November 28, the Commission is taking another step to make the EU’s energy system fit for the future by adopting the first list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMIs) that is fully in line with the European Green Deal. These key cross-border infrastructure projects will help the EU reach its ambitious energy and climate goals. The projects will benefit from streamlined permitting and regulatory procedures, and become eligible for EU financial support from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).
This list is adopted under the revised Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation (TEN-E) which ends support for fossil fuel infrastructure and focuses on cross-border energy infrastructure of the future. It includes PCIs, which are projects within the EU territory, and for the first time PMIs, which connect the EU with other countries. The Commission will ensure the projects are swiftly completed and can contribute to doubling the EU’s grid capacity by 2030 and meeting its 42.5% renewable energy target.
Out of the 166 selected PCIs and PMIs:

over half (85) are electricity, offshore and smart electricity grid projects, with many expected to be commissioned between 2027 and 2030.
for the first time, hydrogen and electrolyser projects (65) are included, which will play a major role in enabling energy system integration and the decarbonisation of EU industry.
the list also includes 14 CO2 network projects in line with our goals to create a market for carbon capture and storage.

Following the adoption of the PCI and PMI List by the Commission today, as a Delegated Act under the TEN-E Regulation, it will now be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council for their scrutiny. Both co-legislators have two months to either accept or reject the list in full, but may not amend it. This process can be extended by two months, if requested by the co-legislators. Once the list is adopted, the Commission will work with project promoters and Member States to support the rapid implementation of this list of projects, in line with the enhanced measures proposed today in the EU Action Plan for Grids.
Background
The list adopted today is the 6th Union List including PCIs, and the first Union list of PCIs and PMIs established under the revised TEN-E Regulation, which was adopted in 2022. The revised Regulation ensures that EU-supported cross-border energy infrastructure projects help the Union achieve its climate and energy goals as set out in the European Green Deal. As set out in the TEN-E Regulation, such lists are adopted every two years, following extensive stakeholder consultation in regional groups which are established by the TEN-E regulation.
 
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The Commission welcomes the provisional agreement reached last night between the European Parliament and the Council strengthening the current provisions for emissions from industry and large intensive rearing farms.
The updated law will help guide industrial investments necessary for Europe’s transformation towards a cleaner, carbon neutral, more circular and competitive economy by 2050. It will spur innovation, reward frontrunners, and help level the playing field on the EU market and increase long-term investment certainty for industry. 
New measures for a less polluting and carbon neutral industry, more innovation and transparency 
Once adopted and applied, the new law will more effectively limit polluting emissions from industrial installations. Compared to the directive currently in force, the new law will cover additional sources of emissions, make permitting more effective, reduce administrative costs, increase transparency, and give more support to breakthrough technologies and other innovative approaches. The revised law will also tighten rules on granting derogations to further protect the environment and human health.
The updated rules will also provide more opportunities to EU innovation frontrunners who will be able to test more environmentally performing emerging techniques thanks to more flexible permits. A new Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions (INCITE) will help industry identify pollution control solutions and transformative technologies. Finally, operators of industrial installations will need to develop Transformation Plans to achieve the EU’s 2050 zero pollution, circular economy and decarbonisation goals, and will benefit from flexible permits to implement deeply transformative techniques.
The updated law will also support circular economy investments by including resource use performance levels, as well as lower chemical pollution through requirements for a reduced use of toxic chemicals during industrial processes.
The new law will cover more installations, notably:

More large-scale intensive livestock farms. Under the new rules, the largest pig and poultry farms would be covered, while the inclusion of cattle farms would be assessed in a review at a later stage. As farms have simpler operations than industrial plants, all farms covered will benefit from a lighter permitting regime also reflecting the size of farms as well as the livestock density.
Extraction of metals and large-scale production of batteries. These activities will significantly expand in the EU to enable the green and digital transitions. The governance mechanisms of the revised Industrial Emissions Directive will support the sustainable growth of these activities in the EU, thus contributing to the objectives of the Critical Raw Material and Net-Zero Industry Acts.

Finally, the improved measures on penalties and opportunities for citizens to seek compensation will increase transparency and public participation in the permitting process, and will reinforce environmental governance and enforcement. With the new EU Industrial Emissions Portal, citizens will be able to access data on permits issued anywhere in Europe and gain insight into polluting activities in their immediate surroundings in a simple way.
Next steps
The European Parliament and the Council will now have to formally adopt the revised Industrial Emissions Directive and the new Industrial Emissions Portal Regulation in line with the agreement reached. Once formally adopted, they will enter into force on the 20th day following publication in the Official Journal.
Once the revised Industrial Emissions Directive enters into force, Member States will have 22 months to implement the new rules. Before the Industrial Emissions Portal Regulation becomes law, the Commission will work on reporting manuals and secondary acts so that the operators and Member States are ready to report under the new regime in 2028.
Background
The Industrial Emissions Directive currently covers some 50 000 large industrial installations and intensive livestock farms in Europe. These installations need to comply with emissions conditions by applying activity-specific ‘Best Available Techniques’. These techniques are determined together by industry, national and Commission experts, and civil society.
 
