Today, July 25, marks the first anniversary of the Joint Statement by President Juncker and President Trump, which launched the new phase in the relationship between the United States and the European Union.
As a first step, the Presidents set up an Executive Working Group, co-chaired by Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström and her counterpart US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, to work on the different tracks for cooperation identified in the Joint Statement.
One year on, a series of concrete actions have been achieved, taking the trillion-dollar transatlantic trade relationship to the next level.A report on the implementation of the EU-U.S. Joint Statement of 25 July 2018 was published today, providing an overview of the progress made and illustrating the depth of the engagement between EU and U.S. over the past year, both at political and technical level.
On this occasion, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker said: “The European Union is delivering on what President Trump and I agreed on this day last year. We want a win-win situation on trade, which is beneficial for both the European Union and the United States. Having one of the most important economic relationships in the world, we want to continue strengthening trade between us based on the positive spirit of last July.”
Since July 2018, the EU has significantly increased its imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S. by over 367%. So far, in 2019, one third of all U.S. LNG exports have gone to the EU. The U.S. is the EU’s third largest supplier of LNG, while the EU has emerged as the primary destination of U.S. LNG exports.
EU imports of U.S. soya beans increased by almost 100% from July 2018 to June 2019, compared to the same period the previous year. The United States is now Europe’s number one soya beans supplier and has been able to expand its market further, following the decision by the European Commission on 29 January 2019, to authorise the use of U.S. soya beans for biofuels.
Following the Council’s mandate of 15 April 2019 to open talks with the U.S. for a horizontal agreement on conformity assessment, there have already been three rounds of constructive discussions on regulatory cooperation. An EU-U.S. agreement would allow exporters from a wide range of sectors to get certification of their products in their own country (as opposed to, for example, sending samples to the export destination).
The Council gave the Commission the authorisation to open talks with the U.S. on eliminating tariffs on industrial goods. While it was not yet possible to launch negotiations in this area due to diverging objectives on the two sides, the EU remains ready to engage with the U.S. along the lines agreed between the two Presidents in July 2018.
Regarding cooperation on standards, the EU presented its ideas on a deeper cooperation in strategic sectors, in particular those related to emerging technologies, such as 3D printing, robotics and connected vehicles. Important progress has been made in the areas of pharmaceuticals, medical devices and cybersecurity. Onpharmaceuticals, the EU and U.S. reached a milestone on 11 July 2019, as all EU Member State authorities were recognised under the Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on good manufacturing practices for human medicines. This has already resulted in cutting of costs for businesses and freeing up administrative resources, by avoiding the duplication of inspections.
The EU and U.S. have engaged to identify and address distortions caused by unfair market-distorting trade practices. Together with Japan, both partners have submitted a joint proposal in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enhance Members’ compliance with transparency requirements. The trilateral EU-U.S.-Japan process is also expected to lead to proposals for new rules on industrial subsidies and State Owned Enterprises.
In addition, a recent example that illustrates the excellent cooperation fostered in the spirit of the July 2018 Joint Statement, is the agreement found on the share of a duty-free tariff rate quota for U.S.exports ofhormone-free beef to the EU market.
The EU continues to make the case for ending U.S.tariffs on steel and aluminiumcomingfromthe EU, which would also benefit the U.S., since Americanproducers would be able to source these materials more cheaply from the EU. The EU could then also remove the rebalancing tariffsonU.S.exports.
Background
The United States and the European Union have a $1 trillion bilateral trade relationship with more than €3 billion in two-way trade every single day. Together both sides count more than 830 million citizens and close to 50% of global Gross Domestic Product. This is the largest economic relationship in the world.
With their Joint Statement of 25 July 2018, President Juncker and President Trump expressed their commitment to further strengthen this trade relationship to the benefit of all American and European citizens.
More Information
EU-U.S. joint statement of July 2018
Progress Report on the implementation of the EU-U.S. Joint Statement of 25 July 2018
Compliments of the European Commission

Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada and Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, met in Montreal on 17-18 July 2019 for the 17th Canada-European Union Summit. They issued the following statement:

The partnership between Canada and the European Union (EU) is deep and lasting, with its roots in shared values, a long history of close cooperation, and strong people-to-people ties.
The Canada-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) reflect our shared commitment to addressing global challenges in a manner that benefits our citizens, upholds our values, and strengthens the rules-based international order. 
We will further deepen our cooperation to deliver economic growth that benefits everyone, combat climate change and protect the environment, advance international peace and security, promote gender equality and women’s empowerment and foster innovation.

Full text of the 17th EU-Canada summit joint declaration 
Compliments of the European Council 

By Yuanyan Sophia Zhang |  International Monetary Fund
Wage rises have remained stubbornly low in advanced Europe in recent years, but, at the same time, newer EU members are experiencing rapid wage acceleration.
This paper investigates the drivers of this wage divergence. Econometric analysis using error correction models suggests that wage growth responds more quickly to changes in unemployment in the newer EU members than in advanced Europe, where wages are more closely related to inflation and inflation expectations in the short run, implying greater inertia in nominal wage rises in advanced Europe. In the years after the global crisis, this inertia contributed to the build up of a real wage overhang relative to sharply slowing labor productivity, which subsequently dragged on nominal wage rises even as unemployment began to decline. Spillovers of subdued wage growth between euro area countries also weighed on wage rises in advanced Europe.
Download the paper HERE
Compliments of the IMF

Governments worldwide provide more than USD 500 billion in often ineffective and trade distorting support to farmers each year, and efforts to reform these policies have largely stalled, according to a new OECD report.
Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2019 shows that farm policies in the 53 countries studied in the report – all OECD and EU countries, plus 12 key emerging economies – provided on average USD 528 billion (EUR 465 billion) per-year of direct support to farmers during the 2016-18 period. At the same time, countries that implicitly taxed farmers through artificially depressed prices reduced farm revenues by USD 83 billion (EUR 73 billion) per-year.
The OECD finds that little progress has been seen this decade in reforming agricultural support policies. Many agricultural policies continue to distort farm production and trade decisions and do not effectively target stated government objectives.
‌The report shows that 54% of support is provided through policies that artificially maintain domestic farm prices above international levels. This type of support harms consumers – especially poor consumers – while increasing the income gap between small and large farms and reducing the competitiveness of the food industry.
Relatively little of the current policy mix in most countries targets agricultural productivity growth and the sustainable use of land, water and biodiversity resources. The report also highlights large variations in support for different commodities, both within and across countries. This can result in significant price support for some products, while others are artificially depressed, and contributes to distortions in international markets.
“Governments can support farm households and rural communities without negative effects on global markets,” said OECD Director for Trade and Agriculture Ken Ash. “By removing the link between support and farm production decisions, and investing instead in needed public services, governments can build an enabling environment in which farmers have the freedom to make business decisions in response to evolving market opportunities at home and abroad. At the same time farm policy should be better targeted, improving access to technologies that will drive both productivity growth and sustainable resource use,” Mr Ash said.
The annual Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation report provides up-to-date estimates of government support to agriculture for all OECD and the European Union as a whole, plus key emerging economies. The 2019 edition includes Brazil, People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine, Viet Nam, and for the first time, both India and Argentina.
Download the report HERE.
Compliments of the OECD

