Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Petri Sajari on 24 November 2020 |
What are the key risks for the euro area recovery at the moment?
The fourth quarter of 2020 will be marked by the measures taken by euro area governments to deal with the new wave of coronavirus (COVID-19) infections that started after the summer. While these containment measures are generally not on the same scale as those taken in March or April, they will have an impact on the economy. We had a welcome surprise in the third quarter, but our quarter-on-quarter growth projection for the fourth, which was slightly above 3%, will not be met. Looking at leading indicators such as the purchasing managers’ index, negative quarter-on-quarter growth is now the most realistic scenario for the end of the year.
The main issue in the near future will be the availability of the vaccine and the precise details of how and when it is to be rolled out. The news is having a positive impact on market sentiment, but the implementation of the vaccine warrants our attention. Hopefully, a very high percentage of the population will soon be vaccinated and the nightmare of this pandemic will begin to draw to a close.
According to the International Monetary Fund, the pandemic will have the largest impact on the eurozone economy. What do you think the long-term damage of this crisis will be?
There are indeed factors that cause concern. The first long-term consequence of the pandemic is that public debt-to-GDP ratios will increase by between 15 and 20 percentage points. Similarly, leverage in the private, mainly corporate, sector will also increase. And there is a risk, which we need to avoid, of long-term scars in the labour market. Currently we see a decoupling between the drop in economic activity and the evolution of the labour market, i.e. unemployment levels have not risen by as much as you would expect with such a deep decline in activity. This is because the temporary work schemes implemented by governments across Europe are avoiding a sharp increase in unemployment.
We believe the economy will start to recover in 2021 and continue its revival in 2022. It will be essential that those who are currently on furlough schemes continue to belong to the labour force, and that those who have lost their jobs can rejoin the labour market. We can then not only recover the level of economic activity we had before the pandemic, but also the level of employment.
If the crisis gets worse, which now seems inevitable, what more will the ECB be able to do?
As I’ve mentioned, the fourth quarter will be worse than forecast, but the medium-term outlook – mainly because of the ray of hope brought by news of the vaccine – looks brighter. However, when we assess our instruments we do not only look at economic output. We also look at the evolution of inflation, which is our primary mandate. Inflation will be negative until the end of the year and we expect that it will turn positive next year because some drivers of this negative inflation will be reverted, for instance the reductions in value added tax or the sharp decline in oil prices caused by the lack of economic activity. All in all, we expect inflation to be close to 1% in 2021 and to see it moving up towards 1.2% or 1.3% in 2022.
As President Lagarde indicated after the last Governing Council meeting, we will recalibrate our instruments in December and this recalibration mainly involves our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO), which is an instrument to inject liquidity into the banking sector, and the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), which right now comprises an envelope of €1.35 trillion to be implemented until mid-2021.These are the two main tools if the situation gets darker, although the arrival of the vaccines brings hope regarding the medium-term outlook.
Is there a risk that low interest rates, combined with the asset purchase program and the PEPP, are creating zombie companies that would not have survived under normal financial conditions and are therefore an obstacle to creative destruction?
The interest rate environment is not only a consequence of monetary policy decisions. It is also the consequence of a combination of other factors, such as globalisation, digitalisation and demographics. These have made the natural interest rate, which is a real variable rather than a monetary variable, decline over time. This, combined with very low inflation expectations, has created a situation where nominal interest rates, which are the ones we observe in the markets, are very low. But this is not only a result of monetary policy – it also reflects a decline in the natural interest rate.
Furthermore, low rates have been very useful in sustaining economic activity. Without them, the process would most likely not just have been one of creative destruction but one of simple destruction of companies and a decline in GDP.
Some might also say that the high debt levels in the economy will lead to zombie banks and zombie companies that constrain growth because of extraordinary debt burdens. What is your assessment of this?
As I mentioned earlier, there will be a legacy of debt after this crisis, in both the public and the private sector, and we will have to take this into consideration. But there is no alternative in the short term. The first line of defence against the consequences of the pandemic has been, and had to be, fiscal policy. The alternative – doing nothing – would have had much worse consequences in the short term and also in the medium and long term.
Regarding private debt, when you experience a decline in revenues as substantial as that experienced by many European companies, you need to try to bridge the gap and survive until the pandemic is over. And to do that you need to take on debt. There’s no alternative. Once the pandemic is over, issues such as fiscal sustainability and private lending will come to the fore, but in the short term there is no alternative.
Let’s move to the banking system. What are the main vulnerabilities in the eurozone banking system?
European banks have more capital and are more liquid and resilient than before the global financial crisis. But their weak point is very low profitability, which is reflected in very low valuations. This is not trivial, as it has an impact on their capacity to raise capital in the markets or generate it organically. It also makes it challenging to achieve an adequate level of provisioning that is in line with developments in the economy. Profitability was already the key weak point before the pandemic, and the crisis has aggravated it. Banks will also suffer a decline in revenues and the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) will go up. We expect the bulk of the NPL wave to come in the first half of next year.
Do you believe there will be consolidation via mergers and acquisitions in the eurozone banking sector?
We have started to see some consolidation, for instance in Italy and Spain. So far it’s domestic consolidation. It would be good if we also saw some cross-border consolidation. Consolidation is not a target in itself, but it could be a way to reduce excess capacity and costs.
The ECB started its asset purchase programme in early 2015 and abandoned it in late 2018. In autumn 2019, it was started again, but inflation remains very low. What are the key factors behind this extraordinarily low inflation?
Both headline and core inflation have been low over the last ten years and, as I mentioned, there are some structural factors, such as digitalisation, globalisation and demographics, that help explain why. In 2015 and 2016, there was a clear risk of deflation and the ECB acted to avoid it and to anchor inflation expectations. It remains to be seen what will happen with some of these factors. For instance, globalisation will likely not be as intense as it has been in recent decades, as the pandemic could make value chains more regional, which might have an impact on inflation. However, according to our projections inflation will remain low, and we will therefore keep monetary policy accommodative so that inflation can converge to our medium term aim.
In July 2020 the European Union introduced a recovery plan worth €750 billion. What is your take on that? Is there a risk that States may use it in a manner that does not promote structural changes?
The Next Generation EU fund is a very positive response, not only because of its size but also because it sends a very clear signal of the common willingness to defend Europe and the euro area. And regarding the funds, indeed, it’s not about spending but about spending properly, through programmes that can transform the European economy and accompany the structural reforms needed to improve productivity and enhance competitiveness. The European Commission will monitor this spending. If this money is not spent properly, we will be missing a great opportunity to make the European economy greener, more digital and more competitive.
Since introducing the PEPP in March, the ECB has definitely been able to calm the markets, but many people might still wonder how the programme has supported the real economy and households. What is your answer?
Calming the situation in the sovereign debt markets also brought reassurance to other markets, which has had a positive impact on the financing conditions that banks offer to their clients, households and companies. By avoiding fragmentation in the sovereign debt markets, we also avoided a credit crunch. Furthermore, PEPP also includes corporate sector purchases such as bonds or commercial paper.
Do you believe the attitude towards public debt has changed for good? Or is this change temporary, based on the fact that extraordinary times require extraordinary actions to support the economy?
Fiscal policy has to be the first line of defence, and fiscal deficits will be the consequence of the measures that governments have taken and will continue to take to address the impact of the pandemic. Public expenditure has to focus on the pandemic, for instance on furlough or public guarantee schemes, healthcare, etc. As a result, we will see larger public debt ratios. But in the medium term, once the pandemic is over, the situation will need to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of public finances.
So, basically, your answer is that you don’t believe that there has been a major shift in attitude towards public debt?
The big change is that the pandemic has caused a public health crisis which demanded a fiscal response. There was no alternative and, in the medium term, we will see higher public debt ratios. We will have to deal with that once the pandemic is over.
The response to this crisis has been quite different from what it was ten years ago, when the eurozone crisis began, because then the constant narrative was that we cannot allow public debt to increase.
