179 videos Celsius’ representatives uploaded to YouTube – also must meet the FTC Act’s truth-in-advertising standards. Those provisions are designed to protect consumers from deceptive or unfair practices. They’re also in place to protect honest businesses from having to compete against alleged fabricators and falsifiers.
Don’t think the “Inc.” after a company name shields corporate executives from the consequences of their illegal actions.  Read the first page of the complaint and you’ll see the FTC is suing Mashinsky, Leon, and Goldstein “individually and as an officer” of various Celsius-related companies. Let’s not mince words. Depending on the facts, the FTC will take action to hold corporate decision makers individually accountable for violations of the law.
Thinking about investing in cryptocurrency? The FTC has advice for consumers to consider before sinking their savings into crypto.
Compliments of the Federal Trade Commission.The post FTC | Crypto platform Celsius feels the heat from FTC lawsuit alleging unfair and deceptive practices first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Ask people about the records they consider the most private and they may say personal health data. (If they misunderstand the question, they may mention disco singles they bought in junior high – but perhaps that’s just us.) Of course, say “health privacy” and many people think of HIPAA – the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Did you know that some entities that hold or interact with consumers’ personal health records aren’t subject to HIPAA? But they may be covered by the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule. Given the proliferation of health apps, fitness trackers, and other health-related monitors subject to the Rule, the FTC is thinking about whether the Rule should be updated to reflect changes in technology and in how consumers use those products. In May, the FTC put a proposal on the table and wants your feedback by the August 8, 2023, deadline.
You’ll want to read the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the specifics, but there’s a helpful summary on the Rule’s Regulations.gov page. The most important thing is to share your insights by filing a public comment by August 8th. Save a step by filing online.
If you have never filed a public comment, here are some how-tos:

Yes, the FTC wants your feedback.  We welcome comments from industry members, but we also value the viewpoints of consumers, consumer groups, small businesses, and others with practical perspectives on the topic. Of course, this isn’t a vote. So rather than just saying yes or no, please help us by explaining your thinking on the subject.
Not a lawyer? Not a problem.  If we could debunk one myth about filing a public comment, it’s that comments have to be replete with cites, footnotes, and cross-references. No! We’ll wade through lofty legal language if we have to, but we want to hear straight talk from real people about the real issues.
The online process for filing comments is simple.  Visit the Health Breach Notification Rule page on Regulations.gov to let you voice be heard. Click the COMMENT button and start typing. It’s as simple as that. Looking for more advice on collecting your thoughts? Just under the WRITE A COMMENT button, there’s a helpful Commenter’s Checklist. You can also browse comments that people have already filed.
Please don’t include personal health information or other sensitive data.  Public comments are just that: public. Your comment can be read by anyone who visits the website. So before clicking the SUBMIT COMMENT button, please reread what you’ve written to make sure you haven’t mentioned something you would prefer to keep private.

Compliments of the Federal Trade Commission.The post FTC | Share your perspectives on the Health Breach Notification Rule first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The EU-U.S. Task Force on Energy Security met virtually on 6 July 2023 to discuss the implementation of the 25 March 2022 Joint Statement by Presidents Biden and von der Leyen, as well as their commitment of 10 March 2023 to continue to work together to advance energy security and sustainability in Europe. The meeting was co-chaired by Ditte Juul Jørgensen, Director-General for Energy at the European Commission, and Sarah Ladislaw, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Climate and Energy at the National Security Council.
The Task Force reviewed progress on the successful diversification of natural gas supplies to Europe, reduction of EU’s gas demand, and accelerating the development and deployment of clean technologies. It also decided to continue its work at technical level, to monitor the energy security situation in the EU, its neighbourhood, and globally.
The Task Force will reconvene in person later this year, ahead of the next winter season.
Related links
EU -U.S energy cooperation

Compliments of the European Commission.The post EU-U.S. Task Force on Energy Security reviews the progress on energy security situation first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