The European Commission has opened a formal antitrust investigation to assess whether Amazon’s use of sensitive data from independent retailers who sell on its marketplace is in breach of EU competition rules.
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, in charge of competition policy, said: “European consumers are increasingly shopping online. E-commerce has boosted retail competition and brought more choice and better prices. We need to ensure that large online platforms don’t eliminate these benefits through anti-competitive behaviour. I have therefore decided to take a very close look at Amazon’s business practices and its dual role as marketplace and retailer, to assess its compliance with EU competition rules.”
Amazon has a dual role as a platform: (i) it sells products on its website as a retailer; and (ii) it provides a marketplace where independent sellers can sell products directly to consumers.
When providing a marketplace for independent sellers, Amazon continuously collects data about the activity on its platform. Based on the Commission’s preliminary fact-finding, Amazon appears to use competitively sensitive information – about marketplace sellers, their products and transactions on the marketplace.
As part of its in-depth investigation the Commission will look into:
the standard agreements between Amazon and marketplace sellers, which allow Amazon’s retail business to analyse and use third party seller data. In particular, the Commission will focus on whether and how the use of accumulated marketplace seller data by Amazon as a retailer affects competition.
the role of data in the selection of the winners of the “Buy Box” andthe impact of Amazon’s potential use of competitively sensitive marketplace seller information on that selection. The “Buy Box” is displayed prominently on Amazon and allows customers to add items from a specific retailer directly into their shopping carts. Winning the “Buy Box” seems key for marketplace sellers as a vast majority of transactions are done through it.
If proven, the practices under investigation may breach EU competition rules on anticompetitive agreements between companies (Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and/or on the abuse of a dominant position (Articles 102 TFEU).
The Commission will now carry out its in-depth investigation as a matter of priority. The opening of a formal investigation does not prejudge its outcome.
 
Background
Article 101 of the TFEU prohibits anticompetitive agreements and decisions of associations of undertakings that prevent, restrict or distort competition within the EU’s Single Market. Article 102 of the TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. The implementation of these provisions is defined in the Antitrust Regulation (Council Regulation No 1/2003), which can also be applied by the national competition authorities.
Article 11(6) of the Antitrust Regulation provides that the opening of proceedings by the Commission relieves the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to apply EU competition rules to the practices concerned. Article 16(1) further provides that national courts must avoid adopting decisions that would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated.
The Commission has informed Amazon and the competition authorities of the Member States that it has opened proceedings in this case.
There is no legal deadline for bringing an antitrust investigation to an end. The duration of an antitrust investigation depends on a number of factors, including the complexity of the case, the extent to which the undertakings concerned cooperate with the Commission and the exercise of the rights of defence.
More information on the investigation will be available on the Commission’s competition website, in the public case register under case number AT.40462.
Compliments of the European Commission

By John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
The fact that Dail Eireann voted yesterday to reject an EU Trade and Investment deal with Mercosur, that took 20 years to negotiate, and that few members could have read,  shows that Irish politics is not immune to the Brexit disease that has infected British politics. 
This disease consists in thinking that there is no need to make concessions in international relations and that, instead, one “can have it all”, without paying any price.
This delusion has led the UK into a deeply destructive position on Brexit.
I will not go into the details of the Mercosur trade deal here. Commissioner Phil Hogan dealt with these in an interview he gave to Sean O Rourke on RTE 1.  
The Dail vote showed a poor understanding of the importance of trade agreements to the very existence of the EU.
The EU is not a military power. It is a commercial power. That commercial power is exercised through agreements through which the EU can promote its values, and can protect the commercial and strategic interests of its member states, including smaller ones like Ireland.
 In recent times, the EU has made Agreements with Canada and Ukraine, and both had great difficulty being ratified, because one or two national parliaments took a similar line on them to the one taken on Mercosur by Dail Eireann yesterday.
If the EU cannot make and ratify Trade Agreements, it will gradually wither away, and member states will be forced  to find other ways of protecting their national interests. 
That might work for big states like France and Germany. But it will not work well for smaller states. The members of Dail Eireann should keep that in mind when they next come to consider the Mercosur deal.
Compliments of John Bruton