 
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Blog post by Simon Black, Florence Jaumotte, Prasad Ananthakrishnan |  With each passing year, the stark reality of a hotter planet becomes clearer and the ensuing risks to the global economy intensify. But as the world is waking up to the scale of the climate crisis, geopolitical tensions and fragmentation risks are undermining our ability to coordinate global actions to solve this planetary problem.
Eight years on from the Paris Agreement, policies remain insufficient to stabilize temperatures and avoid the worst effects of climate change. Collectively, we are not cutting emissions fast enough and are falling short on the needed investment, financing, and technology. The window is closing, but we still have time—just—to change our trajectory and leave a healthy, vibrant, and livable planet to the next generation.
Limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees to 2 degrees Celsius and reaching net zero by 2050 requires cutting carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases by 25 percent to 50 percent by 2030 compared with 2019. But, as our new analysis shows, the current global commitments reflected in nationally determined contributions would reduce emissions by just 11 percent by the end of this decade.

To make matters worse, current policies are not consistent with commitments, which means that the world is set to fall short of even that meager goal. Business-as-usual policies would see annual global emissions increase by 4 percent by 2030 and reach a cumulative level sufficient to breach the 1.5-degree target by 2035.
More ambition, stronger policies
To get back on track with the global climate goals, we need more ambition now. A fair approach is for countries to target cuts in emissions in line with per capita incomes.
For example, to keep within 2 degrees of warming, high, upper-middle, lower-middle, and low-income countries will need emissions reductions of 39 percent, 30 percent, 8 percent and 8 percent, respectively, by 2030. To stay below 1.5 degrees of warming would entail more drastic emissions cuts of 60 percent and 51 percent for high- and upper-middle income countries.

Ambition alone is not enough. We also need major policy changes to achieve these more ambitious targets. These would ideally be centered on a robust carbon price—rising to a global average of at least $85 per ton by 2030—to provide broad incentives to reduce carbon-intensive energy, shift to cleaner sources, and invest in green technologies.
A carbon price also generates more than enough budget revenues to support vulnerable groups. Around 20 percent of carbon pricing revenues can more than compensate the poorest 30 percent of households. This is in direct contrast to damaging fossil fuel subsidies, which have risen to a record $1.3 trillion annually in explicit fiscal costs alone. Countries must act to phase out such subsidies.

At a global level, cooperation is needed to help assuage fears that carbon pricing would hurt national economic competitiveness. Here, an agreement among large emitters could spur other countries to follow—such as a progressive deal between China, the European Union, India, and the United States. This would cover over 60 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions and send a strong signal to the rest of the world.
Boosting climate finance
The path to net zero by 2050 requires low-carbon investments to rise from $900 billion in 2020 to $5 trillion annually by 2030. Of this figure, emerging and developing countries (EMDEs) need $2 trillion annually, a fivefold increase from 2020. Even if advanced economies meet or somewhat exceed their promise to provide $100 billion a year, the bulk of the financing for these low-carbon investments will need to come from the private sector.
Our analysis shows that private sector share of climate finance must rise from 40 percent to 90 percent of the total in EMDEs by 2030. That means a broad mix of policies to overcome barriers such as foreign exchange and policy risks, underdeveloped capital markets, and too few investable projects.

For example, targeted economic policies and governance reforms can lower capital costs. Meanwhile, blended finance that combines private capital with public and donor funding—including from multilateral development banks—can bring down the risk profile of green projects. Think of first-loss capital, credit enhancements, or guarantees.
At the same time, global policies to increase transparency and comparability of projects, standardize taxonomies and strengthen climate-related disclosure requirements are vital in helping investors make low-carbon choices. Again, this highlights the importance of international cooperation.
Scaling up innovation
Of the 50 percent cut to emissions needed by 2030 to stay on track for the 1.5-degree target, more than 80 percent can be achieved from technologies available today. Getting to net-zero by 2050 will, however, require technologies that are still under development or yet to be invented.
Unfortunately, patent filings for low-carbon technology peaked at 10 percent of total filings in 2010 and have since declined. Worse, key technologies aren’t spreading fast enough to emerging and developing countries.
How can this trend be reversed? Recent IMF analysis shows climate policies—such as feed-in tariffs and emissions trading schemes—boost green innovation and investment flows,and help spread low carbon technology across borders. Moreover, in some countries, lowering trade barriers can accelerate imports of low carbon technologies by 20 percent to 30 percent. Yet again this points to the importance of cooperation: to avoid protectionist measures that would impede the broader spread of low-carbon technologies.
Helping countries meet goals
Wherever climate policy intersects with macroeconomic policy, the IMF is here to help. Our new Resilience and Sustainability Trust provides long-term financing on affordable terms to help vulnerable middle- and low-income countries cope with threats such as climate change. The $40 billion trust has already supported programs for 11 countries, with twice that number in the pipeline.
For our wider membership, we add a climate lens to our economic analysis, policy advice, capacity development and data provision. Why? Because macroeconomic and financial sector policies are critical to harnessing the opportunities of the green transition: for low-carbon, resilient growth, and jobs.
But no country can tackle climate change on its own. International cooperation is more important than ever. Only with concerted action, now, will we bequeath a healthy planet to our children and grandchildren.

