Read More
EACC

IMF | Currencies and Crisis: How Dominant Currencies Limit the Impact of Exchange Rate Flexibility

Faced with an unprecedented shock of collapsing global demand and commodity prices, capital outflows, major supply chain disruptions and a generalized drop in global trade, many emerging markets and developing economies’ (EMDEs) currencies have weakened sharply. Will these currency movements support the recovery of these economies?
Building on a new dataset, research laid out in a new IMF Staff Discussion Note indicates that the short-term gains from weaker currencies may be limited. This is especially true for EMDEs where firms price their international sales and finance themselves in a few foreign currencies, notably the US dollar—so-called Dominant Currency Pricing and Dominant Currency Financing.
The prevalence of dominant currencies like the US dollar in firms’ pricing decisions alters how trade flows respond to exchange rates.
Dominant currency pricing
The central assumption underlying the traditional view on exchange rates is that firms set their prices in their home currencies. As a result, domestically-produced goods and services become cheaper for trading partners when the domestic currency weakens, leading to more demand from them and, thus, more exports. Similarly, when a country’s currency depreciates, imports become more expensive in home currency terms, inducing consumers to import less in favor of domestically-produced goods. Thus, if prices are set in the exporter’s currency, a weaker currency can help the domestic economy recover from a negative shock.
However, there is growing evidence that most of global trade is invoiced in a few currencies, most notably the US dollar—a feature dubbed Dominant Currency Pricing or Dominant Currency Paradigm. In fact, the share of US dollar trade invoicing across countries far exceeds their share of trade with the US. This is especially true in EMDEs and, given their growing role in the global economy, increasingly relevant for the international monetary system.
The inception of the euro initially reduced the dominance of the US dollar somewhat, but the latter has remained largely unabated since then. Other reserve currencies play a limited role. Dominant currency pricing is common both in goods and in services trade, although it is less prevalent in the latter—especially in some sectors, like tourism.
Image Courtesy of the IMF.
The prevalence of dominant currencies like the US dollar in firms’ pricing decisions alters how trade flows respond to exchange rates, especially in the short term. When export prices are set in US dollars or euros, a country’s depreciation does not make goods and services cheaper for foreign buyers, at least in the short term, creating little incentive to increase demand. Thus, in EMDEs, where dominant currency pricing is more common, the reaction of export quantities to the exchange rate is more muted and so is the short-term boost of a depreciation to the domestic economy.
Another important implication of the use of the US dollar in trade pricing is that a global strengthening of the US dollar entails short-term contractionary effects on trade. This is because the weakening of other countries’ currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar leads to higher domestic currency prices of their imports, including from countries other than the US, and, thus, a lower demand for them.
Image Courtesy of the IMF.
Dominant currency financing
The prevalence of the US dollar is also a feature of corporate financing in EMDEs. This feature—Dominant Currency Financing—means that exchange rate fluctuations can also have effects through their impact on firms’ balance sheets, a phenomenon widely studied in the literature. A depreciation that increases the value of a firm’s liabilities relative to its revenues weakens its balance sheet and hinders access to new financing, as firms’ capacity to repay deteriorates. However, this effect depends on the currency in which revenues are earned, that is, whether revenues are in foreign currency or in local currency.
Exporting firms that use the US dollar or euros for both pricing and financing, are “naturally hedged” as liabilities and revenues move in tandem when exchange rates fluctuate. This means foreign currency financing is less of a concern when concentrated in exporting firms. Revenues and liabilities of importing firms, however, are typically not matched, and exchange rate fluctuations bring about balance sheet effects that constrain financing and import volumes. Dominant currency financing tends to amplify the effect of a country’s depreciation on its imports.
The prevalent use of the US dollar in corporate financing also means that a generalized strengthening of the US dollar can have globally contractionary effects through importing firms balance sheets.
Image Courtesy of the IMF.
Dominant Currencies and the Great Lockdown
Our analysis on dominant currencies suggests that the weakening of EMDE’s currencies is unlikely to provide a material boost to their economies in the short term as the response of most exports will be muted, besides the physical disruptions to trade from supply and demand disruptions. Meanwhile, key sectors that would normally respond more to exchange rates—like tourism—are likely to be impaired by COVID-related containment measures and consumer behavior changes.
Additionally, the global strengthening of the US dollar—which mainly reflects a flight to safe haven assets—is likely to amplify the short-term fall in global trade and economic activity, as both higher domestic prices of traded goods and services and negative balance sheet effects on importing firms, lead to lower import demand among countries other than the United States.
Exchange rates still have a role to play to contain capital outflow pressures and support the recovery over the medium term, but sustaining the domestic economy in the short term requires a decisive use of other policy levers, such as fiscal and monetary stimuli, including through unconventional tools.
AUTHORS:
Gustavo Adler
Gita Gopinath
Carolina Osorio Buitron
Compliments of the IMF.