By Antonio de Lecea
The US administration just announced a new $4 billion list of European Union (EU) products which it could apply additional tariffs on in response to the ongoing dispute between both sides of the Atlantic over government subsidies to aerospace companies Boeing and Airbus. While the United States thinks it can create better economic outcomes by forcing concessions out of Europe, this new action will only continue the lose-lose spiral of threats gripping the transatlantic trade relationship. Washington could pursue a different strategy, however, by legitimately working with Europe to reduce government subsidies, while also taking tangible steps to strengthen antitrust enforcement at home. The transatlantic trade environment, growth prospects, and public finances would greatly benefit from such a change in approach.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has ruled that both Boeing and Airbushave over time received excessive subsidies from the US and the EU governments, respectively. In principle, the WTO rulings entitle both sides to retaliate with tariffs on a scale deemed appropriate by an arbitrator. The EU has called instead for a negotiated solution to this  fifteen-year-old argument over whose subsidies are legitimate and whose should be removed. In the words of EU Commissioner for trade Cecilia Malmström “We do not want a tit-for-tat. While we need to be ready with countermeasures in case there is no other way out, I still believe that dialogue is what should prevail between important partners such as the EU and the [United States], including in bringing an end to this long-standing dispute.”
The US administration argues that additional US tariffs are needed to bring the EU to the negotiating table, but this has already happened. There is no need for further tariffs, which would drive prices higher on European olives and cheese and US bourbon and motorbikes. The EU has clearly shown a willingness to discuss this issue, as well as a new trade agreement to eliminate current tariffs on industrial goods and reduce the compliance costs of exporting across the Atlantic. Ratcheting up the pressure may only lead the EU to conclude that there is not the minimum level of trust needed to pursue negotiations, and US-EU tariff escalation will result in significant losses for US consumers and importers.
The Boeing-Airbus case is just one example of the more general challenge of antitrust enforcement and unfair government subsidies on both sides of the Atlantic. The first antitrust rules were introduced in the United States  in the late 19th century and informed the competition rules that the EU later put in place in the 1960s. Until the 1990s, markets were more competitive in the United States than in the EU, but enforcement has become looser in the United States in the last twenty years, so that concentration and market power is now higher in the United States than in EU. Washington could achieve massive economic gain just by enforcing its own rules again.
Recent research shows that, since 2000, prices paid by US consumers has increased by 15 percent more than in the EU, while median wages rose only by 7 percent more. As a result, US profit margins have increased, but US consumers now pay 8 percent more for US products than they would under EU-like competition standards. Thus, looser competition enforcement acts like an 8 percent tax rise on US consumers and a concomitant hidden subsidy of 8 percent of gross domestic product to big US corporates. Lax antitrust enforcement is also a drag on US investment. Higher market power has not resulted in higher investment, but has actually declined in the United States, while it has remained stable in the EU.
Fairer competition enforcement would boost short term growth through three channels. First, it would have the same effect as an 8 percent income tax cut, increasing middle class purchasing power and hence consumption. Second, as seen in the US-EU comparison, stricter antitrust regulation could also result in increased private investment. Third, lower costs and enhanced innovation would improve the international competitiveness of many US firms.
A fairer domestic playing field could also give the US government more fiscal breathing room. If low- and middle-income families received up to an 8 percent “dividend” from better antitrust enforcement, US fiscal policy could then focus on the areas with the highest impact on long-term growth and on equal opportunity-enhancing programs.
US taxes and government spending currently redistribute around 8 percent of national income from the wealthiest 10 percent of the population to the remaining ninety percent (before taxes, the top 10 percent earners hold 47 percent of national income; after taxes their share falls to 39 percent). With low and middle earners gaining from lower prices, some current expenditure programs could become less necessary, and fiscal room could become available to improve infrastructure, human capital, and innovation, enhancing potential growth. It could also be possible to raise community expenditure to support adjustment and basic living standards in areas and population groups hit by the ill effects of technological change and globalization.
Rather than responding to the Airbus and Boeing subsidies fight by engaging again in a lose-lose game of tariff escalation and protectionism, the US administration could genuinely pursue negotiations with the EU to reduce subsidies on both sides, while also improving the competitive landscape at home. Providing finance and risk-sharing to companies is a legitimate government instrument to support innovation where market financing conditions are inadequate. Subsidies, tax-credits, and other government support tools, however, sometimes cause the cost of the associated distortion of competition to clearly exceed the benefits gained from increased innovation and should only be used under limited, specific circumstances.
The United States and the European Union could seize the Airbus-Boeing case as a good opportunity to agree on rules that limit government support to commercial innovation at both national and state level. Agreed rules could then be used in negotiations with China and other countries that make more pervasive use of state support to industry.
The United States doesn’t need tariffs to level the playing field. Engaging in negotiations to agree on subsidy reductions seems a much more promising avenue. It could also help de-escalate tensions on other trade issues and provide impetus to kickstart the parallel transatlantic negotiations towards the elimination of industrial tariffs. Cooperation, not conflict, can help unlock prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic.
Compliments of The Atlantic Council.  This piece originally appeared on the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist blog
 