 
 
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From tomorrow to 1 December the Commission is hosting a high-level conference in Vilnius, Lithuania on the green recovery in Ukraine. Commissioner Virginijus Sinkevičius will represent the Commission and stress the commitment for a continued cooperation with and assistance to Ukraine in its sustainable reconstruction efforts. Commissioners Wopke Hoekstra and Iliana Ivanova will participate in the event via video messages.
Comprising a policy and a business segment, the conference aims to take stock of the challenges ahead and discuss with Ukrainian policymakers, mayors and businesses the strategies and concrete solutions underpinning a green reconstruction and recovery. The high-level event aims to create a momentum for high sustainability ambition for the benefit of all Ukrainians. In addition to supporting Ukraine’s European perspective, a sustainable recovery and reconstruction is essential to guarantee Ukraine’s prosperity, resource autonomy, and the quality of life of Ukrainians when the war finally ends.
Holistic approach to green recovery of Ukraine
The Conference aims to offer all key stakeholders a holistic approach to the green recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. The hybrid policy segment on 28-29 November focuses on policymakers and civil society, setting out the overall challenges and presenting the main policy support measures to the green reconstruction of Ukraine and the first concrete results of the PHOENIX initiative, launched by President von der Leyen in February 2023 during a College visit to Ukraine. The initiative aims to help Ukraine rebuild its cities in a high-quality, sustainable and inclusive way with the New European Bauhaus community. High-level personalities, such as Gitanas Nausėda, President of Lithuania, Simonas Gentvilas, Minister of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania, and Ruslan Strilets, Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine will take part in the policy segment, followed by a debate session with Ukrainian mayors.
The business segment from 30 November to 1 December 2023 will introduce specific, applicable solutions in green reconstruction, discuss systemic barriers to the deployment of a more circular and greener economy, and connect companies from the EU and Ukraine.
Damage of the war to the environment in Ukraine
The Commission supports a range of efforts to monitor and record the environmental damage, going much beyond natural areas. Environmental damage from Russia’s war against Ukraine brings devastating consequences for essential infrastructures, natural resources, critical ecosystems and people’s health, livelihoods and security. A green recovery is about remedying that damage and setting Ukraine on a new path of environmental and social sustainability.
Damage of the war to the environment and environmental infrastructures estimated so far:

Over €52 billion of total damage
497 water management facilities damaged or destroyed
Over €1.4 billion damages in the forestry sector
20% of protected areas under threat

Environmental devastation resulting from the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydropower Plant, the worst man-made disaster since the Chernobyl accident
Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world.

A press conference by Commissioner Virginijus Sinkevičius and Ruslan Strilets, Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, can be followed on Tuesday at 13h00 CET can be followed here.
Background
The conference comes at a critical juncture, following the adoption of the 2023 Enlargement Package, where the Commission recommended opening accession negotiations with Ukraine.  The Ukrainian government is also set to propose by the end of this year an overall plan on recovery and restoration, closely tied to the €50 billion Ukraine Facility proposed by the European Commission and now under adoption.
The Commission is helping Ukraine align its environmental laws with the EU acquis and build administrative structures to enforce and implement this regulatory framework. It is also building coalitions, closely interacting with international partners (such as UNEP, UNIDO, World Bank) and support groups such as the High-Level Working Group on Environmental Consequences from the War.
With the proposed in June this year €50 billion Ukraine Facility over the 2024-2027 period, the EU Ukraine Facility will help rebuild Ukraine’s infrastructure, while ensuring that environmental sustainability is considered in future investments. 
 
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Central bank digital currencies can improve payment systems as well as financial inclusion—if they are appropriately designed. If not, they could pose risks.

While not all countries may see an immediate case to deploy a CBDC, many countries are exploring CBDCs so they will have the option to introduce one in the future if it becomes pertinent for them. Benefits are more likely to come in time, following the policies pursued by countries and the private sector’s response, as well as the evolution of technology.
In most cases, it would be useful for countries to continue exploring CBDC, carefully and systematically, as IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva noted in her recent speech at the Singapore Fintech Festival.
The Bahamas, Jamaica, and Nigeria have already introduced CBDCs. And more than 100 countries are in the exploration stage. Central bankers in Brazil, China, the euro area, India, and the United Kingdom are at the forefront.
The IMF recently launched a virtual CBDC Virtual Handbook to collect and share knowledge with policymakers around the world, and to serve as a basis for the IMF’s engagement with country authorities. We intend this to be a living document that will be updated and expanded as our body of knowledge and analysis grows, and as new lessons and insights emerge from countries.
The chapters published so far cover process and policy topics:

How Should Central Banks Explore Central Bank Digital Currency? Countries that decide to pursue CBDCs will take different paths, depending on the degree of digitalization of the economy, the legal and regulatory frameworks, and the central bank’s capacity. We propose a dynamic decision-making process in which central banks can proceed despite uncertainty, and adjust the pace, scale, and scope of their initiatives in response to changes in domestic and international conditions.

A Guide to Central Bank Digital Currency Product Development. To help guide central banks in exploring and developing CBDC, we’ve established a step-by-step guide to address the complex requirements and risks associated with CBDCs. We call it the 5P methodology: preparation, proof-of-concept, prototypes, pilots, and production.