This time is different. This crisis hasn’t been triggered by banks or financial stability troubles, as was the case in 2008. This is an exogenous shock of a magnitude we have not seen since the end of the Second World War. The policy response was the only one available: fiscal measures as the first line of defence, accompanied by monetary policy. Not acting rapidly on the fiscal side would have provoked an even deeper decline in GDP, and fiscal policy would also have had to react to that.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | Interview with Helsingin Sanomat: On the recovery and causes of concern first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Article by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, in L’ENA hors les murs magazine | Paris, 30 November 2020 |
Important lessons can be drawn from the past to understand the factors influencing the journey towards the future of money, including the possible introduction of a digital euro. Ensuring the euro meets the needs of European citizens is at the core of the ECB’s mandate.
Throughout history, the nature of money has evolved in response to socioeconomic changes. But the functions of money – as a means of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value – have remained the same for centuries.
One reason why money first emerged was to overcome the limitations and inefficiencies of bartering. As economies became more specialised, trade became all the more essential, and a universal medium of exchange was needed to facilitate it. Coins made from (precious) metals fulfilled that purpose for centuries.
But with the development of international trade, coins became increasingly impractical because they are difficult to store and transport in large volumes.
This led to the next phase in the evolution of money through medieval times into the late middle ages and early modern times. Developments included the advent of Templar’s credit notes in France, private giro banking in Italy, bills of exchange and promissory notes, and the first predecessors of paper money.
Role of the public sector
All of these instruments foresaw convertibility into precious metal coins. The acceptance of these forms of dematerialised and easy-to-carry money depended on the reputation of the issuer, and credit risk became relevant.
This led to the public sector playing an increasingly important role in issuing money and ensuring its value remained stable. Examples include the emergence of early public giro banks at the beginning of the 15th century and the first attempts to issue modern banknotes in the second half of the 17th century.[1]
In today’s modern economies, including in the euro area, money is no longer convertible into, or backed by, any commodity. Fiat money, as it is known, serves as legal tender by decree of the government or even constitutional legislation (such as the EU Treaty[2]). The value of money is based on citizens’ trust in it being generally accepted for all forms of economic exchange and in the ability of central banks to maintain its purchasing power through monetary policy. Central banks’ institutional independence also bolsters their ability to maintain trust in money.
Since early modern times central banks have gradually been assuming an increasingly pivotal role in ensuring that money delivers on the three functions I outlined. They must be fully aware of and adapt to changing realities.
Technological progress
As we enter the digital age, the nature of money, but also of goods and services, is changing quickly. Digitalisation and technological advances are transforming all areas of society, accelerating the process of dematerialisation.
Non-cash payments continue to increase. In the euro area, over the last year the total number increased by 8.1% to 98 billion. Nearly half of these transactions were made by card, followed by credit transfers and direct debits.[3]
The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has accelerated this trend towards digitalisation, with a surge in online payments and a shift towards contactless payments in shops.[4] Market participants expect payments to be the financial service that will be most affected by technological innovation and competition over the next five years, according to a survey conducted in 2019.[5]
To meet the demand for digital means of payment, new forms of private money (i.e. a liability of private entities) have emerged. They are available as commercial bank deposits which can be used for transfers and direct debits, and as electronic money through credit cards and mobile payment apps.
In the euro area, the Eurosystem’s supervision mechanisms ensure commercial banks and payment service providers are effective and safe. This enables people to continue to have confidence in private money, which remains an integral part of our financial system.
But central bank money in digital form is still not available for retail payments.
Digital euro
The ECB wants to ensure the euro remains fit for the digital era. Early this year, the Governing Council decided to explore the possibility of issuing of a digital euro – digital central bank money for retail payments, in other words.
The Eurosystem is assessing the implications of the potential introduction of a digital euro, which in legal terms would be a liability of the central bank. In October the ECB published the Report on a digital euro[6] and launched a public consultation[7].
But why issue a digital euro, if other forms of (private) digital money are already available?
Central bank money is unique. It provides people with unrestricted access to a simple, essentially risk-free and trusted means of payment they can use for any basic transaction. But for retail use it is currently only offered physically in the form of cash.
A digital euro would complement cash and ensure that consumers continue to have unrestricted access to central bank money in a form that meets their evolving digital payment needs.
It could be important in a range of future scenarios, from a decline in the use of cash to pre-empting the uptake of foreign digital currencies in the euro area. Issuing a digital euro might become necessary to ensure both continued access to central bank money and monetary sovereignty.
A properly designed digital euro would create synergies with the payments industry and enable the private sector to build new businesses based on digital euro-related services.
A digital euro would also be an emblem of the ongoing process of European integration and ultimately help to unify Europe’s digital economies.
Crypto-assets pose risks
But what about bitcoin or other crypto-assets that have been trying to gain a foothold in the digital payments space and to anchor trust in their technology?
Innovations like distributed ledger technology (DLT), in particular blockchain (which is at the core of crypto-assets such as bitcoin), bring both new opportunities and new risks.
Transactions between peers occur directly, with no need for a trusted third-party intermediary. The trust that is usually inherent in a transaction is replaced by cryptographic proofs and the security and integrity of records is ensured by DLT, which avoids the “double-spending” problem. Nevertheless, trust is not entirely dispensable.
The main risk lies in relying purely on technology and the flawed concept of there being no identifiable issuer or claim. This also means that users cannot rely on crypto-assets maintaining a stable value: they are highly volatile, illiquid and speculative, and so do not fulfil all the functions of money.[8]
Recently, we have seen the emergence of stablecoins, which try to solve crypto-assets’ problem of a lack of stability and trust by pegging their assets to stable and trusted fiat money issued by States.[9] And the issuers of “global” stablecoins, which target a global footprint, further aim to introduce their own payment schemes and clearing and settlement arrangements.[10]
Although stablecoins could drive additional innovation in payments and be well integrated into social media, trade and other platforms, they pose serious risks.
If widely adopted, they could threaten financial stability and monetary sovereignty. For instance, if the issuer cannot guarantee a fixed value or if they are perceived as being incapable of absorbing losses, a run could occur. Additionally, using stablecoins as a store of value could trigger a large shift of bank deposits to stablecoins, which may have an impact on banks’ operations and the transmission of monetary policy.[11]
Stablecoins, particularly those backed by global technology firms (the “big techs”), could also present risks to competitiveness and technological autonomy in Europe, as they would attempt to leverage their competitive advantage and control of large platforms. Their dominant positions may harm competition and consumer choice, and raise concerns over data privacy and the misuse of personal information.[12]
“Money is memory”
In general, end users prioritise ease of use and smooth integration with other apps or services, and therefore welcome new solutions in exchange for providing their personal data. Public authorities are open to innovation and are prepared to act as catalysts for change, while implementing appropriate policy measures to ensure this innovation helps consumers rather than hindering them.
Payment providers and their payment solutions must be subject to appropriate regulation and oversight – in accordance with the principle of “same business, same risks, same rules” – to protect users and safeguard the stability of the economy against new risks that even go beyond financial ones.
Some say that “money is memory”[13], and it seems that this memory is becoming increasingly digital. But consumers’ digital data and records must not be misused. The abuse of personal information for commercial or other purposes could endanger privacy and harm competition. These and other potential risks are being assessed by the Eurosystem and European institutions.
At the same time, public authorities must balance the benefits and risks of innovation in payments and be prepared to take a leading role in ensuring that payments remain efficient, safe and inclusive in the digital age.
As the economy continues to evolve and new expectations about the nature of money emerge, the Eurosystem must be ready to respond and ensure that European payments adapt to changing consumer preferences and remain inclusive and efficient.
Despite all the changes I have mentioned, the foundations of money remain intact. People accept money only if it is highly trusted, maintains its value and respects privacy – an aspect that is becoming increasingly important in the digital age. These foundations have been and will continue to be found in central bank money, irrespective of the form it takes in the future.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | The future of money – innovating while retaining trust first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