“We will do it the European way”
On 16 July 2019 the European Parliament elected Ursula von der Leyen the future President of the European Commission. She is the first woman to be President-elect of the European Commission. 
A European by heart and by conviction, Ursula von der Leyen announced that she will focus on an ambitious climate agenda to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. She also committed to working closely with the European Parliament to strengthen democracy and a fair social market economy in Europe. Ursula von der Leyen also gave a very personal insight into her idea of Europe’s path amid global challenges: “We need to do it the European way”. 
Ursula von der Leyen intends to select a team of Commissioners composed of an equal number of women and men, based on candidates suggested by the Heads of State or Government. To take office, the list of Commissioners-designate has to be agreed by the Council and the European Parliament needs to give its consent to the new European Commission (2019-2024) as a whole. 
Born in Brussels in 1958, Ursula von der Leyen is a doctor and was member of the German government from 2005 to 2019.
Political guidelines for the next Commission (2019-2024) – “A Union that strives for more: My agenda for Europe” Download it HERE
Ursula von der Leyen’s Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session. Download it HERE
Ursula von der Leyen’s declaration of interests. Download it HERE
Compliments of the European Commission

G7 high-level conference – Paris, 16 July 2019 – Bretton Woods: 75 years later – Thinking about the next 75
Welcome address by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure to welcome you to this G7 high-level conference dedicated to the next 75 years of the Bretton Woods system… which is a sign of confidence. 75 years ago, John M. Keynes for Britain, Harry Dexter White for the US, Pierre Mendès-France for France inaugurated what we now see as the “golden age” of multilateralism and cooperation. Quite remarkably, the Bretton Woods Conference preceded peace: economic cooperation was seen as a prerequisite for peace. Today, we are unfortunately far away from this spirit: multilateralism is facing a major crisis. Yet the Bretton Woods institutions (BWI) are remarkably resilient, thanks to the commitment of their successive leaders – many of them are here – and to the strength of their history. They are priceless assets – we are probably all convinced of this. But we also know that the current situation is not stable. So, where do we go from here? The worst-case scenario would be an implosion of the system, implying a real step backward, with a rise of protectionism and bilateralism. A more promising scenario – and this is what we should fight for – would be to come out of this crisis stronger by re-building common solutions. For that, we can boast two major achievements, while acknowledging that each of them poses two challenges that we will discuss today:
Thanks to international cooperation including the IMF, we successfully responded to the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). But, today, we are being challenged on monetary policies, and on the safeguarding of financial stability.
Along with the World Bank and the IMF, we have well supported the prodigious development of globalisation. But today, we are being challenged by the calling into question of free trade, and by aspirations for other “global public goods” – starting with climate change and social inclusion.
A. Two challenges after managing the GFC
I. Monetary policies, ten years after
There is no doubt that monetary policies played a key role in helping to overcome the GFC, thanks to two major differences compared to the 1930s, innovations and cooperation. However, they are now being challenged, on the “upside” – by ever increasing demands – and on the “downside” – by criticism of prolonged low interest rates and non-standard policies.
Today, it seems all the more important to me to restate three principles:
Monetary policies cannot do everything, and cannot perform miracles. They cannot repair the damage caused by protectionist uncertainties; they can neither replace reforms conducive to long-term growth, nor more growth-enhancing fiscal policies.
Monetary policies in the major advanced economies are guided by their sole domestic mandate: price stability and contracyclical demand management. They are not targeting exchange rates. This is the fruitful paradox of recent years: the coexistence of “domestically focused” policies that results in a “globally-cooperative” monetary environment.