Implications of Central Bank Digital Currencies for Monetary Policy Transmission. We analyze how CBDCs would likely affect monetary policy. In general, policy transmission is not expected to be affected much under normal circumstances, but the effects can be more significant in an environment with low interest rates or financial market stress.

Implementing capital flow management measures with CBDC. We explain how CBDCs could be designed to facilitate cross-border payments while still managing capital flows. With new digital technologies that can make payment infrastructure programmable, some of the capital-flow management measures could be implemented more efficiently and effectively with a CBDC compared to the traditional approach.

Central Bank Digital Currency’s Role in Promoting Financial Inclusion. As a risk-free and widely acceptable form of digital money, with potentially lower costs and greater accessibility, CBDCs can increase financial inclusion. If properly designed to replicate some of the properties of cash, CBDCs could gain acceptance as a payment mechanism for financially excluded populations—and be an entry point to the broader formal financial system.

Looking ahead, our engagement with central banks will continue as they pursue new technologies. We will keep assessing the potential effects of CBDCs on areas from financial stability to cybersecurity and cross-border payments and build on these first five chapters with new publications planned for next year. And we’ll continue our collaboration with other global bodies, including the Group of Twenty.
The IMF will continue assisting countries exploring CBDCs, along with efforts by other global bodies like the Bank for International Settlements.

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The European economy has lost momentum this year against the background of a high cost of living, weak external demand and monetary tightening. While economic activity is expected to gradually recover going forward, the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast revises EU GDP growth down compared to its summer projections. Inflation is estimated to have dropped to a two-year low in the euro area in October and is set to continue declining over the forecast horizon.
Growth has lost momentum, but a rebound is still expected
Following a robust expansion throughout most of 2022, real GDP contracted towards year-end and barely grew in the first three quarters of 2023. Still high, though declining, inflation, and tightening monetary policy took a heavier toll than previously expected, alongside weak external demand. The latest business indicators and survey data for October point to subdued economic activity also in the fourth quarter of this year, amid increased uncertainty. Overall, the Autumn Forecast projects GDP growth in 2023 at 0.6% in both the EU and the euro area, 0.2 percentage points below the Commission’s summer forecast.
Economic activity is expected to gradually pick up as consumption recovers on the back of a steadily robust labour market, sustained wage growth and continued easing of inflation. Despite tighter monetary policy, investment is projected to continue increasing, supported by overall solid corporate balance sheets and by the Recovery and Resilience Facility. In 2024, EU GDP growth is forecast to improve to 1.3%. This is still a downward revision of 0.1 pps. from the summer. In the euro area, GDP growth is projected to be slightly lower, at 1.2%.
In 2025, with inflation and the drag from monetary tightening subsiding, growth is expected to strengthen to 1.7% for the EU and 1.6% for the euro area.
Inflation to continue easing after falling to two-year low
Inflation remains on a downward trend. It is estimated to have declined to 2.9% in the euro area in October, from its 10.6% peak a year ago. This marks its lowest level since July 2021.
While the moderation in the past year was mainly driven by the sharp fall in energy prices, it has now become increasingly broad-based across all main consumption categories, beyond energy and food.
As monetary tightening works its way through the economy, inflation is set to continue declining, though at a more moderate pace, reflecting a slower, but more broad-based, easing of inflationary pressures in food, manufactured goods and services. Headline inflation in the euro area is projected to fall from 5.6% in 2023 to 3.2% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025. In the EU, headline inflation is set to decrease from 6.5% in 2023 to 3.5% in 2024 and 2.4% in 2025.
Labour market to remain resilient
The EU labour market continued to perform strongly in the first half of 2023, despite the slowdown in economic growth. In the second quarter, activity and employment rates in the EU reached their highest level on record, and in September the unemployment rate remained at 6% of the labour force, close to its record low.
Although latest information from surveys points to some cooling and some Member States have seen an uptick in unemployment, the labour market is set to remain resilient over the forecast horizon. Employment growth in the EU is projected at 1.0% this year, before easing to 0.4% in both 2024 and 2025. The unemployment rate in the EU is expected to remain broadly stable at 6.0% in 2023 and in 2024, and to edge down to 5.9% in 2025. Real wages are expected to turn positive as of next year on the back of continued nominal wage growth and declining inflation.
Public deficits decrease as fiscal support is phased out
The phase-out of pandemic-related temporary measures, a reduction in subsidies to private investment and a lower net budgetary impact of energy-related measures are expected to offset the pressure on the fiscal balances from a less favourable economic environment and higher interest expenditure. Consequently, the EU general government deficit is projected to decline slightly in 2023, to 3.2% of GDP. Continued restraint in discretionary fiscal support is expected to further reduce the EU public deficit to 2.8% of GDP in 2024 and to 2.7% in 2025. The main driver of this decline is set to be the sizeable reduction in energy-related measures next year and their phase out in 2025.
The EU debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to continue to decline in 2023, to 83%. This is supported by high inflation, while higher interest rates on new debt issuances raise interest expenditure only gradually given the long average maturity of public debts in the EU. In 2024 and 2025, the debt ratio is forecast to broadly stabilise above the 2019 level of around 79%.
Risks and uncertainty increase amid geopolitical tensions
Uncertainty and downside risks to the economic outlook have increased in recent months amid Russia’s protracted war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East. So far, the latter’s impact on energy markets has been contained, but there is a risk of disruptions to energy supplies that could potentially have a significant impact on energy prices, global output and the overall price level. Economic developments in the EU’s major trading partners, especially China, could also pose risks.
On the domestic side, the transmission of monetary tightening may weigh on economic activity for longer and to a larger degree than projected in this forecast, as the adjustment of firms, households and government finances to the high interest rate environment could prove more challenging. Finally, extreme weather events like heatwaves, fires, droughts and floods, which have been raging across the continent and beyond with increasing frequency and scope, illustrate the dramatic consequences that climate change can have not only for the environment and the people affected, but also for the economy.
New candidate countries covered for the first time
This Autumn Economic Forecast for the first time covers Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Ukraine, to which the European Council granted EU candidate status last year. In Ukraine, the economy has shown remarkable resilience in 2023. Growth is forecast to reach 4.8% in 2023, 3.7% in 2024 and 6.1% in 2025, after collapsing by 29% in 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion.
This rebound can be attributed to exceptional harvests and government stimulus underpinned by the unwavering support of international partners, as well as to the authorities’ commitment to ensure macrofinancial stability.
Background
This forecast is based on a set of technical assumptions concerning exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices with a cut-off date of 25 October. For all other incoming data, including assumptions about government policies, this forecast takes into consideration information up until, and including, 31 October. Unless new policies are announced and specified in adequate detail, the projections assume no policy changes.
The European Commission publishes two comprehensive forecasts (spring and autumn) and two interim forecasts (winter and summer) each year. The two comprehensive forecasts cover a broad range of economic indicators for all EU Member States, candidate countries, EFTA countries and other major advanced and emerging market economies. The interim forecasts cover annual and quarterly GDP and inflation for the current and following year for all Member States, as well as EU and euro area aggregates.
The European Commission’s Winter 2024 Economic Forecast will update the GDP and inflation projections in this publication and is expected to be presented in February 2024.
 