There is a great deal of anticipation on the markets and in general looking ahead to the ECB’s December meeting. What can we expect from it?
We should expect what the President stated very clearly at the last press conference: that the ECB’s Governing Council will reassess the macroeconomic outlook and recalibrate its measures accordingly. The outlook for inflation has clearly deteriorated rather than improved over the past few months owing to the resurgence of the pandemic and the containment measures taken in response. It’s also clear that our stimulus so far has not been sufficient to make progress towards our aim in a sustained way. In spring we reacted quickly and we should do so again. The consensus within the Governing Council is that our instruments need to be recalibrated in December.
When you talk about recalibration, what do you mean exactly? Are you referring to an increase in the rate of monthly asset purchases or the use of new instruments?
This is a collegial decision taken by the Governing Council. But it’s useful to think about our policy in two ways. The euro area has suffered a huge economic shock, with considerable downside risks that have threatened to set self-reinforcing recessionary and deflationary dynamics in motion. Our forceful policy response since March has first of all been designed to stem these downward spirals and allow financial markets and ultimately the economy to withstand the shock, thereby supporting price stability. This will remain the case for as long as necessary. The second element involves calibrating our stance to reflect our commitment to bring inflation back to our aim. We must do this without undue delay, in order to eliminate any possible question marks over our determination to preserve price stability – our primary mandate – and to avoid a disanchoring of inflation expectations: with the second wave, some of the downside risks have materialised and the starting point for the inflation outlook is now lower than a few months ago. In this endeavour we are data-driven: at our last meeting, we decided that it would not be wise to take a decision before understanding the extent of the new containment measures, their impact on the economy and the fiscal measures that governments would take in response.
Does the ECB still have the firepower to deal with this second wave of coronavirus?
Dealing with the second wave is all about the right policy mix. Research shows that when private sector demand is constrained by uncertainty and health restrictions – as is the case today – fiscal policy is key. Favourable financing conditions create the best environment for an effective fiscal policy, which in turn creates the conditions for the private sector to also take full advantage of the favourable financing conditions we ensure through our measures. In other words, fiscal policy in this phase has become an important channel for transmitting our monetary policy impulses and supporting our stabilisation goals. Seen from this perspective, there’s a lot more we can do through a combination of our asset purchase programmes and our measures to support the financing of the real economy through banks and the bond market. And there should be no doubt as to our commitment to bring inflation back to our aim and therefore the continuity of our policies even when the recovery gets underway. We want to see inflation converge towards our aim in a sustained manner and we cannot hesitate in taking decisive measures if we wish to avoid the risk of a downward adjustment in inflation expectations. We have firepower, we have instruments that we can recalibrate, and we’re going to do so.
Are you concerned we might fall back into recession?
I am concerned. There has been some good news, such as the announcement of the possible approval of vaccines by health authorities. In this respect, there is light at the end of the tunnel. But even under the most optimistic scenario, the production, distribution and administration of these vaccines will take time. It may take even longer to reduce the risk and the perception of risk among the population: savings intentions are at a record high, households and businesses are more indebted than one year ago and coronavirus-induced uncertainty has the potential to leave scars even after the economy recovers. In other words, 2021 will still be a “pandemic year”, and we will still have to tread very carefully. We cannot be complacent. We cannot take the risk of adverse interim scenarios and of letting the consequences of the pandemic last longer without introducing additional policy stimulus, otherwise our production capacity will be hollowed out in the process. The recovery would then take even longer and inflation could continue to hover at very low levels.
The markets were ecstatic following the vaccine announcements. Do you feel there has been too much optimism on show?
Financial markets are forward-looking by their very nature. Based on the new information available and their interpretation of it, they take a view on the future trajectory of the economy, corporate earnings and dividends – which by the way reflect assumptions about policy support. But in our role as central bankers, we must be prudent. We need to base our decisions on the various scenarios that could materialise in the absence of our intervention. And we cannot take it for granted that things will go as well as expected by financial markets. We cannot afford to be too optimistic. The risk of adverse scenarios – and the damage they could cause – is simply too great. And even in the optimistic scenario, inflationary pressures are likely to remain subdued and to recover very slowly.
Do you think that governments and the European Commission, as well as the ECB, should also be prepared to do more if the crisis persists or is more serious than expected?
Governments are aware of the need to intervene and all the conditions are in place for governments to act. Financing conditions are favourable, we have been clear that we would ensure that they remain favourable, and our forward guidance makes our commitment explicit. Moreover, European authorities have already reacted strongly: the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme will support the recovery and other instruments have already been deployed, such as the European Commission’s instrument to help Member States protect people’s jobs during the pandemic. I have no reason to doubt that additional efforts will be made if necessary. Governments have confirmed this, including those previously reluctant to take part in common responses. We have seen a forceful, timely, European policy reaction to support European people and businesses in response to a common shock. And it is working well.
In some countries, such as Portugal, the fiscal stimulus is relatively limited because of high public debt levels. Do you agree with this more cautious approach or do you think that governments should be more expansionary?
Fiscal policy throughout the euro area has been expansionary, although more so in some countries than in others. Substantial discretionary stimulus measures have been taken across the board. We should not look at these measures on a country-by-country basis as the spillovers from a forceful synchronised and common fiscal response are large. Moreover, the efficacy of fiscal policy – the so-called fiscal multiplier – increases when interest rates are close to their lower bound. And like in the United States, we have seen a decisive, area-wide response in terms of both fiscal policy and monetary policy.
Isn’t there a risk that some countries, such as Portugal, Spain or Italy, will get left behind in the recovery since they have less fiscal space to respond?
We cannot rule out that possibility altogether. But compared to the previous crisis, we have a very different set of solutions in place. Even countries with high debt to GDP ratios, whose response was weaker in the past, can now take advantage of the resources made available at the European level. What is now crucial is that countries use those resources to finance investment and boost their growth potential.