 And for this purpose, monetary policy must be conducted in full independence. That is, independently of political powers, of course, and we regret to have to say it again. But also independently of short-term pressures or any particular economic interests. So we take account of market indications, but we must not be market dependent; this includes not relying too exclusively for inflation expectations on market-based measures. We are data dependent and I say this in particular for the ECB: in our coming Governing Council meetings, we will assess actual economic data and we will act accordingly if and when needed.
II. Financial stability issues and crises
On financial stability issues, the Bretton Woods system has undergone numerous disruptions and crises since its inception, including its quasi break-up in 1971. And a decade after the GFC, we still have to define the future of our current international monetary system, or “non-system” as many describe it.
Today we will discuss financial stability risks caused by the growth of cross-border flows and financial assets. Over the past few years, international capital flows have been too abundant in good times, – potentially fueling domestic bubbles and destabilising national financial systems – but also prone to “sudden stops” in bad times. The exponential increase of contagion effects through cross border flows and stocks, but also asset price volatility, has led to an evolution of the IMF’s view on capital flows, from its original doctrine of liberalisation, into a more pragmatic Institutional View.
More importantly we need to enhance the crisis prevention toolkit and avoid excessive risk-taking. Our first line of defense to address financial stability issues should be sound macroeconomic, prudential and structural policies. It is the reason why it is so important to strengthen the bilateral and multilateral surveillance of the IMF.
But, prevention can never cover all risks. The Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) has been reinforced over the past few years, thanks to the increased IMF capacity – whose total resources amount to about 1.3 US$ trillion, and should be at least maintained in the future –, the development of regional financing agreements (RFAs) in Europe and Asia, and networks of central banks swaps. But the GFSN is still imperfect in coverage, and of insufficient size:  total IMF resources have dropped from about 4 % of global external liabilities in 1980 to less than 1% in recent years[i]. Besides, the coordination between the different layers of the GFSN should be more effective in case of a systemic crisis. There is also scope to make better use of precautionary instruments, and to protect sound by-standers without increasing moral hazard, as suggested in particular in the report of the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance.
 
B. Two new challenges after extending globalisation
I. International trade and FDI
Let me now turn to international trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Over time, trade and FDI integration have contributed to productivity growth and prosperity. But important distortions in the international trade system remain, as shown by large global imbalances. These are linked, for example, to the export-led growth model in Asia and managed exchange rate regimes in most emerging countries, as trade issues have become intertwined with other concerns: growing inequality, environmental damage, security, etc. The issues are real, and partly explain the resurgence of protectionism; but protectionism doesn’t solve any of these problems. Bilateralism cannot solve bilateral imbalances and even less global imbalances.
A renewed multilateralism needs to be more effective, in at least three ways. First, on trade, the G20 has agreed – in principle – that action is necessary to improve the functioning of the WTO. Concrete progress is now needed on a package of reforms, in particular regarding the dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO needs to strengthen and broaden the Most-favoured-nation principle, and it should continue to strongly support trade liberalisation, including in the servicessector where it is lagging. Secondly, we need to better understand and address global imbalances. At 40 percent of world GDP, global external imbalances – measured by the sum of the absolute values of net creditor and net debtor international investment positions – are now at a historical peak and four times larger than in the early 1990s. And finally, we must take account of new public goods in international agreements.
 