You can read the forecast in full here.

 
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On November 17, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on revising EU procedures and control measures for waste shipments. The agreed law aims to protect the environment and human health more effectively, while contributing to achieve the EU’s climate neutrality, circular economy and zero pollution goals.

Strengthening the rules governing exports of waste outside the EU
EU exports of certain non-hazardous wastes and mixtures of non-hazardous wastes for recovery (i. e. to be used for other purposes) will be allowed only to those non-OECD countries that consent and fulfil the criteria to treat such waste in an environmentally sound manner, including by complying with international labour and workers’ rights conventions. The Commission will draw up a list of such recipient countries, to be updated at least every two years.
Parliament ensured that plastic waste can no longer be exported to non-OECD countries within two and a half years after the entry into force of the regulation. Plastic waste exports to OECD countries will be subject to stricter conditions, including an obligation to apply the prior written notification and consent procedure, and closer compliance monitoring.
Better information exchange and clearer rules for shipments within the EU
Negotiators agreed that all shipments of waste destined for disposal in another EU country are generally prohibited and allowed only in exceptional cases. Waste shipments destined for recovery operations will have to meet strict requirements on prior written notification, consent and information.
The new law also foresees, two years after its entry into force, that the exchange of information and data on waste shipments in the EU will be digitalised, through a central electronic hub, to improve reporting and transparency.
Reinforcing prevention and detection of illegal shipments
The deal endorses the establishment of an enforcement group to improve cooperation between EU countries to prevent and detect illegal shipments. The Commission will be able to carry out inspections, in cooperation with national authorities, where there is sufficient suspicion that there are illegal waste shipments occurring.
Quote
Rapporteur Pernille Weiss (EPP, DK) said: “The result of our negotiations will bring more certainty to Europeans, that our waste will be appropriately managed no matter where it is shipped. The EU will finally assume responsibility for its plastic waste by banning its export to non-OECD countries. Once again, we follow our vision that waste is a resource when it is properly managed, but should not in any case be causing harm to the environment or human health.”
Next steps
Parliament and Council need to formally approve the agreement before it can come into force.
Background
On 17 November 2021, the Commission tabled a proposal to reform the EU’s rules on waste shipments, laying down procedures and control measures for the shipment of waste, depending on its origin, destination and transport route, the type of waste shipped and the type of waste treatment applied when it reaches its destination.
At international level, the Basel Convention regulates the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal. The OECD also adopted a legally binding decision (the “OECD control system”) to facilitate and control transboundary movements of wastes destined for recovery operations between OECD countries.