What should Portugal’s priorities be?
Every country has its own challenges. But a number of cross-cutting themes also apply to Portugal. The priority should be investment to facilitate the reallocation of production and jobs to the sectors with the highest growth potential: investing in activities that improve the quality of the environment and the country’s technological and digital infrastructure, activities that create a knowledge-based economy building on human capital and education. These are also the priorities identified by the Next Generation EU programme.
In any event, the debt levels of many countries will hit new highs. David Sassoli, President of the European Parliament, recently spoke about the idea of making the recovery fund permanent, of having European debt and even of debt forgiveness. What do you think of these ideas?
The move towards deeper European integration is highly desirable. It’s a natural development of monetary union. We should bear in mind that, following the approval of the NGEU this summer, euro area countries have taken a big step towards closer fiscal integration. They have also created the legitimate expectation of a common fiscal response when dealing with a common shock in the future. I don’t know how long it will take to make even greater progress. It is my hope that, when we look back in 20 years’ time, we will look upon 2020 as a turning point on the road towards European integration.
Is it possible or even desirable for there to be some form of debt forgiveness via the ECB and its public debt portfolio?
Doing so would contravene the Treaties. And we must remember that all debt is credit. If we cancel a debt, we cancel the corresponding credit and this could have broader, destabilising consequences. Only growth can protect us from debt.
Will the ECB continue to avoid country yields skyrocketing and there being any sign of debt market fragmentation?
Taking steps to avoid financial fragmentation is essential in order to implement monetary policy. We therefore introduced a new programme – the pandemic emergency purchase programme – which was more flexible than previous ones, precisely to combat any fragmentation of financial markets along national lines. But this programme also has a second role, which is to support our core price stability mandate. The economy is currently subject to lockdown measures and inflation is moving away from our objective of 2%, so we need to take action to stimulate demand and strengthen the inflation path.
What can we expect from the ECB’s strategy review?
We will review each and every aspect of the strategy. But there is not much use in speculating about the outcome while the process is still ongoing. We are involved in very complex discussions. It is a question of striking an overall balance – a typical case of nothing being agreed until everything is agreed. And we will present our final conclusions in late 2021.
But how far can the review go? Might we potentially see a new inflation objective in excess of 2%?
We will look at all elements. No specific factors will be excluded: the numerical issue of defining price stability, the instruments concerned, the interaction between monetary policy and financial supervision, the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability, the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy. We will be looking at everything.
Can we expect to see banks in difficulties, as was the case during the financial crisis? Particularly in countries whose financial sectors have been more vulnerable, such as Portugal, Spain or Italy.
I’d like to challenge that assumption. There are no countries that are inherently “more vulnerable”. Past experience shows that in all countries, if there is a prolonged period of recession, bank balance sheets will run into trouble as companies and households struggle to repay their loans. The outcome is different depending on how quickly countries react and what their fiscal capacity to react is. Portugal and Italy are not fiscally constrained today in the way they were a decade ago. But clearly all authorities need to work to bring our economy out of recession as soon as possible, otherwise banks will be affected. Nothing is inevitable. Our response to this crisis is entirely different from ten years ago.
Have supervisors responded differently?
When the financial crisis hit in 2008, the reaction of many supervisors was largely procyclical. This time it has been quite different. The ECB has encouraged banks to use their capital and liquidity buffers for lending purposes and loss absorption. It has introduced supervisory flexibility for the treatment of non-performing loans (NPLs). And we are discussing further potential responses at European level. Sooner or later, I would expect banks to be affected by the crisis. Whether or not it will result in a banking crisis will depend on the policies that we adopt. We are aware of the risks and are not in denial. We will continue to monitor the situation and be ready to act if things deteriorate.
Would the creation of a European “bad bank” to deal with NPLs be a good idea?
If we take the view that tensions in a country are caused by weaknesses or poor policy decisions within that country, there might be less willingness to take action at European level, using European resources. But we now have supervision of significant institutions at European level. This has, together with a greater focus on NPLs, made banks more robust. And this time, we have seen a common shock that is also affecting banks which are better off and supervised at European level. This strengthens the case for intervening with European tools in the event of tensions in the financial sector.
Should banks continue to not distribute dividends next year?
As long as it remains unclear how the situation will develop, banks should be prudent. If they do not pay out dividends this year, they can distribute more next year and are in the meantime better positioned to face a severe crisis situation. If I had the choice between the two approaches, I would rather be more prudent, but this might mean a cost to the banks. I believe that a reasonable solution, as economic conditions improve, would be a case-by-case approach by banking supervisors.
Are mergers and acquisitions within European banking an appropriate way of making the financial sector more robust?
Some mergers and acquisitions are successful and others are not. Empirical evidence suggests that those that are successful involve a stronger buyer acquiring a weaker “target”. I have not looked at every transaction in detail but my feeling is that most cases tie in with this pattern. They can also help reduce excess capacity in the European banking market, which in some cases results in inefficiencies, excessively low profitability and ultimately financial fragility. But we are still mainly seeing consolidation within domestic markets, rather than across countries. Consolidation across countries would be more beneficial for the banks themselves and for the European financial market as a whole, as it would allow for diversification of risk and reduce the impact of adverse developments in individual Member States.
On Joe Biden, US President-elect
We are facing global challenges that require a global response. It is essential that the world’s major economies and the international community work closely together, in particular through multilateral institutions. This would be an important step forward and would reduce uncertainty, including for trade and the global economy.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | Recalibrating to face the pandemic first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Consumers to be better protected against domestic and cross-border “mass harm”
Safeguards against abusive lawsuits by using “loser pays principle”
Designated consumer organisations to launch actions on behalf of consumers