II. Global public goods and development
Global public goods – notably climate and social inclusiveness – are a matter of concern for all: politically they create rising expectations, and economically they generate externalities. Deficient provision of these goods can have huge disruptive effects on economic, financial, and social systems, with large welfare costs, still more in developing countries. The simple truth is that we have underestimated these expectations, for too long. The so called “Washington consensus” was economically sound, but socially too weak. Nothing sustainable is achieved without a strong economy, so let’s stick to that mandate. But globalisation has often been viewed as having mainly benefited large corporates – and their tax avoidance – as the prosperous, globally mobile class – and the rapid growth of their income. Inequalities between countries – in particular between the North and the South – have fortunately decreased, those within countries have increased. And younger generations are demanding that we ensure the protection of the planet.
A lot has been achieved in recent years. For instance, the BWI have contributed to the significant reduction of poverty at the global level: since 1990, the number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide has dropped by 1.1 billion. But much remains to be done. In this respect, the BWI can play a key role by focusing on their core competencies, – namely surveillance, technical assistance and lending –, and by developing new tools for the analysis of macro-critical issues such as climate change, digitalisation, and inequalities. We should aim at a better coordination between the BWI and other international organisations including UN bodies (UN Development Programme, UN Climate Change Conference, UN Conference on Trade and Development…). Given the insufficient achievement of economic development in Africa and part of South Asia, there is a need to review the functioning of development aid. We could say the same concerning climate change, stronger coordination between UN bodies and the BWI could be achieved, with the latter providing the macro-financial framework needed to assess risks and policies, following the example of the NGFS.
**
Let me conclude with the prophetic words of President Roosevelt, during his inaugural address of the Bretton Woods Conference back in 1944: “Economic diseases are highly communicable [and] the economic health of every country is a proper matter of concern to all its neighbors, near and distant; [for that reason] the things that we need to do, must be done – can only be done – in concert”. Most of us could not agree more: the world today needs a new harmony instead of the dissonance of this unruly cacophony. This should be a guiding principle for the next 75 years. With that in mind, I very much look forward to the outcome of your discussions today. Thank you for your attention.
 

References
[i] European Central Bank (2018), A quantitative analysis of the size of IMF resources, IRC task force on IMF issues.
Compliments of the Banque de France

With 383 votes in favour, the European Parliament elected Ursula von der Leyen President of the next European Commission in a secret ballot on 16 July.

She is set to take office on 1 November 2019 for a five-year term. There were 733 votes cast, one of which was not valid. 383 members voted in favour, 327 against, and 22 abstained.
Parliament currently comprises 747 MEPs as per the official notifications received by member state authorities, so the threshold needed to be elected was 374 votes, i.e. more than 50% of its component members. President Sassoli formally announced the requisite number before the results were revealed in plenary. The vote was held by secret paper ballot.
EP President David Sassoli said:
“On behalf of Parliament, I congratulate you on your election as President of the European Commission.
Now begins a very important phase for the European institutions; we will have to prepare for the hearings of the Commissioners-designate, which, as you know, will be very thorough on the part of the members of this Parliament.
We expect that the issues you spoke about today in front of the plenary chamber will also be examined in depth and followed up by the members of your college during the hearings in the competent Parliament committees.
The next few years will be very important for the future of the European Union and we can only tackle them successfully if there is close and full cooperation between the institutions.”
Next steps
The Commission President-elect will now send official letters to the member states’ heads of state or government inviting them to propose their candidates for members of the Commission. Hearings of the nominees in Parliament’s competent committees are scheduled to take place from 30 September to 8 October. The full college of Commissioners then needs to be elected by Parliament, most likely in its 21-24 October session. More information here.