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On 16 November, EU Commissioner for Climate Action, Wopke Hoekstra met China’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, Xie Zhenhua, in Beijing, to prepare for the COP28 UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai. In a frank and constructive exchange, they agreed to increase cooperation on tackling the climate crisis, which no single country can solve on its own.
Both parties wholeheartedly underlined that climate science shows the urgency of action in this decade to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement. The impacts of the climate crisis are dramatically felt both in China and the EU and remind us of the responsibility to fully commit to emissions reductions while making our economies more resilient.
They discussed the key issues at stake at COP28 including the Global Stocktake, decarbonisation of the energy systems, climate adaptation, climate finance and carbon pricing, and the operationalisation of the loss and damage fund.
Commissioner Hoekstra highlighted the importance of ambition on emission reductions at COP28 via the outcome of the Global Stocktake. In particular he raised the importance of peaking global emissions as soon as possible this decade, and of tripling renewable energy capacity, and doubling energy efficiency measures by 2030, to contribute to the phase out of fossil fuels. They discussed at length what the end of coal and other fossil fuels means for industrial restructuring and how to make these efforts compatible with energy security concerns.
On the issue of climate finance, the Commissioner underlined that all parties able to contribute should do so in general, and in particular for the loss and damage fund. He also recalled the EU’s role as the world’s largest provider of international climate finance.
Commissioner Hoekstra agreed to work closely together with Special Envoy Xie ahead of and during COP28 to ensure a successful outcome for all parties. Decades of continuous cooperation by the EU and China in the multilateral climate negotiations provide a strong foundation.
Commissioner Hoekstra commended Special Envoy Xie on China’s massive increase in renewable energy capacity over recent years. Beyond COP, he committed to continue close EU-China cooperation on climate issues such as carbon pricing and the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), measuring and reducing methane emissions, and scientific analysis. The Commissioner also raised concerns from the European side about the global level playing field, and expressed his commitment to creating mutual benefits from the green transition in areas such as innovation, clean technologies and industrial decarbonisation.

 
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Keynote address of Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director at Singapore Fintech Festival |  President Tharman, excellencies, distinguished guests: good morning! It’s a pleasure to be in Singapore again. And it’s an honor to join you this morning at this impressive forum to take stock of how far we’ve come and set the course for the future.
There is no better place to look into this future than Singapore — a place where fintech flourishes and where this festival brings the unlimited energy of fintech enthusiasts.
FinTech innovation has already been transformative — and will continue to be so — changing the world of finance and making it much more accessible to hundreds of millions of businesses and people who used to be cut off from it.
I am proud the IMF is part of this great community and that I am with you today. I come in the footsteps of my predecessor, Christine Lagarde, who five years ago gave a speech here encouraging policymakers to follow the “winds of change,” and embark on a digital money voyage by exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs, and fintech.
Five years on, I’m here to provide an update on that voyage. I have four main messages. First, countries did set sail. Many are investigating CBDCs and are developing regulation to guide digital money developments. Second, we have not yet reached land. There is so much more space for innovation and so much uncertainty over use-cases. Third, this is not the time to turn back. The public sector should keep preparing to deploy CBDCs and related payment platforms in the future. Fourth, these platforms should be designed from the start to facilitate cross-border payments, including with CBDCs.
We’ve left port and are now on the high seas. This calls for courage and determination. We can learn from you: entrepreneurs, business leaders, and investors. You are sailors in the world of fintech. Every day you brave the open waters. Waves and winds are your inspiration. 
If anything, we need to raise another sail to pick up speed. The world is changing faster than most imagined. Just take artificial intelligence – a key theme of this festival. Look at the number of months before various applications reached 100 million users. The average is 3 years. It took ChatGPT 2 months!
The CBDC voyage
Adoption of CBDCs is nowhere close. But about 60 percent of countries are exploring them in some form today. CBDCs can replace cash which is costly to distribute in island economies. They can offer resilience in more advanced economies. And they can improve financial inclusion where few hold bank accounts.
In some countries the case seems dim today, but even they should remain open to potentially deploy CBDCs tomorrow. Why?
First, the benefits of CBDCs will stem from what happens in the payments environment. How many other countries will adopt CBDCs? To what extent will cash become obsolete? And will private forms of money proliferate?
Libra was a wake-up call that turned out to be a false alarm. But others, more compliant, will come knocking. In that case, CBDCs would offer a safe and low-cost alternative. They would also offer a bridge to go between private monies and a yardstick to measure their value, just like cash today which we can withdraw from our banks.
Second, the success of CBDCs will rely on policy decisions and how the private sector responds. The actions of many of you here today will matter!
Country authorities wishing to introduce CBDCs may need to think a little more like entrepreneurs. Communication strategies, and incentives for distribution, integration, and adoption, are as important as design considerations.
Will you, fintech leaders and developers, spend the resources onboarding merchants so they accept CBDCs? Will you make it easy for CBDCs to be integrated into financial services and messaging apps so people can pay each other from any environment? It depends on your return, that’s only fair.
Third, the benefits of CBDCs will depend on how technologies evolve.
AI, for instance, could amplify some of the benefits of CBDCs. It could improve financial inclusion by providing rapid, accurate credit scoring based on various data. It could provide personalized support to people with low financial literacy. To be sure, we need to protect personal privacy and data security, and avoid embedded biases so we don’t perpetuate inequality but aim to reduce it. Managed prudently, AI could help.
Another important potential transformation resulting from the work of many of you is the tokenization of financial assets, such as bonds issued on blockchains. This opens another door to CBDC, potentially in wholesale form, to pay for those assets.
So countries should continue exploring CBDCs.
In that spirit, I am delighted to announce the launch of a CBDC Handbook available on the IMF website starting today. The Handbook is intended to collect and share knowledge on CBDCs for policymakers around the world—to help them to sail ahead.
The cross-border payments voyage
To the extent CBDCs are deployed, they must be built to facilitate cross-border payments, which are at present expensive, slow, and available to few. Again, we must start this work today so we don’t have to backpedal tomorrow.
Efficient cross-border payments allow for capital to get more quickly to where it is needed. Small businesses can grow beyond borders, and households can receive needed funds from abroad. While we see encouraging declines in the cost of remittances, they remain above Sustainable Development Goal targets. We must ensure that countries do not get stuck on the wrong side of the digital divide.
We know what to do to make cross-border payments more efficient in the short term: improve what we already have. This is the spirit of the G20 Roadmap to enhance cross-border payments. In fact, I’m happy to announce that the IMF and World Bank will soon publish a common plan to provide capacity development to countries in just this area.
But in the medium term, new cross-border platforms may help. Think of these as next-generation virtual town-squares where central banks, commercial banks, and potentially even households and firms, can gather to exchange CBDCs in wholesale or retail form. Such platforms can even be built to interface with traditional forms of money and manage risks from payments.
These platforms are being actively explored by a range of players.
Banks and fintech companies are at the forefront. They are building infrastructure to pay each other, and to exchange financial assets on common blockchain networks.
The public sector is also pushing the frontier, including with the help of the BIS Innovation Hub. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is particularly active. Its project Guardian explores platforms to exchange digital money and assets. IMF staff will participate in project Guardian as observers to advise on the implications for the international monetary system. Thank you, Ravi Menon, for including us!
As you all know, there are many ships sailing these waters. And that is very good.
But we may be at a point where the public sector needs to offer a little more guidance. Not to crowd out, not to disrupt. But to act as a catalyst, to ensure safety and efficiency—and to counter fragmentation.
What we need in this voyage is a compass.
One way to provide a compass is to establish the desirable properties of cross-border platforms from a policy standpoint. For instance, platforms must allow countries to manage capital flows and retain control over their money supply. Equally important, we need common rules of the game on fighting money laundering and terrorist financing, and on data protection for instance.
AI could help here as well. AI solutions known as RegTech could reduce costs of compliance. It would be like using priority lanes in airports, skipping over the long queues at security.
Again, like CBDCs, we don’t need to decide today whether cross-border platforms are desirable. It’s about keeping the option open, building capacity, and setting the design contours to support the integration and stability of the international monetary system. If not, we may actually end up fragmenting it.
No one institution can provide such guidance. We will have to collaborate tightly across international institutions, central banks, and ministries of finance. The IMF can and will play its part.
Conclusion
Let me conclude with the following: We will be in the high seas for some time. But the potential payoff is clear—a more inclusive international financial system that meets our future needs.
So let us not disembark at the first island. Nor turn back. There is value in the voyage itself.
As Marcel Proust once said, “The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.”
That speaks to the strength of the Singapore Fintech Festival, and of all of you gathered here – the strength of many eyes. The power to bring fresh perspectives to problems and challenges old and new. I look forward to continuing this voyage with all of you. Let us sail together.
 