Parliament today endorsed a new law that will allow groups of consumers to join forces and launch collective action in the EU.
The new rules introduce a harmonised model for representative action in all member states that guarantees consumers are well protected against mass harm, while ensuring appropriate safeguards to avoid abusive lawsuits.
All member states must put in place at least one effective procedural mechanism that allows qualified entities (e.g. consumer organisations or public bodies) to bring lawsuits to court for the purpose of injunction (ceasing or prohibiting) or redress (compensation). This legislation aims to improve the functioning of the internal market by stopping illegal practices and facilitating access to justice for consumers.
More rights for consumers and safeguards for traders
The European class action model will allow only qualified entities, such as consumer organisations, to represent groups of consumers and bring lawsuits to court, instead of law firms.
In order to bring cross-border actions to court, qualified entities will have to comply with the same criteria across the EU. They will have to prove that they have a certain degree of stability and be able to demonstrate their public activity, and that they are a non-profit organisation. For domestic actions, entities will have to fulfil the criteria set out in national laws.
The rules also introduce strong safeguards against abusive lawsuits by using the “loser pays principle”, which ensures that the defeated party pays the costs of the proceedings of the successful party.
To further prevent representative actions from being misused, punitive damages should be avoided. Qualified entities should also establish procedures to avoid conflict of interest and external influence, namely if they are funded by a third party.
Collective actions can be brought against traders if they have allegedly violated EU law in a broad range of areas such as data protection, travel and tourism, financial services, energy and telecommunication.
Finally, the directive also covers infringements that have stopped before the representative action is brought or concluded, since the practice might still need to be banned to prevent it from recurring.
Quote
The rapporteur Geoffroy Didier (EPP, FR) said: “With this new directive, we found a balance between more consumer protection and giving businesses the legal certainty that they need. At a time when Europe is being severely tested, the EU has demonstrated that it can deliver and adapt to new realities, better protect its citizens and offer them new concrete rights in response to globalisation and its excesses”.
Next steps
The directive will enter into force 20 days following its publication in the Official Journal of the EU. Member states will then have 24 months to transpose the directive into their national laws, and an additional six months to apply it. The new rules will apply to representative actions brought on or after its date of application.
Background
The Representative Action Directive, presented in April 2018 by the European Commission, was agreed by EP negotiators and EU ministers in June 2020. The bill, which is part of the New Deal for Consumers, comes as a response to a recent series of scandals related to breaches of consumers’ rights by multinational companies. In some member states, consumers can already launch collective action in courts, but now this option will be available in all EU countries.
Contact:

Yasmina Yakimova, Press Officer | yasmina.yakimova[at]europarl.europa.eu

Compliments of the European Parliament.
The post EU consumers will soon be able to defend their rights collectively first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Various fallback rates proposed, based upon the euro short-term rate (€STR)
Potential events described that could trigger fallbacks
Stakeholders asked to provide their views by 15 January 2021

The working group on euro risk-free rates has today released two public consultations on the topic of fallback rates to EURIBOR. Fallback rates are rates that can be relied upon in case of an unavailability of the main rate. In one consultation, stakeholders are invited to provide their views on fallback rates based on the euro short-term rate (€STR) and spread adjustment methodologies in order to produce the most suitable EURIBOR fallback measures per asset class. In the other consultation, stakeholders are invited to give their views on potential events that could trigger such fallback measures.
As regards €STR-based fallback rates, the working group considered two types of rates:
1) Forward-looking rates which are based on the derivatives markets referencing the €STR and which reflect market expectations of the evolution of the €STR. These rates are known at the start of the interest rate period.
2) Backward-looking rates which are based on simple mathematical calculations of the value of past realised daily fixings of the €STR over a given period of time. These rates are known and available at the end of the interest rate period.
Based on its analysis and international standards and practices the working group acknowledges that for more sophisticated and globally operating market participants the most appropriate EURIBOR fallback measure would be based on backward-looking rates. However, the working group also acknowledges that there may be some use cases for certain products or for less sophisticated and locally operating market participants where it is necessary to know the interest rate in advance, and therefore the forward-looking rates could be applied. As these rates do not exist at this stage and should such rates not be available in due time, the working group proposes a waterfall structure according to product types, thereby allowing users to know what rates can be used, depending on circumstances and/or preferences.
As regards potential trigger events, the working group has identified a generic set of potential EURIBOR fallback trigger events that market participants could consider including in fallback provisions in their contracts and financial instruments referencing EURIBOR.
For both consultations, stakeholders are invited to provide their views by 15 January 2021. The working group members would like to encourage responses from as many user groups as possible, among others from banks, non-bank financial corporates, non-financial corporates, industry organisations, consumer associations. A summary of the feedback received will be published. A final recommendation by the working group on euro risk-free rates on both topics, taking into account the views expressed by stakeholders in this public consultation, is expected to be published in the course of the first quarter of 2021.
Contact:

William Lelieveldt, Principal Press Officer at the ECB | william.lelieveldt[at]ecb.europa.eu

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post Working group on euro risk-free rates launches two public consultations on fallbacks to EURIBOR first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Main results
At a virtual summit hosted by Saudi Arabia, the G20 leaders expressed their strong commitment to coordinated global action, solidarity, and multilateral cooperation. They committed to working together to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, restore growth and jobs, and build a more inclusive, sustainable and resilient future.
Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, represented the EU at the two-day event.
At the end of the summit, the G20 leaders adopted a declaration:

G20 Riyadh Declaration

President Michel and President von der Leyen issued a joint press release following the summit.

G20 Summit: G20 leaders united to address major global pandemic and economic challenges (press release)

COVID-19
The EU leaders stressed the need for strong multilateral cooperation in the fight against the pandemic. They called on the G20 to provide, before the end of the year, $4.5 billion for mass procurement and delivery of COVID-19 tools. This amount is urgently needed for the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) and its COVAX facility.
The G20 leaders committed to sparing no effort to make sure that all people have affordable and equitable access to safe and effective COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.
They also committed to advancing global pandemic preparedness, prevention, detection and response. In this context, President Michel proposed an initiative to ensure a better global response to future pandemics.

An international treaty on pandemics could help us respond more quickly and in a more coordinated manner when pandemics occur. It should be negotiated with all UN organisations and agencies, in particular the WHO. The WHO must remain the cornerstone of global coordination against health emergencies.
Charles Michel, President of the European Council

Debt relief
The G20 leaders were determined to support the most vulnerable and fragile countries, notably in Africa, in their fight against the pandemic.
To this end, they committed to allowing countries eligible under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to suspend official bilateral debt service payments until June 2021.
The EU leaders stressed that additional steps might be needed, and the summit endorsed the “Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI”, which is also endorsed by the Paris Club.

The G20 debt moratorium is a good step in the right direction, and it might have to be extended beyond mid-2021.
Charles Michel, President of the European Council

Climate change and the green transition
The EU leaders urged all G20 members to work towards the full and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement.
They stressed that the EU is leading the way to climate neutrality by 2050 and welcomed the fact that many G20 partners had taken the same commitments.
They also promoted a recovery based on green, inclusive, sustainable, resilient and digital growth in line with the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals.
Global trade and taxation of the digital economy
The G20 leaders reaffirmed their support to the WTO reform process in the lead-up to the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference. They recognised the contribution that the Riyadh Initiative on the Future of the WTO has made.
The leaders also agreed to strive to find a consensus-based solution for a globally fair, sustainable, and modern international tax system by mid-2021, built on the ongoing work of the OECD.
On the digital economy, the G20 leaders expressed their support for fostering an open, fair and non-discriminatory environment and for protecting and empowering consumers while addressing the challenges related to privacy, data protection, intellectual property rights and security.

Let us use this window of opportunity to shape together the 21st century global economy in ways that are clean, green, healthy, safe and more resilient. We owe it to the future generations.
Charles Michel, President of the European Council

G20 leaders’ summit (official website)
Remarks by President Charles Michel before the G20 summit 2020
The EU at the G20 summit (European Commission factsheet)

Background
The summit follows an earlier, extraordinary G20 leaders’ video conference that was held on 26 March to coordinate action to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.
At their meeting on 26 March, leaders expressed their determination to spare no effort, both individually and collectively, to:

protect lives
safeguard people’s jobs and incomes
restore confidence, preserve financial stability, revive growth and recover stronger
minimise disruptions to trade and global supply chains
provide help to all countries in need of assistance
coordinate on public health and financial measures

G20 leaders’ statement on COVID-19, 26 March 2020

During the meeting, President Michel and President von der Leyen underlined the European Union’s commitment to international cooperation in tackling this pandemic, and stressed that the EU will continue to assist vulnerable countries and communities around the world, especially in Africa.

Statement by President Michel and President von der Leyen after the extraordinary G20 video conference on COVID-19

About the Saudi Arabian G20 presidency
Under the overall theme of “Realising Opportunities of the 21st Century for All”, the Saudi Arabian G20 presidency focuses on three areas:

empowering people: creating conditions in which all people, especially women and youth, can live, work, and thrive
safeguarding the planet: fostering collective efforts to protect our commons
shaping new frontiers: adopting long-term and bold strategies to utilise and share benefits of innovation

About the G20
The G20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Spain is a permanent guest.
The last physical G20 summit took place in Osaka, Japan, in 2019.