On 10 July 2023, the European Commission adopted its adequacy decision for the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework. The decision concludes that the United States ensures an adequate level of protection – comparable to that of the European Union – for personal data transferred from the EU to US companies under the new framework. On the basis of the new adequacy decision, personal data can flow safely from the EU to US companies participating in the Framework, without having to put in place additional data protection safeguards.
The EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework introduces new binding safeguards to address all the concerns raised by the European Court of Justice, including limiting access to EU data by US intelligence services to what is necessary and proportionate, and establishing a Data Protection Review Court (DPRC), to which EU individuals will have access. The new framework introduces significant improvements compared to the mechanism that existed under the Privacy Shield. For example, if the DPRC finds that data was collected in violation of the new safeguards, it will be able to order the deletion of the data. The new safeguards in the area of government access to data will complement the obligations that US companies importing data from EU will have to subscribe to.
President Ursula von der Leyen said: “The new EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework will ensure safe data flows for Europeans and bring legal certainty to companies on both sides of the Atlantic. Following the agreement in principle I reached with President Biden last year, the US has implemented unprecedented commitments to establish the new framework. Today we take an important step to provide trust to citizens that their data is safe, to deepen our economic ties between the EU and the US, and at the same time to reaffirm our shared values. It shows that by working together, we can address the most complex issues.”
US companies will be able to join the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework by committing to comply with a detailed set of privacy obligations, for instance the requirement to delete personal data when it is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected, and to ensure continuity of protection when personal data is shared with third parties.
EU individuals will benefit from several redress avenues in case their data is wrongly handled by US companies. This includes free of charge independent dispute resolution mechanisms and an arbitration panel.
In addition, the US legal framework provides for a number of safeguards regarding the access to data transferred under the framework by US public authorities, in particular for criminal law enforcement and national security purposes. Access to data  is limited to what is necessary and proportionate to protect national security.
EU individuals will have access to an independent and impartial redress mechanism regarding the collection and use of their data by US intelligence agencies, which includes a newly created Data Protection Review Court (DPRC). The Court will independently investigate and resolve complaints, including by adopting binding remedial measures.
The safeguards put in place by the US will also facilitate transatlantic data flows more generally, since they also apply when data is transferred by using other tools, such as standard contractual clauses and binding corporate rules.
Next steps
The functioning of the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework will be subject to periodic reviews, to be carried out by the European Commission, together with representatives of European data protection authorities and competent US authorities.
The first review will take place within a year of the entry into force of the adequacy decision, in order to verify that all relevant elements have been fully implemented in the US legal framework and are functioning effectively in practice.
Background
Article 45(3) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) grants the Commission the power to decide, by means of an implementing act, that a non-EU country ensures ‘an adequate level of protection’ – a level of protection for personal data that is essentially equivalent to the level of protection within the EU. The effect of adequacy decisions is that personal data can flow freely from the EU (and Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland) to a third country without further obstacles.
After the invalidation of the previous adequacy decision on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield by the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Commission and the US government entered into discussions on a new framework that addressed the issues raised by the Court.
In March 2022, President von der Leyen and President Biden announced that they had reached an agreement in principle on a new transatlantic data flows framework, following negotiations between Commissioner Reynders and US Secretary Raimondo. In October 2022, President Biden signed an Executive Order on ‘Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities’, which was complemented by regulations issued by US Attorney General Garland. Together, these two instruments implemented the US commitments reached under the agreement in principle into US law, and complemented the obligations for US companies under the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework.
An essential element of the US legal framework enshrining these safeguards is the US Executive Order on ‘Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities’, which addresses the concerns raised by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Schrems II decision of July 2020.
The Framework is administered and monitored by the US Department of Commerce. The US Federal Trade Commission will enforce US companies’ compliance.
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The latest Standard Eurobarometer survey conducted in June 2023 and published today shows that EU citizens continue to back overwhelmingly the energy transition and to expect massive investment in renewables.