Compliments of the IMF.The post IMF | Central Banks Should Continue Digital Currency Development first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The ECB Blog looked at how communication has become a key factor for the transmission of a central bank’s policies in a recent post.[1] Central banks exercise a profound influence on what occurs in the economy through what they say. While banks and financial institutions hang on to their every word as decisions affect financing conditions and the economy, the wider public – which is certainly not less affected by monetary policy decisions – follows the communication of central banks indirectly, if at all.
This is where the news media comes into play. Journalists select and condense information about the activities of central banks for the public. Media coverage thus plays a key role in influencing what the public thinks about monetary policy, and even whether it thinks about it at all.[2]
The ECB regularly offers one occasion during which journalists can address questions directly: the press conference. Eight times a year – immediately after the policy meetings of the Governing Council – the ECB President and the Vice-President are available to answer questions from the media. The Q&A part of the press conference last usually 30 to 45 minutes, during which around 10 journalists get the chance to ask questions. Once they get the floor, the selected journalists are free to ask what they consider appropriate and most interesting.
The press conference is a key communication event: it is closely followed by newspapers, TV and news wires, and it is the basis upon which other media form their own comments and coverage. In this post (and in the ECB Working Paper on which it is based) we take a closer look at who is asking, what kinds of topics they are raising, and we investigate geographic patterns.
Let’s begin with who asks the questions.
Look who’s asking
Chart 1 summarises where questions came from across a ten-year period between May 2012 and July 2022. All in all, President Christine Lagarde and her predecessor Mario Draghi answered a total of 2,166 questions posed by 266 journalists representing 124 media outlets.
The lion’s share of these more than 2,000 questions was posed by international media specialising in economic coverage like the Financial Times, Bloomberg, CNBC, Reuters and The Wall Street Journal. Within the European Union, northern and southern EU outlets asked roughly equal shares of questions (25% and 20%, respectively), while enquiries from eastern EU media accounted for only 1% of the total. While the question of why enquiries come from where they do is an interesting one, here we will focus on the distribution as it actually is.