G20 summit in Osaka, Japan, 28-29 June 2019

Compliments of the European Council.
The post G20 summit, 21-22 November 2020 first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

On Monday, November 23, 2020, EU Leaders spoke to President-elect Joe Biden over the phone.
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, congratulated President-elect Joe Biden on his victory.
President von der Leyen said that his election as the next President of the United States would be a new beginning for the EU-US global partnership, and commented that a strong European Union and a strong United States working together can shape the global agenda based on cooperation, multilateralism, solidarity, and shared values.
Charles Michel, President of the European Council, invited President-elect Joe Biden to a special meeting in Brussels in 2021 of the EU-27 heads of state or government.
President Michel stressed the need to rebuild a strong EU-U.S. alliance and to join forces on COVID-19, climate, security, and multilateralism.
You can find the readout of President Michel’s call with President-elect Joe Biden here.
Compliments of the Delegation of the European Union to the United States.
The post EU Leaders Talk to President-elect Joe Biden first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

November 17, 2020 |
The OECD Forum on Tax Administration (FTA) has today published a report on Advancing Gender Balance in the Workforce: A Collective Responsibility. This report, developed by the FTA’s Gender Balance Network, sets out a range of policies and practices undertaken by tax administrations and their national governments to advance gender balance in the workforce. 
This report highlights innovative approaches, legislative options, flexible workplace initiatives and leadership practices adopted by FTA members in order to assist administrations in their domestic considerations of where and how to improve gender balance and inclusion.
“Achieving gender equality requires strategic, top-down and visible leadership if we are to be successful in creating gender balance within our Administrations,” said Naomi Ferguson, Commissioner of Inland Revenue New Zealand. “The initiatives this report brings together underscore the importance of addressing historical and systemic inequalities primarily faced by women.  We also recognise that inequality can impact men and our aim is to learn from each other to create a workforce culture and environment that respects and embraces diversity and inclusion”.
“Economies are more resilient, productive and inclusive when gender inequalities are removed and we actively support women’s equal participation”, commented Grace Perez-Navarro, the Deputy Director of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration. “The FTA’s Gender Balance Network has a valuable role to play in helping to drive gender equality within tax administrations, including through the sharing of knowledge on domestic initiatives and practices.”
For more information on the OECD Gender Balance Network, including a recent interview between Commissioner Naomi Ferguson and Grace Perez-Navarro, visit: www.oecd.org/tax/forum-on-tax-administration/about/gender-balance-network
Contact:

Grace Perez-Navarro, Deputy Director of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration | Grace.Perez-Navarro@oecd.org

Achim Pross, Head of the International Co-operation and Tax Administration Division | Achim.Pross@oecd.org

Compliments of the OECD.
The post OECD publishes report on tax administrations’ policies and practices to enhance gender balance first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

To help meet the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050, the European Commission today presents the EU Strategy on Offshore Renewable Energy. The Strategy proposes to increase Europe’s offshore wind capacity from its current level of 12 GW to at least 60 GW by 2030 and to 300 GW by 2050. The Commission aims to complement this with 40 GW of ocean energy and other emerging technologies such as floating wind and solar by 2050.
This ambitious growth will be based on the vast potential across all of Europe’s sea basins and on the global leadership position of EU companies in the sector. It will create new opportunities for industry, generate green jobs across the continent, and strengthen the EU’s global leadership in offshore energy technologies. It will also ensure the protection of our environment, biodiversity and fisheries.
Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal, Frans Timmermans said: “Today’s strategy shows the urgency and opportunity of ramping up our investment in offshore renewables. With our vast sea basins and industrial leadership, the European Union has all that it needs to rise up to the challenge. Already, offshore renewable energy is a true European success story. We aim to turn it into an even greater opportunity for clean energy, high quality jobs, sustainable growth, and international competitiveness.”
Commissioner for Energy, Kadri Simson, said: “Europe is a world leader in offshore renewable energy and can become a powerhouse for its global development. We must step up our game by harnessing all the potential of offshore wind and by advancing other technologies such as wave, tidal and floating solar. This Strategy sets a clear direction and establishes a stable framework, which are crucial for public authorities, investors and developers in this sector. We need to boost the EU’s domestic production to achieve our climate targets, feed the growing electricity demand and support the economy in its post-Covid recovery.” 
Commissioner for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries, Virginijus Sinkevičius, said: “Today’s strategy outlines how we can develop offshore renewable energy in combination with other human activities, such as fisheries, aquaculture or shipping, and in harmony with nature. The proposals will also allow us to protect biodiversity and to address possible socio-economic consequences for sectors relying on good health of marine ecosystems, thus promoting a sound coexistence within the maritime space.”
To promote the scale-up of offshore energy capacity, the Commission will encourage cross-border cooperation between Member States on long term planning and deployment. This will require integrating offshore renewable energy development objectives in the National Maritime Spatial Plans which coastal states are due to submit to the Commission by March 2021. The Commission will also propose a framework under the revised TEN-E Regulation for long-term offshore grid planning, involving regulators and the Member States in each sea basin.
The Commission estimates that investment of nearly €800 billion will be needed between now and 2050 to meet its proposed objectives. To help generate and unleash this investment, the Commission will:

Provide a clear and supportive legal framework. To this end, the Commission today also clarified the electricity market rules in an accompanying Staff Working Document and will assess whether more specific and targeted rules are needed. The Commission will ensure that the revisions of the State aid guidelines on energy and environmental protection and of the Renewable Energy Directive will facilitate cost-effective deployment of renewable offshore energy. 

Help mobilise all relevant funds to support the sector’s development. The Commission encourages Member States to use the Recovery and Resilience Facility and work together with the European Investment Bank and other financial institutions to support investments in offshore energy through InvestEU. Horizon Europe funds will be mobilised to support research and development, particularly in less mature technologies.

Ensure a strengthened supply chain. The Strategy underlines the need to improve manufacturing capacity and port infrastructure and to increase the appropriately skilled workforce to sustain higher installation rates. The Commission plans to establish a dedicated platform on offshore renewables within the Clean Energy Industrial Forum to bring together all actors and address supply chain development.