EACC

Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on US sanctions

Brussels, 17/07/2020 | Statement by HR/VP
I am deeply concerned at the growing use of sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, by the United States against European companies and interests. We have witnessed this developing trend in the cases of Iran, Cuba, the International Criminal Court and most recently the Nordstream 2 and Turkstream projects.
As a matter of principle the European Union opposes the use of sanctions by third countries on European companies carrying out legitimate business. Moreover, it considers the extraterritorial application of sanctions to be contrary to international law. European policies should be determined here in Europe not by third countries.
Where common foreign and security policy goals are shared, there is great value in the coordination of targeted sanctions with partners. We have seen many positive examples of this and will continue to coordinate where we can. Where policy differences exist, the European Union is always open to dialogue. But this cannot take place against the threat of sanctions.
Compliments of the Delegation of the EU to the US.

EACC

OECD presents international tax update to G20 Finance Ministers

Secretary-General Angel Gurría briefed the G20 Finance Ministers today on ongoing negotiations to address the tax challenges of digitalisation and on recent international tax developments |
Overview
Since I last reported to you in February 2020, the world has undergone a cataclysmic change. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has upended daily life as countries attempt to protect the health of their citizens and mitigate the economic fallout from the ongoing crisis.
In responding to this crisis, the tax agenda is more relevant than ever. First, fiscal measures – in particular tax-related measures – have played and will continue to play a critical role as countries continue to navigate their way through the COVID-19 crisis. Following a request of Saudi Arabia’s G20 Presidency, the OECD outlined measures taken by countries in its report Tax and Fiscal Policy in Response to the Coronavirus Crisis: Strengthening Confidence and Resilience1, presented during the virtual meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, on 15 April 2020. Effective tax policy responses in the recovery phase will provide countries with essential tools to face the upcoming challenges arising from the current crisis. The OECD stands ready to deliver tax policy recommendations by spring 2021.
Second, there remains a pressing issue that has been on the table for more than seven years: reaching a multilateral, consensus-based solution to the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy amongst the 137 members of the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS (the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework). Although practical challenges as a result of the pandemic have inevitably affected the pace of progress, technical work on a solution continues to progress well under both Pillar One (establishing a new nexus and reallocating taxing rights) and Pillar Two (ensuring a minimum level of taxation). Since January, and the adoption of an outline of Pillar One based on an OECD Secretariat proposal for a Unified Approach, 11 building blocks have been developed technically by the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework. Work on Pillar Two has also progressed well, with the aim of delivering blueprints for each Pillar for the October meeting of G20 Finance Ministers. Failure to reach an agreement comes with serious risks of escalating tax and trade tensions, which would further undermine the global economy.
Contrary to what has been reported publicly, all members are committed to the current negotiation even though some are of the view that a pause at the political level is needed. We encourage you all to remain fully engaged and advance the work so that, when the COVID-19 crisis is over and some of the electoral deadlines have passed, a political agreement can be reached. We look forward to delivering a detailed blueprint of Pillar One in October, embedding needed simplification measures to the architecture of the Pillar that was agreed in January 2020. This blueprint could serve as the basis for both a public consultation, so that all stakeholders can input and comment, and a final round of negotiation with a view to agreeing a consensus based solution.
The work to finalise Pillar Two is also well advanced and is increasingly relevant as public tolerance of tax avoidance by companies is expected to reach an historic low in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis. By ensuring that a minimum level of tax will be paid on all profits made by multinational enterprises, Pillar Two offers another powerful tool to address BEPS and also establishes a floor to tax competition. Work is underway to finalise the technical design of Pillar Two, which will be submitted to the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework at its plenary meeting in October 2020.
Reaching a solution to the tax challenges arising from digitalisation will only be achieved with your strong leadership and clear political support. International co-operation is needed more than ever to provide tax certainty to businesses during very uncertain times and to prevent an unnecessary exacerbation of the already daunting economic challenges posed by the pandemic.
Further progress on the tax agenda