They continue to widely approve measures taken by the EU to support Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. They also support stronger EU defence cooperation and increased defence spending.
While inflation remains a major concern, perceptions of the economic situation and economic expectations are improving. A majority of Europeans believe that NextGenerationEU, the EU’s €800 billion recovery plan, can be effective to respond to the current economic challenges. Support for the euro stays high.
Wide support for the energy transition
More than eight in ten EU citizens think that the EU should invest massively in renewable energies, such as wind and solar power (85%) and that increasing energy efficiency of buildings, transport, and goods will make us less dependent on energy producers outside the EU (82%). In addition, 80% believe that EU Member States should jointly buy energy from other countries to get a better price.
Furthermore, 81% of respondents agree that reducing imports of oil and gas and investing in renewable energy is important for our overall security and 82% say that the EU should reduce its dependency on Russian sources of energy as soon as possible.
Strong backing for the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Approval for actions taken in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains very high.
88% of EU citizens are in favour of providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war and 86% are in favour of welcoming into the EU people fleeing the war. 75% approve of financial support to Ukraine and 72% back economic sanctions on Russian government, companies and individuals.
In addition, 66% agree with banning state-owned media, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, from broadcasting in the EU and 64% support financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine. 64% also agree with the EU granting candidate status as a potential member of the EU to Ukraine.
All in all, 56% of respondents are satisfied with the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and 54% are satisfied with the response by their national government.
In favour of a stronger European defence
In this context, 77% of Europeans are in favour of a common defence and security policy. 80% think that cooperation in defence matters at EU level should be increased, 77% believe that Member States’ purchase of military equipment should be better coordinated, 69% would like the EU to reinforce its capacity to produce military equipment and 66% say that more money should be spent on defence in the EU.
A stronger Europe in the World
77% agree that the EU should build partnerships with countries outside the EU to invest in sustainable infrastructure and connect people and countries around the world. In addition, 69% believe that the EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of Europe in the global economy.
Levels of trust in the EU have considerably risen in most candidate countries since winter 2022-2023. The highest level of trust is observed in Albania (77%, +6), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (57%, +7), Montenegro (54%, +7), North Macedonia (48%, +1), Moldova (44%, +2), Türkiye (41%, +12) and Serbia (32%, +2).
An improved economic environment
Economic perceptions have significantly improved. 45% of respondents now think that the situation of the European economy is good (+5 pp since January-February), slightly outweighing the number thinking it is bad (44%, -7 pp). 40% describe the economic situation in their own country as good (+5 pp) and 58% as bad (-8 pp).
55% of Europeans think that the EU recovery plan worth €800 billion, NextGenerationEU, can be an effective measure to respond to the current economic challenges.
In the euro area, support for the single currency remains very high (78% vs. 17%), while it is slightly lower for the EU as a whole (71% vs. 23%).
Inflation still a major concern, but less than at the beginning of the year
27% of Europeans think that ‘rising prices/inflation/cost of living‘ is one of the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment (-5 pp since January-February). The international situation comes second at 25% (-3 pp), closely followed by immigration (24%, +7 pp) and the ‘environment and climate change‘ (22%, +2 pp). Energy supply (16%, -10 pp) has seen a sharp decrease, dropping from the third position to the sixth.
When asked about the two most important issues facing their country, 45% identified ‘rising prices/inflation/cost of living‘ (-8 pp), largely before the economic situation (18%, +1 pp), the ‘environment and climate change’ (16%, +2 pp), immigration (14%, +5 pp) and health (14%, no change). Concerns for energy supply have sharply decreased (12%, -7 pp), falling from the second to the fifth position.
The general perception of the EU remains stable
Most general indicators remain stable. Notably, 47% of the EU population tend to trust the EU while 32% tend to trust national governments. 45% tend not to trust the EU.
45% of EU citizens have a positive image of the EU, 18% a negative image and 37% a neutral image. In all Member States, positive perceptions outweigh negative ones.
63% of EU respondents say that they are optimistic about the future of the EU and 34% say that they are pessimistic.
Background
The “Spring 2023 – Standard Eurobarometer” (EB 99) was conducted through face-to-face interviews between 31 May and 21 June 2023 across the 27 EU Member States. 26,425 EU citizens were interviewed in the EU. Some questions were also asked in twelve other countries or territories.
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The Council today adopted a new regulation that strengthens sustainability rules for batteries and waste batteries. The regulation will regulate the entire life cycle of batteries – from production to reuse and recycling – and ensure that they are safe, sustainable and competitive.