Chart 1
Number of questions asked by region and audience type

y-axis: number of questions, on top of the bars: percentage over the total

Sources: Angino, S., and Robitu, R., (2023), “One question at a time! A text mining analysis of the ECB Q&A session“, Working Paper Series, No 2852, ECB

It is not all about monetary policy
We used structural topic modelling (STM) to group the questions into topics. STM is a well-known technique in text analysis. It is based on the idea that each text – in our case each question – is a mixture of different topics, with each topic being a distribution of words. It is then up to the researcher to assign a name to these clusters of words.
We identified nine recurring topics among the journalists’ questions, not all of which are about monetary policy. The topics that do relate to the core of the ECB’s work include “Conventional monetary policy”, “Purchase programmes”, “Inflation and economic outlook” and “Deflation and Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)”. Another frequent topic revolves around the “Banking System”, related to keywords such as the state of the banking union, European banking supervision, and even more specific issues: for instance, non-performing loans, and even the situation of individual banks.
Some questions concern past and potential future crises threatening the existence of the monetary union, and the reversibility of the euro. They are captured by the topic “Sovereign debt crisis and European Monetary Union (EMU)”, which was unsurprisingly very prominent between 2012 and 2015.
“National affairs” captures questions on the economic, financial, and political affairs of Member States. This topic comprises structural reforms and fiscal policy, as well as issues on which the ECB cannot comment, such as national elections or referenda.
We also found two topics connected to the internal processes of the ECB. The first is “Governance”, which is mainly connected to the Governing Council deliberations, including the unanimity, or lack thereof, in their decisions. Other issues captured by this topic are legal ones, for instance the rulings of the German Federal Constitutional court on various ECB programmes (like in 2013 or in 2020). The second operational topic is “Communications”. This topic includes references to forward guidance,a monetary policy tool used to provide information about their future monetary policy intentions, but also comprises words like “announcement”, “signal” and “minutes”. This, in our view, adds to the evidence of the increasing interest in central bank communications.
The next question is: do journalists from different parts of the euro area and the world ask about the same topics? And do questions from outlets catering for general audiences differ from those for expert audiences?
Paese che vai, usanza che trovi[3]

The topics journalists inquire about differ depending on the geographical sphere of their outlet and on the type of audience they report for.

After having identified the nine topics in the questions, we move onto the differences across media types. We consider five outlet groups: “Northern EU – general audience”, “Northern EU – specialised audience”, “Southern EU – general audience”, “Southern EU – specialised audience”, and “International”. Virtually all outlets in the international group specialise in economics and finance so there is no need to differentiate audiences.
What do we find? First, international media tend to focus on technical topics related to monetary policy more than national outlets. In Chart 2, these are the topics like “Purchase programmes”, “Conventional monetary policy”, and “Deflation and ZLB” – more pertinent for expert audiences than the wider public.

Chart 2
Estimated topic proportions by region and audience

Percentage

Sources: Angino and Robitu (2023).

At the same time, international outlets ask very little about national affairs. The share of their questions that these outlets devote to the topic is 8 percentage points smaller than the equivalent share for national media targeting the wider public, in both the Northern and Southern EU groups. This finding suggests that general audiences are more interested in national affairs than in abstract and technical areas of the ECB’s activities like unconventional monetary policy.
The sovereign debt crisis (yellow in the chart) also features more in the questions of general audience outlets. This topic is especially prominent in Southern EU outlets.
The “Banking System” topic (dark green in the chart) is also very salient in the South. In fact, outlets in that region devote a share of their questions to this topic that is between 8 and 14 percentage points larger than that devoted by outlets elsewhere. This appetite for banking supervision topics squares with evidence from other research on the matter.[4] Why might this be? While this is beyond the scope of our analysis, the banking crises of recent decades and the subsequent reforms in Europe’s south may be an important clue.
Coverage of the “Governance” and “Communications” topics, meanwhile, does not change much across different media spheres.
What about differences between general and specialised audience outlets? They are especially important in the Southern EU group. Specialised outlets in the South tend to be quite similar to international outlets. In the Northern EU group, however, the most sizeable difference is in the “Inflation and economic outlook” topic (light blue). The share of their questions that specialised outlets devote to this topic is 8 percentage points larger than the share devoted to it by general outlets.
So what?
When they have the chance, journalists don’t just ask the ECB about its monetary policy. They often stray into topics well beyond what is usually considered the main role of a central bank. What exactly they focus on depends on their geographical scope and the type of audience they cater to.
Outlets targeting the wider public want to focus on more domestic, political and vivid issues that attract the public’s interest. So the ECB faces a trade-off. By granting questions to these outlets, it can broaden the discussion and speak on topics close to citizens’ hearts. The risk, on the other hand, is being confronted with sensitive issues lying beyond the scope of its mandate.
 
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
 
Footnotes:

For further info see also Blinder, A., et al. (2008), “Central bank communication and monetary policy: A survey of theory and evidence“, Working Paper Series, No 898, ECB or Assenmacher, K., et al. (2021), “Clear, consistent and engaging: ECB monetary policy communication in a changing world“, Occasional Paper Series, No 274, ECB.
According to the latest Knowledge and Attitudes survey, whose fieldwork took place in Autumn 2022, 75% of respondents in the euro area have heard about the ECB on television, 45% via printed press, 40% via online press, 37% on radio, and 29% via at least one social media platform.
Italian proverb referring to how different countries have different customs, broadly equivalent to “when in Rome, do as the Romans do”.
See for instance, ECB communication with the wider public.

 
Compliments of the ECB.The post ECB | A European view on central banking and the economy first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.