Allow me to remind you that progress on international co-operation has been one of the great success stories of the G20. In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, you decided to end bank secrecy once and for all in order to crack down on tax evasion. Now, 12 years later, the results of the fruitful multilateral collaboration between the now 161 members of the OECD-hosted Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum), bank secrecy for tax purposes, and the tax evasion it facilitated, have been seriously reduced.
The numbers speak for themselves. Newly reported figures show that in 2019, information was exchanged on around 84 million financial accounts, with a total balance of around EUR 10 trillion. This represents a significant increase compared to the 2018 figures, amounting to 47 million financial accounts, representing EUR 5 trillion. With this wealth of new information, tax administrations so far have been able to identify for collection EUR 102 billion that was previously hidden money.
Effective multilateral co-operation has also delivered new model rules to require reporting by digital platform operators with respect to sellers in the sharing and gig economy. This new tax compliance tool approved by the 137 member countries and jurisdictions of the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework will greatly enhance transparency in this sector of the digital economy. Activities facilitated by digital platforms may not always be reported to tax administrations, either by third parties or by taxpayers themselves. The model rules are designed to help taxpayers comply with their tax obligations, while also ensuring a level playing field with traditional businesses, in the key sectors (e.g. accommodation and transportation) of the sharing and gig economy. These model rules also help digital platform operators by avoiding the excessive compliance burdens that would result from a multiplicity of uncoordinated unilateral reporting requirements. These new model rules constitute an important element in addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy and demonstrate that multilateral co-operation continues to deliver.
Further proof of what can be accomplished through multilateralism can be seen from the results of the ongoing implementation of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative. As you will recall, following a G20 mandate, international co-operation fundamentally altered the international tax landscape as countries agreed to crack down on base erosion and profit shifting practices by multinational companies. Since 2016, the implementation of the BEPS Project’s measures is producing results, as reflected in this year’s fourth annual progress report of the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework (see Annex 1). As a result of this co-operation, taxation is now better aligned with where value is created, tax transparency has increased, and individuals and businesses have benefitted from improvements to dispute resolution.
It should also be noted that a global crisis requires a global response, and particular attention should be devoted to the specific challenges faced by developing countries. As developing countries often rely to a large extent on corporate tax revenues, they may therefore suffer from BEPS behaviours to a greater degree, thereby restricting their fiscal space in times of economic crisis. Currently, the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework includes 70% of non-OECD, non-G20 member jurisdictions, including 66 developing member jurisdictions. Fortunately, through extensive training and capacity building efforts, developing countries are in a better position than they would have been in the absence of BEPS implementation. In addition, the partners in the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) – the International Monetary Fund (IMF), OECD, United Nations (UN), and World Bank Group (WBG) – continue to strengthen their co-operation in support of developing countries. The PCT continues to deliver on its 2018 Action Plan, and a full update on its activities is available in the Platform for Collaboration on Tax Progress Report 20202. Innovative programmes such as Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB), which has resulted in over USD 530 million of tax revenue being recovered from tax assessments of over USD 1.7 billion to date, has also helped shore up the national budgets of developing countries.
Access the full report here: OECD SECRETARY-GENERAL TAX REPORT TO G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS
Compliments of the OECD.

EACC

EACCNY #COVID19 Impact Stories from Our Members – CitizenM Hotel

Together with our members we are creating a Video series of first-hand accounts of the Pandemic’s impact, both personally & professionally.

We invite you to join us today for a first-hand look at the impact of the global shutdown following the Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak – Today we are featuring Michael Levie, Chief Operations Officer, CitizenM Hotel a Member of the EACCNY.
The questions we asked our members for this series are:1) What are some challenges you, personally and your organization have faced?2) What are some of the most surprising (positive, innovative) responses/changes you have witnessed?3) How will this experience change us going forward, as a society and in terms of how we do business?

EACCNY has its finger on the pulse of how this worldwide pandemic is effecting companies and organizations on both sides of the Atlantic. EACC is where Americans & Europeans connect to do business.
Stay tuned for more on this series! We hope you enjoy these short vignettes our members and friends of the EACC created to share their experience.