Offshore renewable energy is a rapidly growing global market, notably in Asia and the United States, and provides opportunities for EU industry around the world. Through its Green Deal diplomacy, trade policy and the EU’s energy dialogues with partner countries, the Commission will support global uptake of these technologies.
To analyse and monitor the environmental, social and economic impacts of offshore renewable energy on the marine environment and the economic activities that depend on it, the Commission will regularly consult a community of experts from public authorities, stakeholders and scientists. Today, the Commission has also adopted a new guidance document on wind energy development and EU nature legislation.
Background
Offshore wind produces clean electricity that competes with, and sometimes is cheaper than, existing fossil fuel-based technology. European industries are fast developing a range of other technologies to harness the power of our seas for producing green electricity. From floating offshore wind, to ocean energy technologies such as wave and tidal, floating photovoltaic installations and the use of algae to produce biofuels, European companies and laboratories are currently at the forefront.
The Offshore Renewable Energy Strategy sets the highest deployment ambition for offshore wind turbines (both fixed-bottom and floating), where commercial activity is well advanced. In these sectors, Europe has already gained unrivalled technological, scientific and industrial experience and strong capacity already exists across the supply chain, from manufacturing to installation.
While the Strategy underlines the opportunities across all of the EU’s sea basins – the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic – and for certain coastal and island communities, the benefits of these technologies are not limited to coastal regions. The Strategy highlights a broad range of inland areas where manufacturing and research is already supporting offshore energy development.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Boosting Offshore Renewable Energy for a Climate Neutral Europe first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The European Commission, the enforcer of EU competition rules, has generally made good use of its powers in antitrust proceedings and merger control, and addressed competition concerns with its decisions. But according to a new report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) published today, it has not yet fully addressed the complex new enforcement challenges in digital markets, the ever-increasing amount of data to be analysed or the limitations of existing enforcement tools. The auditors also found that the Commission has limited capacity to monitor markets, proactively detect antitrust infringements and check the accuracy of merger information.
EU competition rules are aimed at preventing companies from indulging in anticompetitive practices such as secret cartels, or abusing a dominant position. The Commission can impose fines on companies that infringe these rules. In the last 10 years, competition enforcement has had to come to terms with significant changes in market dynamics due to the emergence of digital markets, big data and price-fixing algorithms. The auditors examined whether the Commission had properly enforced the rules in merger control and antitrust proceedings. They assessed how effectively the Commission had been able to detect and investigate infringements, and how well it had cooperated with national competition authorities (NCAs).
“In the last decade, the Commission has been using its powers in merger control and antitrust proceedings effectively,” said Alex Brenninkmeijer, the ECA Member responsible for the report. “But it now needs to scale up market oversight to be fit for a more global and digital world. It needs to get better at proactively detecting infringements and select its investigations more judiciously. Together with stronger cooperation from NCAs, this will result in better competition enforcement in the EU internal market, protecting businesses and consumers.”
The auditors found that the level of resources at the Commission’s disposal for monitoring markets for potential problems and for own detection of antitrust cases, which it does in addition to reacting to external complaints – was relatively limited. Sector enquiries are resource-intensive: for example, the Commission’s 2015 inquiry into e-commerce required a 15-person full-time team working for two years. The auditors observed that the number of own-initiative cases had fallen since 2015. A similar reduction also affected the leniency programme for companies that volunteer insider information on anticompetitive practices in return for immunity or reduced fines. The Commission also has to decide which cases to prioritise in its investigations. It did so based on criteria which were not clearly weighted to ensure the selection of cases with the highest risk. In the field of merger control, the Commission faces further challenges: the amount of data to be verified is always increasing, as is the number of mergers to be analysed. The Commission has already simplified its procedures for some less risky mergers to some degree, but it needs to carry on that simplification work. The auditors also found that some significant transactions fell outside the Commission’s scrutiny because companies did not have to notify them to the Commission according to the turnover thresholds set out in EU legislation.
The Commission took all merger decisions within the legal deadlines, but its antitrust proceedings remain lengthy (up to eight years). This can reduce the effectiveness of its enforcement decisions. This is particularly true in rapidly evolving digital markets, where the Commission has to cope with complex investigations. Meanwhile, the legal tools at its disposal may no longer be fully adequate to deal with these new types of competition problems. The auditors also noted that the Commission had imposed recordbreaking fines on companies, but had never evaluated their deterrent effect.
The Commission generally cooperated well with NCAs, but it did not know very much about the NCAs’ own enforcement priorities. At the same time, the Commission and NCAs did not closely coordinate their market monitoring, and cases were only rarely reallocated from the NCAs to the Commission. An early warning mechanism is intended to optimise case allocation and to prevent many NCAs from needing to examine similar instances of behaviour by the same company, but the NCAs did not use it extensively. Finally, the Commission did not evaluate the effectiveness of its decisions on a regular basis, although this would have helped its future decision-making and resource allocation. The auditors make recommendations aimed at improving the Commission’s capacity to proactively detect infringements, render its competition enforcement more effective, help it coordinate better with NCAs through the European Competition Network, and report better on its own performance.
Background Information
The Commission can prohibit anticompetitive agreements between companies and abuses of dominant position (“antitrust proceedings”), and review significant concentrations of companies to determine their impact on competition in the EU’s internal market (“merger control”). Both the Commission and the NCAs can directly enforce EU competition rules in antitrust cases affecting trade between Member States.
Every year, the Commission examines over 300 merger notifications and around 200 antitrust cases. From 2010 to 2019, it imposed fines amounting to €28.5 billion for infringements. Due to limited resources, it has conducted only four own-initiative sector inquiries since 2005, which helped to detect infringements.
The auditors examined a risk-based sample of 50 antitrust cases and proposed mergers launched between 2010 and 2017, as well as a sample of notifications of antitrust investigations made by NCAs. They visited the NCAs of Bulgaria, France, the Netherlands and Poland.
ECA special report No 24/2020, “The Commission’s EU merger control and antitrust proceedings: a need to scale up market oversight”, is available in 23 EU languages at eca.europa.eu. The ECA recently published reports on state aid control and trade defence instruments.
Contact:

Damijan Fišer, Press Officer, ECA | damijan.fiser[at]eca.europa.eu

Compliments of the European Court of Auditors. 
The post European Commission needs to scale up antitrust and merger control to fit a more globalised world first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.