Batteries are key to the decarbonisation process and the EU’s shift towards zero-emission modes of transport. At the same time end-of-life batteries contain many valuable resources and we must be able to reuse those critical raw materials instead of relying on third countries for supplies. The new rules will promote the competitiveness of European industry and ensure new batteries are sustainable and contribute to the green transition.
Teresa Ribera, Spanish minister for the ecological transition

The regulation of the European Parliament and the Council will apply to all batteries including all waste portable batteries, electric vehicle batteries, industrial batteries, starting, lightning and ignition (SLI) batteries (used mostly for vehicles and machinery) and batteries for light means of transport (e.g. electric bikes, e-mopeds, e-scooters).
Circular economy
The new rules aim to promote a circular economy by regulating batteries throughout their life cycle. The regulation therefore establishes end-of-life requirements, including collection targets and obligations, targets for the recovery of materials and extended producer responsibility.
The regulation sets targets for producers to collect waste portable batteries (63% by the end of 2027 and 73% by the end of 2030), and introduces a dedicated collection objective for waste batteries for light means of transport (51% by the end of 2028 and 61% by the end of 2031).
The regulation sets a target for lithium recovery from waste batteries of 50% by the end of 2027 and 80% by the end of 2031, which can be amended through delegated acts depending on market and technological developments and the availability of lithium.
The regulation provides for mandatory minimum levels of recycled content for industrial, SLI batteries and EV batteries. These are initially set at 16% for cobalt, 85% for lead, 6% for lithium and 6% for nickel. Batteries will have to hold a recycled content documentation.
The recycling efficiency target for nickel-cadmium batteries is set at 80% by the end of 2025 and 50% by the end 2025 for other waste batteries.
The regulation provides that by 2027 portable batteries incorporated into appliances should be removable and replaceable by the end-user, leaving sufficient time for operators to adapt the design of their products to this requirement. This is an important provision for consumers. Light means of transport batteries will need to be replaceable by an independent professional.
Fair rules for all operators
The new rules aim to improve the functioning of the internal market for batteries and ensure fairer competition thanks to the safety, sustainability and labelling requirements.
This will be reached through performance, durability and safety criteria, tight restrictions for hazardous substances like mercury, cadmium and lead and mandatory information on the carbon footprint of batteries.
The regulation introduces labelling and information requirements, among other things on the battery’s components and recycled content, and an electronic “battery passport” and a QR code. In order to give member states and economic actors on the market enough time to prepare, labelling requirements will apply by 2026 and the QR code by 2027.
Reducing environmental and social impacts
The new regulation aims to reduce environmental and social impacts throughout the life cycle of the battery. To that end, the regulation sets tight due diligence rules for operators who must verify the source of raw materials used for batteries placed on the market. The regulation provides for an exemption for SMEs from the due diligence rules.
Next steps
The vote by the Council today closes the adoption procedure. The regulation will now be signed by the Council and the European Parliament. It will then be published in the EU’s Official Journal and enter into force 20 days after.
Background
The regulation on batteries aims to create a circular economy for the batteries sector by targeting all stages of the life cycle of batteries, from design to waste treatment. This initiative is of major importance, particularly in view of the massive development of electric mobility. Demand for batteries is expected to grow by more than ten-fold by 2030.
The new regulation will replace the current batteries directive of 2006 and complete the existing legislation, particularly in terms of waste management.
The European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on batteries on 10 December 2020. The Council adopted a general approach on 17 March 2022. The European Parliament adopted its negotiating position in the plenary on 10 March 2022. Following interinstitutional negotiations, a provisional agreement was reached between the Council presidency and European Parliament negotiators. The outcome of the agreement was adopted in plenary by the European Parliament on 14 June 2023.
Contact:

Johanna Store, Press Officer | johanna.store@consilium.europa.eu

Compliments of the EU Council, the Council of the European Union.The post EU Council adopts new regulation on batteries and waste batteries first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Europeans invited to express preferences on shortlisted themes in public survey open until 31 August 2023
ECB’s Governing Council expected to choose future theme by 2024, and final designs in 2026

The European Central Bank (ECB) is asking European citizens about their views on the proposed themes for the next series of euro banknotes. From 10 July until 31 August 2023 everybody in the euro area can respond to a survey on the ECB’s website. In addition, to ensure opinions from across the euro area are equally represented, the ECB has contracted an independent research company to ask a representative sample of people in the euro area the same questions as those in its own survey.
ECB President Christine Lagarde invites everybody to participate in the survey. She said “There is a strong link between our single currency and our shared European identity, and our new series of banknotes should emphasise this. We want Europeans to identify with the design of euro banknotes, which is why they will play an active role in selecting the new theme.”
Developing our future euro banknotes
“We are working on a new series of high-tech banknotes with a view to preventing counterfeiting and reducing environmental impact,” said Executive Board member Fabio Panetta. “We are committed to cash and to ensuring that paying with public money is always an option.”
It is the duty of the ECB and the euro area national central banks to ensure euro banknotes remain an innovative, secure and efficient means of payment. Developing new series of banknotes is a standard practice for all central banks. In a world where reproduction technologies are rapidly evolving and where counterfeiters can easily access information and materials, it is necessary to issue new banknotes on a regular basis. Beyond security considerations, the ECB is committed to reducing the environmental impact of euro banknotes throughout their life cycle, while also making them more relatable and inclusive for Europeans of all ages and backgrounds, including vulnerable groups such as people with visual impairment.
Shortlisted themes for future banknotes
The seven themes shortlisted by the ECB’s Governing Council are listed below.[1]
Birds: free, resilient, inspiring
Birds know nothing of national borders and symbolise freedom of movement. Their nests remind us of our own desire to build places and societies that nurture and protect the future. They remind us that we share our continent with all the lifeforms that sustain our common existence.
European culture
Europe’s rich cultural heritage and dynamic cultural and creative sectors strengthen the European identity, forging a shared sense of belonging. Culture promotes common values, inclusion and dialogue in Europe and across the globe. It brings people together.
European values mirrored in nature
Europe is a living place, but also an idea. The European Union is an organisation, but also a set of values. The theme highlights the role of European values (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights) as the building blocks of Europe and links these values to our respect for nature and the preservation of the environment.
The future is yours
The ideas and innovations that will shape the future of Europe lie deep within every European. The images created for this theme represent the bearers of the collective imagination through which people will create this shared future. This theme signifies the boundless potential of Europeans.
Hands: together we build Europe
Hands are familiar to all of us but no two pairs are the same. Hands built Europe, its physical infrastructure, its artistic heritage and its achievements. Hands build, weave, heal, teach, connect and guide us. Hands tell stories of labour, age and relationships, of heritage, history, and culture. This theme celebrates the hands that have built Europe and continue to do so every day.
Our Europe, ourselves
We grow up as individuals but also as part of a community, through our relationships with one another. We have our own stories and identities, but we also share a common identity as Europeans. This theme evokes the freedom, values and openness of people in Europe.
Rivers: the waters of life in Europe
Europe’s rivers cross borders. They connect us to each other and to nature. They represent the ebb and flow of a dynamic, ever-changing continent. They nurture us and remind us of the deep sources of our common life, and we must nurture them in turn.
The shortlist of themes takes into account the suggestions made by a multidisciplinary advisory group, with members from all euro area countries.
Timeline for the new designs
The outcome of the surveys will be used by the ECB to select the theme for the next generation of banknotes by 2024. After that a design competition will take place. European citizens will again have the chance to express their preferences on the design options resulting from that competition. The ECB is expected to take the decision on the future design, and on when to produce and issue the new banknotes, in 2026.
Contact:

Belén Pérez Esteve, Press Officer, ECB | belen.perez_esteve@ecb.europa.eu

Compliments of the European Central Bank.The post ECB surveys Europeans on new themes for euro banknotes first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.