EACC

EU Council updates the list of countries for which member states should gradually lift travel restrictions at the external borders

Following the first review under the recommendation on the gradual lifting of the temporary restrictions on non-essential travel into the EU, the Council updated the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted. This list will continue to be reviewed and, as the case may be, updated every two weeks.
Based on the criteria and conditions set out in the recommendation, as from 16 July member states should gradually lift the travel restrictions at the external borders for residents of the following third countries:
Algeria
Australia
Canada
Georgia
Japan
Morocco
New Zealand
Rwanda
South Korea
Thailand
Tunisia
Uruguay
China, subject to confirmation of reciprocity
Residents of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican should be considered as EU residents for the purpose of this recommendation.
The criteria to determine the third countries for which the current travel restriction should be lifted cover in particular the epidemiological situation and containment measures, including physical distancing, as well as economic and social considerations. They are applied cumulatively.
Regarding the epidemiological situation, third countries listed should meet the following criteria, in particular:
number of new COVID-19 cases over the last 14 days and per 100 000 inhabitants close to or below the EU average (as it stood on 15 June 2020)
stable or decreasing trend of new cases over this period in comparison to the previous 14 days
overall response to COVID-19 taking into account available information, including on aspects such as testing, surveillance, contact tracing, containment, treatment and reporting, as well as the reliability of the information and, if needed, the total average score for International Health Regulations (IHR). Information provided by EU delegations on these aspects should also be taken into account.
Reciprocity should also be taken into account regularly and on a case-by-case basis.
For countries where travel restrictions continue to apply, the following categories of people should be exempted from the restrictions:
EU citizens and their family members
long-term EU residents and their family members
travellers with an essential function or need, as listed in the recommendation.
Schengen associated countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland) also take part in this recommendation.
Next steps
The Council recommendation is not a legally binding instrument. The authorities of the member states remain responsible for implementing the content of the recommendation. They may, in full transparency, lift only progressively travel restrictions towards countries listed.
A member state should not decide to lift the travel restrictions for non-listed third countries before this has been decided in a coordinated manner.
This list of third countries should continue to be reviewed every two weeks and may be further updated by the Council, as the case may be, after close consultations with the Commission and the relevant EU agencies and services following an overall assessment based on the criteria above.
Travel restrictions may be totally or partially lifted or reintroduced for a specific third country already listed according to changes in some of the conditions and, as a consequence, in the assessment of the epidemiological situation. If the situation in a listed third country worsens quickly, rapid decision-making should be applied.
Background
On 16 March 2020, the Commission adopted a communication recommending a temporary restriction of all non-essential travel from third countries into the EU for one month. EU heads of state or government agreed to implement this restriction on 17 March. The travel restriction was extended for a further month respectively on 8 April 2020 and 8 May 2020.
On 11 June the Commission adopted a communication recommending the further extension of the restriction until 30 June 2020 and setting out an approach for a gradual lifting of the restriction on non-essential travel into the EU as of 1 July 2020.
On 30 June the Council adopted a recommendation on the gradual lifting of the temporary restrictions on non-essential travel into the EU, including an initial list of countries for which member states should start lifting the travel restrictions at the external borders.
Council recommendation amending the recommendation on the gradual lifting of the temporary restrictions on non-essential travel into the EU (16 July 2020)
Council recommendation on the gradual lifting of the temporary restrictions on non-essential travel into the EU (30 June 2020)
Compliments of the European Council.

EACC

ECB Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting (July 16, 2020) the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

The interest rate on the main refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%, 0.25% and -0.50% respectively. The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at their present or lower levels until it has seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2% within its projection horizon, and such convergence has been consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics.
The Governing Council will continue its purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) with a total envelope of €1,350 billion. These purchases contribute to easing the overall monetary policy stance, thereby helping to offset the pandemic-related downward shift in the projected path of inflation. The purchases will continue to be conducted in a flexible manner over time, across asset classes and among jurisdictions. This allows the Governing Council to effectively stave off risks to the smooth transmission of monetary policy. The Governing Council will conduct net asset purchases under the PEPP until at least the end of June 2021 and, in any case, until it judges that the coronavirus crisis phase is over. The Governing Council will reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the PEPP until at least the end of 2022. In any case, the future roll-off of the PEPP portfolio will be managed to avoid interference with the appropriate monetary policy stance.
Net purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) will continue at a monthly pace of €20 billion, together with the purchases under the additional €120 billion temporary envelope until the end of the year. The Governing Council continues to expect monthly net asset purchases under the APP to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of its policy rates, and to end shortly before it starts raising the key ECB interest rates. The Governing Council intends to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time past the date when it starts raising the key ECB interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation.
The Governing Council will also continue to provide ample liquidity through its refinancing operations. In particular, the latest operation in the third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III) has registered a very high take-up of funds, supporting bank lending to firms and households.

The Governing Council continues to stand ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation moves towards its aim in a sustained manner, in line with its commitment to symmetry.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 14:30 CET today.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.

EACC

ESMA responds to European Commission consultation on renewed sustainable finance strategy

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU’s securities markets regulator, has submitted a response to the European Commission’s (EC) consultation on the renewed sustainable finance strategy. The response covers a broad range of topics from strengthening the foundations for sustainable finance, increasing opportunities for citizens, financial institutions and corporates to have a positive impact on sustainability, to managing and reducing risks relating to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors.

In ESMA’s view, the future strategy on sustainable finance should aim to set up a robust and proportionate European regulatory framework that adequately supports the shift towards a more sustainable financial system. ESMA believes that facilitating access to sustainability data would constitute an essential contribution to putting sustainability at the forefront of the financial sector.
Steven Maijoor, Chair, said:
“In setting the strategic direction to mainstream sustainable finance in the EU, ESMA sees three key areas for intervention: improving the accessibility and standardisation of sustainability data, ensuring effective regulation and supervision at EU level in emerging areas, such as green bonds and ESG ratings, and maintaining strong international coordination and cooperation.
ESMA will actively contribute to ensuring investor protection and stability of financial markets in the shift towards a more sustainable financial system.”
In its response to the consultation, ESMA focused on the following aspects:
ESG disclosures – currently there is a lack of a standardised disclosure regime for issuers relating to sustainability reporting. ESMA has brought this point to the EC’s attention in response to the NFRD consultation in June 2020, and notified its readiness to assist the EC regarding standard setting in this area;
ESG ratings – the lack of a legally binding definition and comparability among providers and no legal requirements to ensure transparency of underlying methodologies;
ESG benchmarks – the growing need in Europe for methodologically robust and reliable ESG benchmarks which encompass the entire ESG spectrum, including social and governance aspects;
EU green bonds – the establishment of supervision of third-party verifiers of green bond standards at the European level; and
Ecolabels for retail sustainable financial products – the effects of eco-labelling of products and whether broadening the scope of ecolabels to a wider range of financial products is necessary.
The Chairs of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESMA, the European Banking Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) have submitted a joint letter to the EC highlighting common main messages which are of particular importance for Europe’s strategy in the area of sustainable finance.
Compliments of the European Securities and Markets Authority.

EACC

Boosting the EU’s Green Recovery: EU invests over €2 billion in 140 key transport projects to jump-start the economy

The EU is supporting the economic recovery in all Member States by injecting almost €2.2 billion into 140 key transport projects. These projects will help build missing transport links across the continent, support sustainable transport and create jobs. The projects will receive funding through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the EU’s grant scheme supporting transport infrastructure.
With this budget, the EU will deliver on its climate objectives set out in the European Green Deal. A very strong emphasis is on projects reinforcing railways, including cross-border links and connections to ports and airports. Inland waterway transport is boosted through more capacity and better multimodal connections to the road and rail networks. In the maritime sector, priority is given to short-sea-shipping projects based on alternative fuels and the installation of on-shore power supply for ports to cut emissions from docked ships.
Commissioner for Transport Adina Vălean said: “The €2.2 billion EU contribution to this crucial transport infrastructure will help kick-start the recovery, and we expect it to generate €5 billion in investments. The type of projects we invest in ranges from inland waterways transport to multimodal connections, alternative fuels to massive railroad infrastructure. The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) is one of our key instruments in creating a crisis-proof and resilient transport system – vital now and in the long run.”
The EU will support rail infrastructure projects located on the trans-European transport (TEN-T) core network with a total of €1.6 billion (55 projects). This includes the Rail Baltica project, which integrates the Baltic States in the European rail network, as well as the cross-border section of the railway line between Dresden (Germany) and Prague (Czechia).
It will also support the shift to greener fuels for transport (19 projects) with almost €142 million. A number of projects involve converting vessels so they may run on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), as well as installing corresponding infrastructure in ports.
Road transport will also see the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure, namely through the installation of 17,275 charging points on the road network and the deployment of 355 new buses.
Nine projects will contribute to an interoperable railway system in the EU and the seamless operation of trains across the continent through the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), Upgrading locomotives and railway track to the unified European train control system will boost safety, decrease travel times and optimise track usage. The nine projects will receive over €49.8 million.
Background
The projects were selected for funding via two competitive calls for proposals launched in October 2019 (regular CEF Transport call) and November 2019 (CEF Transport Blending Facility call). The EU’s financial contribution comes in the form of grants, with different co-financing rates depending on the project type. For 10 projects selected under the Blending Facility, EU support is to be combined with additional financing from banks (via a loan, debt, equity or any other repayable form of support).
Overall, under the CEF programme, €23.2 billion is available for grants from the EU’s 2014-2020 budget to co-fund Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects in the EU Member States. Since 2014, the first CEF programming year, six calls for project proposals have been launched (one per year). In total, CEF has so far supported 794 projects in the transport sector, worth a total of €21.1 billion.
Next steps
For both calls, given EU Member States’ approval of the selected projects, the Commission will adopt formal financing decisions in the coming days. The Commission’s Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) will sign the grant agreements with the project beneficiaries at the latest by January 2021.
More information
Connecting Europe Facility 2014-2019 (country overview)
CEF Call 2019 – More information on the selected projects (Brochure – 169 pages)
Maps of EU railway projects
List of selected projects / List of selected projects (Blending Facility)
All selected projects in one list
Q&A: How are projects selected?
European Year of Rail 2021
Transport Infrastructure & Investment
INEA – Innovation and Networks Executive Agency
Compliments of the European Commission.

Read More
EACC

The Next Phase of the Crisis: Further Action Needed for a Resilient Recovery By Kristalina Georgieva

When the Group of Twenty industrialized and emerging market economies (G-20) finance ministers and central bank governors last met in April, the world was in the midst of the Great Lockdown forced by the outbreak of COVID-19. As they meet virtually this week, many countries are gradually reopening, even as the pandemic remains with us. Clearly, we have entered a new phase of the crisis—one that will require further policy agility and action to secure a durable and shared recovery.
I believe that despite the pain and suffering that the pandemic has caused, we can aspire to transform our world.
Last month, the IMF reported a worsened economic outlook and projected global growth to contract by 4.9 percent this year. Some better news is that global economic activity, which posted an unprecedented decline earlier this year, has started to gradually strengthen. A partial recovery is expected to continue in 2021. The exceptional action taken by many countries, including the G-20—through fiscal measures of about US$11 trillion and massive central bank liquidity injections—put a floor under the global economy. This extraordinary effort should not be underestimated.
But we are not out of the woods yet. A second major global wave of the disease could lead to further disruptions in economic activity. Other risks include stretched asset valuations, volatile commodity prices, rising protectionism, and political instability.
On the positive side, medical breakthroughs on vaccines and treatments could lift confidence and economic activity. These alternative scenarios highlight that uncertainty remains exceptionally high.

Many countries will be deeply affected by the economic scars of this crisis. Severe labor market dislocations are a major concern. In some countries, more jobs were lost in March and April than were created since the end of the global financial crisis. School closings also impacted people’s—in particular women’s—ability to participate in the labor market. Though fortunately some jobs have since been regained, the employed share of the working-age population stands much lower than in early 2020. Moreover, the full extent of the impact on the labor market is likely much higher as many employed people are facing reduced hours.

Bankruptcies also are becoming more common as firms exhaust their cash buffers.
And human capital is at risk: the education of over a billion learners across 162 countries has been disrupted, for example.
The bottom line is that the pandemic is likely to increase poverty and inequality, further painfully exposing weaknesses in health systems, the precariousness of work, and the challenging prospects for the young of accessing opportunities they desperately need.
For a more inclusive and resilient recovery, we need further action in two key spheres: (1) domestic policies and (2) collective efforts.
1. Domestic Policies: Sustaining Targeted Lifelines
Countries are at different stages of the pandemic, so their responses will differ as well. As the IMF has emphasized, emerging market and developing countries will be the hardest hit by this crisis—they face bigger challenges and steeper trade-offs than the advanced economies—and they will need more support for longer. That said, there are several domestic policy imperatives that apply broadly.
Protect People and Workers. Across the world, countries have ramped up economic lifelines to individuals and workers. These safety nets must be maintained as needed and, in some cases, expanded: from paid sick leave for low-income families, to access to health care and unemployment insurance, to broader cash and in-kind transfers for those in the informal sector—with digital mechanisms often best for delivery. Encouragingly, countries with higher inequality have devoted larger shares of support to households, including vulnerable groups.
At the same time, many jobs lost will never come back with the crisis triggering long-lasting changes in spending patterns. So workers must continue to be supported, including through reskilling, to help them move away from shrinking sectors and toward expanding ones.
Support Firms. People and workers are also supported when lifelines are extended to viable businesses. Across the G-20, more firms have been supported through relief from taxes or social security contributions, grants, and interest rate subsidies. A significant portion was directed to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)—especially important since SMEs are a major engine of employment. Without such support, staff analysis suggests that SME bankruptcies could triple from an average of 4 percent before the pandemic to 12 percent in 2020, threatening to add to unemployment and harm bank balance sheets.
Increasing bankruptcies will leave governments with difficult choices on whether and how to support firms. Sound analysis of liquidity and solvency prospects of firms can help guide these choices. Liquidity provision might be enough for industries where revenue losses are temporary, for example, while equity injections may be needed for some insolvent firms that are essential for fighting the pandemic or on which many lives and livelihoods depend.
The fiscal costs of this support are substantial and rising debt levels are a serious concern. At this stage in the crisis, however, the costs of premature withdrawal are greater than continued support where it is needed. Of course, measures must be targeted and budgets assessed with an eye to cost-effectiveness—and to medium-term debt sustainability.
Preserve Financial Stability. Job losses, bankruptcies, and industry restructuring could pose significant challenges for the financial sector—including credit losses to financial institutions and investors. Regulation and supervision should support the flexible use of existing capital and liquidity buffers in line with international standards—which in turn would facilitate the continued provision of credit to viable businesses. Monetary policy should remain accommodative where output gaps are significant and inflation is below target, as is the case in many countries during this crisis.
An important domestic priority for policymakers is to ensure that money markets, foreign exchange markets, and securities markets can function effectively. Coordination across central banks and appropriate support from international financial institutions will also continue to be essential in that regard.
2. Collective Efforts: Capturing Opportunities for a Better Future
Indeed, international cooperation is vital to minimize the duration of the crisis and ensure a resilient recovery. Areas where collective action is key include:
Guaranteeing adequate health supplies: through cooperation on the production, purchase, and fair distribution of effective therapeutics and vaccines, including across borders.
Avoiding further ruptures in the global trade system: countries should do their best to keep global supply chains open, accelerate efforts to reform the World Trade Organization, and seek a comprehensive agreement on digital taxation.
Ensuring that developing countries can finance critical spending needs and meet debt sustainability challenges: continued progress on the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative is especially important.
Strengthening the global financial safety net: including consideration of further extensions to swap lines and enhanced use of the IMF’s special drawing rights (SDRs).
The IMF, for its part, has responded to this crisis in an unprecedented way—including emergency financing for 72 countries in three months. With the support of our 189 member nations, we aim to do even more in this next critical phase.
We can take inspiration from the great Lebanese poet, Khalil Gibran, who once said: “To understand the heart and mind of a person, look not at what he has already achieved, but at what he aspires to.”
I believe that despite the pain and suffering that the pandemic has caused, we can aspire to transform our world. We have a once-in-a-century shot at building forward better: a world that is fairer and more equitable; greener and more sustainable; smarter and, above all, more resilient.
To seize this opportunity and achieve greater resilience, action is needed to: (1) invest in people—in education, health, social protection, and in preventing the sharp increase in inequality this crisis could produce; (2) support low-carbon and climate-resilient growth, including through smart allocation of public spending; and (3) take advantage of the digital transformation, whether through greater use of e-government platforms to enhance efficiency and transparency while cutting red tape, e-learning, or remote work.
G-20 policymakers—and all of us working together—must seize the opportunity to make this future a reality.
AUTHOR:
Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the IMF
Compliments of the IMF.

EACC

The EU Court of Justice invalidates Decision 2016/1250 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Data Protection Shield

However, it considers that Commission Decision 2010/87 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries is valid.
Read the full press release here: The Court of Justice invalidates Decision 2016/1250 on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Data Protection Shield
Compliments of the European Commission.